[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
Makuch v. Makuch, Slip Opinion No. 

.]




                                        NOTICE
     This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
     advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
     promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
     South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
     formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
     the opinion is published.




                         SLIP OPINION NO. 

              MAKUCH, APPELLEE, v. MAKUCH, APPELLANT, ET AL.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
   may be cited as Makuch v. Makuch, Slip Opinion No. 

.]
S.Ct.Prac.R. 403.(A)—Appeal not accepted for review—Memorandum in support
        of jurisdiction filed on behalf of appellant deemed frivolous—Imposition of
        sanctions unnecessary because appellant’s counsel has previously been
        declared to be vexatious litigators and appellee was not represented by
        counsel and did not file documents in this matter.
    (No. 2023-1212—Submitted February 6, 2024—Decided April 10, 2024.)
    APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Geauga County, No. 2023-G-0007,
                                    

.
                                 _________________
        Per Curiam.
        {¶ 1} We decline to accept jurisdiction in this discretionary appeal filed on
behalf of appellant, John Makuch III. The purpose of this opinion is not to explain
that decision but to explain why the appeal constitutes a frivolous filing.
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




                               I. BACKGROUND
       {¶ 2} The underlying case is a divorce proceeding brought by appellee,
Jolene K. Makuch, against John in the Geauga County Common Pleas Court. John
is represented by Joseph G. Stafford, Nicole A. Cruz, and Kelley R. Tauring
(collectively, the “Stafford counsel”), all of whom are attorneys with Stafford Law
Co., L.P.A.
       {¶ 3} According to John’s memorandum in support of jurisdiction, the
common pleas court held a trial in the case in April 2022. Jolene represented herself
in the case, telling the magistrate that she could not afford representation. John
represents that Jolene failed to establish critical facts during her case-in-chief to
justify a decision in her favor. In October 2022, after the close of trial, the
magistrate issued a decision determining that the common pleas court had
jurisdiction over the dispute and that venue was proper there but noting that Jolene
had failed to offer evidence regarding the division of marital property, an award of
spousal or child support, or an award of attorney fees. The magistrate thus ordered
the parties to appear at a hearing so that these and other matters could be considered
based on evidence.
       {¶ 4} In November 2022, John filed objections to the magistrate’s decision,
challenging, among other things, the magistrate’s ordering the hearing for the
parties to present additional evidence. In March 2023, Judge Carolyn J. Paschke
issued an entry overruling the objections and adopting the magistrate’s decision.
Relevant here, Judge Paschke’s entry provides: “The parties failed to present
sufficient evidence at trial regarding the nature, extent and value of the marital
property (and separate property) and debts and their income as required by R.C.
3105.171. It is therefore necessary for this Court to set a future hearing date at
which the parties will be required to present complete evidence regarding these
matters.” Less than a week later, John filed an appeal to the Eleventh District Court
of Appeals.




                                          2
                                    January Term, 2024




        {¶ 5} In August 2023, the court of appeals entered a judgment dismissing
John’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, determining that Judge Paschke’s March
2023 entry was not a final order under R.C. 2505.02(B). The court of appeals
explained, “Generally, in a divorce action, no final appealable order exists until all
issues relating to property division, support, and parental rights and responsibilities
have been addressed pursuant to Civ.R. 75(F).”
        {¶ 6} In September 2023, John filed in this court his notice of appeal from
the court of appeals’ judgment and a memorandum in support of jurisdiction. The
memorandum presents the following proposition of law: “A domestic relation
court’s Judgment Entry, sua sponte, reopening trial to provide a pro se litigant a
second chance at trial over the other party’s objection, is a final, appealable order
subject to immediate review and is an abuse of discretion.” Jolene did not file a
memorandum in opposition.1
        {¶ 7} In December 2023, we sua sponte ordered Joseph G. Stafford, counsel
of record for John, to “show cause within 14 days why he should not be sanctioned
under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(A) for instituting a frivolous appeal.” 

, 

, 

.                 Stafford filed two documents in
response. First, on January 3, 2024, Stafford filed a motion for clarification.
Second, on January 10, 2024, he filed a combined preliminary brief and motion for
leave to file a supplemental brief.
        {¶ 8} This case is not the first instance in which we have issued a show-
cause order to Stafford ordering him to explain why he should not be sanctioned
for instituting a frivolous filing. See H.R. v. P.J.E., __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-
4185, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 6. In H.R., we determined that the memorandum in support
of jurisdiction that the Stafford counsel filed on behalf of H.R. was frivolous,



1. In May 2023, Jolene filed a bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Ohio.




                                               3
                                  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




reasoning that the proposition of law advanced therein2 was “neither warranted by
existing law nor supported by a good-faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.” Id. at ¶ 10. As an appropriate resulting
sanction, we determined that P.J.E. should be permitted to recoup reasonable
attorney fees from the Stafford counsel. Id. at ¶ 15. We further declared the
Stafford counsel to be vexatious litigators. Id. at ¶ 19.
                                        II. ANALYSIS
                    A. Motion for clarification and motion for leave
         {¶ 9} Stafford has filed a motion for clarification and a motion for leave to
file a supplemental brief. The latter motion is necessary, Stafford argues, to enable
him to respond to the clarifying entry he asks this court to issue. We deny both
motions.
         {¶ 10} Starting with the motion for clarification, Stafford asserts that this
court should clarify why we directed the show-cause order to him and not someone
else. He argues that he “did not prepare, sign, or file the Notice of Appeal or
Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction.” Because he did not engage in these acts,
Stafford argues, he cannot be sanctioned. In support, he points to S.Ct.Prac.R.
4.03(A), which provides that this court “may impose appropriate sanctions on the
person who signed the appeal or action.” Stafford also claims that clarification is
necessary because the show-cause order does not specify why this court has
determined that the appeal is frivolous.
         {¶ 11} To begin, Stafford overlooks the fact that he is the presumptive
counsel of record in this case. Our rules provide: “When two or more attorneys
represent a party, only one attorney shall be designated as counsel of record to


2. The proposition of law presented for our review in H.R.’s memorandum in support of jurisdiction
was as follows: “A trial court’s arbitrary denial of a motion for continuance, when a party is
unavailable to attend and/or participate in trial due to known and substantial medical conditions is
a final, appealable order subject to immediate review and constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Id. at
¶ 4.




                                                 4
                                 January Term, 2024




receive notices and service on behalf of that party. * * * If no attorney is designated
counsel of record, the first attorney listed for the party on the cover page of the first
document filed shall be considered the counsel of record.” S.Ct.Prac.R. 2.03(A).
        {¶ 12} The first-filed documents in this matter were John’s notice of appeal
and memorandum in support of jurisdiction. The cover page of each document
identifies in typewritten text, moving from top to bottom, that John’s counsel
consists of Stafford, Cruz, and Tauring. Neither cover page designates a counsel
of record for John; thus, by rule, Stafford is considered counsel of record for John.
As counsel of record, Stafford is the designee to whom notices and service are sent
in this case. Consistent with S.Ct.Prac.R. 2.03(A), we directed notice of our show-
cause order to Stafford.
        {¶ 13} Stafford also mistakenly claims that he did not sign the notice of
appeal or memorandum in support of jurisdiction. Stafford appears to assume that
because Tauring’s handwritten signature appears on both documents on pages that
follow the cover pages, Tauring is the one who signed the documents. But our rules
do not distinguish between typewritten and handwritten signatures, and Stafford
cites no authority to support his view that we should attach importance to one type
of signature over another. Applying the ordinary meaning of to “sign,” we conclude
that Stafford signed the documents because his name is affixed to them as the
presumptive counsel of record. See Hitt v. Tressler, 

, 

 (1983), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1239 (5th Ed. 1979)
(observing that “the definition of to ‘sign’ is * * * ‘[t]o affix one’s name to a writing
or instrument, for the purpose of authenticating or executing it, or to give it effect
as one’s act’ ”); see also Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1159 (11th
Ed. 2020) (to “sign” means “to affix one’s name to <[as in] a ~ed review >”).
        {¶ 14} Last, Stafford’s professed ignorance about our reasoning for issuing
our show-cause order in this case is not credible. To be clear, our show-cause order
did not, as Stafford suggests, predetermine that he had instituted a frivolous appeal




                                           5
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




warranting sanctions. Rather, it afforded Stafford the opportunity to explain why
the appeal should not be construed as frivolous and why sanctions should not be
imposed on him. In any event, we are not persuaded by Stafford’s claim that he
was caught unaware by our order. Notably, Stafford’s request for clarification in
this case came after our decision in H.R., __ Ohio St.3d __, 

, __
N.E.3d __. The show-cause order issued in H.R. centered on a proposition of law
resembling the one involved here. A reasonable attorney in Stafford’s shoes would
plainly know that in light of our determination in H.R., a proposition of law
advanced by a member of the Stafford counsel in a future case resembling the
proposition of law they advanced in H.R. would invite heightened scrutiny from
this court.
        {¶ 15} In sum, we deny the motion for clarification. And because Stafford
predicates his motion for leave to file a supplemental brief on our granting of his
motion for clarification, we deny his motion to file a supplemental brief.
                                 B. Frivolous filing
        {¶ 16} S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(A) provides:


               If the Supreme Court, sua sponte or on motion by a party,
        determines that an appeal or other action is frivolous or is prosecuted
        for delay, harassment, or any other improper purpose, it may impose
        appropriate sanctions on the person who signed the appeal or action,
        a represented party, or both. The sanctions may include an award to
        the opposing party of reasonable expenses, reasonable attorney fees,
        costs or double costs, or any other sanction the Supreme Court
        considers just.   An appeal or other action shall be considered
        frivolous if it is not reasonably well-grounded in fact or warranted
        by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension,
        modification, or reversal of existing law.




                                          6
                                 January Term, 2024




The appeal brought by Stafford in his capacity as counsel of record for John in this
case is frivolous because it is neither warranted by existing law nor supported by a
good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
       {¶ 17} It is well settled that a divorce decree is a final, appealable order.
See Wilson v. Wilson, 

, 

, 

, ¶ 15
(observing that “in the context of a divorce proceeding, Civ.R. 75(F) prohibits a
trial court from entering a final judgment unless (1) the judgment divides the
parties’ property, determines the appropriateness of an order of spousal support,
and allocates parental rights and responsibilities, including the payment of child
support, or (2) the judgment states that there is no just reason for delay and that the
court lacks jurisdiction to determine any issues that remain”). Thus, when a divorce
decree “fails to resolve the issues set forth in Civ.R. 75(F), such as property division
or spousal/child support issues, [it] is not a final order.” Reeves v. Reeves, 2016-
Ohio-4590, 

, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.); see also Hillgrove v. Hillgrove, 1st
Dist. Hamilton No. C-220150, 

 (same); Martinez v.
Martinez, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-14-07, 2014-Ohio 4141, ¶ 8-9 (same); Garvin v.
Garvin, 4th Dist. Jackson No. 02CA23, 

 (same); Bringman
v. Bringman, 5th Dist. Knox No. 16CA01, 

 (same);
Kerkay v. Kerkay, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. DR-21-385205, 

 (same); Simon v. Simon, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25933, 

(same); Dach v. Homewood, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 12AP-920 and 12AP-930,

 (same); Miller v. Miller, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2003-P-
0065, 

 (same).
       {¶ 18} John’s memorandum in support of jurisdiction completely ignores
these principles. Instead, just as H.R.’s memorandum in support of jurisdiction did
in H.R., __ Ohio St.3d __, 

, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 12, John’s
memorandum directs us to the manner in which we construed R.C. 2505.02(B) in




                                           7
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




Thomasson v. Thomasson, 

, 

, 

.
Indeed, John’s analysis under Thomasson is quoted verbatim from the analysis
contained in H.R.’s jurisdictional memorandum from H.R.              We rejected that
argument in H.R., saying:


        [H.R.’s] memorandum invokes R.C. 2505.02(B), claiming that the
        trial court’s denial of H.R.’s motion for a continuance is a final order
        that may be immediately appealed. In Thomasson v. Thomasson,
        

, 

, 

,
        which the Stafford counsel cite, we construed that provision as
        authorizing an immediate appeal from a trial court’s order
        appointing a guardian ad litem to represent an adult. Central to this
        court’s analysis was our concern that the trial court’s order, which
        was not preceded by an adjudication of incompetency, prior notice,
        or an opportunity to be heard, had deprived the adult of her
        autonomy to direct the litigation, resulting in a denial of her due-
        process rights. Id. at ¶ 20-21. Nothing in this case comes remotely
        close to the question presented in Thomasson.


H.R. at ¶ 12. So too here.
        {¶ 19} The fact that Jolene proceeded pro se at trial does not, as John’s
memorandum in support of jurisdiction suggests, change the analysis. John’s
memorandum alleges that the common pleas court improperly advocated on
Jolene’s behalf by instructing her on what evidence to present at trial. It is true that
“ ‘pro se litigants are presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal procedures
and that they are held to the same standard as litigants who are represented by
counsel.’ ” State ex rel. Fuller v. Mengel, 

, 

,

, ¶ 10, quoting Sabouri v. Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 

                                January Term, 2024




App.3d 651, 654, 

 (10th Dist. 2001). But none of the cases cited
by John holds that an otherwise nonfinal order is subject to an immediate appeal
based only on how the issuing court treated a pro se litigant.
       {¶ 20} Here, as in H.R., “[w]e cannot countenance [Stafford’s] failure to
acknowledge the body of law directly adverse to the proposition of law advanced
in the jurisdictional memorandum,” H.R. at ¶ 13. Because the proposition of law
presented in John’s jurisdictional memorandum is neither warranted by existing law
nor supported by an argument calling for the modification or overruling of that law,
we conclude that the memorandum is frivolous. See S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(A).
       {¶ 21} The arguments set forth in Stafford’s response to our show-cause
order do not require a different result. Although he did not raise the argument in
John’s memorandum in support of jurisdiction, Stafford now contends that Judge
Paschke’s March 2023 entry setting a hearing date is a final, appealable order
because it granted a new trial. This argument is meritless.
       {¶ 22} R.C. 2505.02(B)(3) provides that “[a]n order is a final order that may
be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is
* * * [a]n order that * * * grants a new trial.” We have held under this language
that an order granting a new trial is “undoubtedly * * * a final appealable order.”
VIL Laser Sys., L.L.C. v. Shiloh Industries, Inc., 

, 2008-Ohio-
3920, 

, ¶ 11.
       {¶ 23} In contending that John could appeal the March 2023 entry, Stafford
relies on Colvin v. Abbey’s Restaurant, Inc., 

, 

(1999), which explained that an order granting a new trial is a final, appealable
order irrespective of whether the order was “precipitated by a motion from one of
the parties,” id. at 539. Because Judge Paschke sua sponte issued an entry setting
a hearing date, Stafford reasons that that entry was immediately appealable. As
additional support, Stafford cites Gray v. Youngstown Mun. Ry. Co., 

                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




511, 

 (1954), and Green v. Castronova, 

, 

 (7th Dist. 1966), which involved grants of new trials.
       {¶ 24} Stafford’s premise is wrong. Judge Paschke did not order a “new
trial” in the way that term is used in Colvin, Gray, and Green. In each of those
cases, the trial court granted a new trial after the jury returned a verdict that the
court found to be problematic. Given the stark factual differences between this case
and those cases, we flatly reject Stafford’s new-trial-order argument.
       {¶ 25} Last, Stafford argues that his due-process rights have been violated
because the show-cause order lacks an explanation. We have already rejected
Stafford’s claim that he did not understand what prompted us to issue our show-
cause order. Beyond this, he has not clearly articulated a right or interest that he
has been deprived of. See State ex rel. Emhoff v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Elections, 

, 

, 

 (“the first requirement for a
procedural due-process claim is an allegation that one has a right or interest that is
entitled to due-process protection”). Even if he had, that argument would fail
because he has received notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See State
ex rel. Mun. Constr. Equip. Operators’ Labor Council v. Cleveland, 

, 

, 

 (observing that the essence of due
process is notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard). First, he received
notice of the possibility that we might declare the appeal he instituted on John’s
behalf frivolous and impose sanctions. Second, our show-cause order gave him an
opportunity to be heard, of which he availed himself.
                               III. CONCLUSION
       {¶ 26} The appeal brought by Stafford in his capacity as counsel of record
for John is frivolous, and we deny Stafford’s motions for clarification and for leave
to file a supplemental brief. Although our show-cause order contemplated the
imposition of sanctions against Stafford, we decline to impose them here. First, it
would serve no purpose to declare Stafford to be a vexatious litigator in this case




                                         10
                               January Term, 2024




because we already made this declaration in H.R., __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-
4185, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 19. Second, unlike in H.R., it would serve no purpose to
allow Jolene an opportunity to recoup attorney fees from Stafford, because she does
not appear to have retained counsel and has not filed anything in this case.
                                                             Judgment accordingly.
       KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER,
and DETERS, JJ., concur.
                               _________________
       Stafford Law Co., L.P.A., Joseph G. Stafford, Nicole A. Cruz, and Kelley
R. Tauring, for appellant.
                               _________________




                                         11