[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Boyd v. Tone, Slip Opinion No. 

.]




                                           NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
      advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
      promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
      formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
      the opinion is published.




                          SLIP OPINION NO. 

      THE STATE EX REL . BOYD, APPELLANT, v. TONE, JUDGE, APPELLEE.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
may be cited as State ex rel. Boyd v. Tone, Slip Opinion No. 

.]
Prohibition—Inmate had adequate remedies in ordinary course of law to raise
        alleged defect in plea colloquy—Trial court did not patently and
        unambiguously lack subject-matter jurisdiction to convict him—Court of
        appeals’ dismissal of complaint affirmed.
      (No. 2023-1140—Submitted March 26, 2024—Decided May 7, 2024.)
                  APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Erie County,
                            No. E-23-0022, 

.
                                   __________________
        Per Curiam.
        {¶ 1} Appellant, Deonta Boyd, is an inmate at the Richland Correctional
Institution. He appeals the Sixth District Court of Appeals’ judgment sua sponte
dismissing his complaint for a writ of prohibition against appellee, Erie County
Common Pleas Court Judge Tygh M. Tone (“the trial court”). We affirm.
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




                                 BACKGROUND
       {¶ 2} In 2006, Boyd pleaded guilty in two consolidated cases to aggravated
murder with a firearm specification, felonious assault, and aggravated burglary.
The trial court accepted Boyd’s pleas and sentenced him to an aggregate sentence
of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 41 years. The trial court informed
Boyd of his right to appeal at the sentencing hearing and in its sentencing entries.
       {¶ 3} Boyd did not appeal his convictions or sentence. He has attempted
unsuccessfully to withdraw his guilty pleas multiple times. See, e.g., State v. Boyd,
6th Dist. Erie No. E-20-006, 

 (affirming denial of Crim.R. 32.1
motion to withdraw guilty plea), appeal not accepted, 

, 2021-
Ohio-961, 

; State v. Boyd, 6th Dist. Erie Nos. E-22-044 and E-22-
045, 

 (same), appeal not accepted, 

, 2023-
Ohio-3789, 

. And we affirmed the Sixth District’s sua sponte
dismissal of two prior extraordinary-writ actions, in which Boyd sought to vacate
his convictions and sentence. State ex rel. Boyd v. Tone, 

, 2023-
Ohio-3832, 

.
       {¶ 4} In March 2023, Boyd filed this complaint for a writ of prohibition in
the Sixth District, claiming that the trial court violated his rights under the Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and their
counterparts in the Ohio Constitution. Specifically, Boyd claims that the trial court
failed to inform him that he was waiving his constitutional right to compulsory
process at the 2006 plea hearing and thereby failed to strictly comply with Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(c). Boyd alleges that his guilty pleas were “not equally voluntary and
knowing” and that they were “obtained in violation of due process and [are]
therefore void.” Boyd seeks a writ of prohibition “as means to void” his guilty
pleas and the trial court’s sentencing entries.
       {¶ 5} The Sixth District sua sponte dismissed Boyd’s prohibition complaint.
The court held that Boyd could have challenged any defect in the plea colloquy on



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                                January Term, 2024




direct appeal and that any issue concerning the trial court’s alleged failure to advise
him of his right to compulsory process is therefore barred by res judicata. 2023-
Ohio-2802, ¶ 11, 14.
       {¶ 6} Boyd has appealed the dismissal of his complaint.
                               LEGAL ANALYSIS
       {¶ 7} A court of appeals may sua sponte dismiss a complaint “if the
complaint ‘is frivolous or the claimant obviously cannot prevail on the facts alleged
in the complaint.’ ” State ex rel. Kerr v. Pollex, 

, 2020-Ohio-
411, 

, quoting State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 

, 

, 

, ¶ 14. “Such a dismissal is appropriate only
if, after presuming the truth of all material factual allegations of the petition and
making all reasonable inferences in the claimant’s favor, it appears beyond doubt
that the claimant can prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested
extraordinary relief in prohibition.” 

 When reviewing a sua sponte dismissal of
a complaint without notice to the parties, we determine whether the appellant’s
claims are frivolous or obviously meritless. State ex rel. Mayer v. Henson, 

, 

, 

.
       {¶ 8} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Boyd must show that (1) the
trial court has exercised judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power was
unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for which no
other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel.
Nyamusevya v. Hawkins, 

, 

, 

. If the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction, Boyd need
not establish the lack of an adequate legal remedy. Schlegel v. Sweeney, 

, 

, 

.
       {¶ 9} Because a criminal defendant waives several constitutional rights by
entering a guilty plea, due process requires that the defendant’s decision to enter a
guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Brinkman, 

                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




St.3d 523, 

, 

; Parke v. Raley, 

, 

, 

 (1992). Prior to accepting a guilty plea from
a criminal defendant, a trial court must inform the defendant that he is waiving
certain constitutional rights, including the right to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. See State v. Ballard, 

, 

 (1981), paragraph one of the syllabus, citing Boykin v.
Alabama, 

, 

, 

 (1969); see Ohio
Constitution, Article I, Section 10 (“the party accused shall be allowed * * * to have
compulsory process to procure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf”). Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(c) requires the court in felony cases to inform the defendant personally
and determine whether the defendant understands that he is waiving his
constitutional rights by entering a guilty plea. See also State v. Dangler, 

, 

, 

.
       {¶ 10} Boyd claims in his complaint that he is entitled to a writ of
prohibition because the trial court failed to inform him during the plea colloquy that
by entering his guilty pleas, he was waiving his constitutional right to compulsory
process. But Boyd had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of the law to raise
this claim, including a direct appeal, a petition for postconviction relief, and a
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. See State ex rel. Davic v. Franklin Cty. Court
of Common Pleas, 

, 

, 

,
citing State ex rel. Parker v. Russo, 

, 

, 

, ¶ 21; Bell v. McConahay, 

, 

, 

.
       {¶ 11} Boyd contends that he need not show the lack of an adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of the law, because the trial court patently and
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to convict him. In support of this contention,
Boyd relies on Johnson v. Zerbst, 

, 

, 

                                          4
                                January Term, 2024




(1938), in which the United States Supreme Court held that “[a] court’s jurisdiction
at the hearing of trial may be lost ‘in the course of the proceedings’ due to failure
to complete the court—as the Sixth Amendment requires—by providing counsel
for an accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who has not intelligently waived
this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake,” 

. Boyd
argues, by comparison, that the trial court “lost” jurisdiction when it accepted his
guilty pleas without informing him that he was waiving his constitutional right to
compulsory process. Even assuming that a waiver of the right to compulsory
process stands on equal footing with a waiver of the right to counsel, Boyd’s
argument is mistaken because “the United States Supreme Court no longer treats a
violation of the right to counsel * * * as an error divesting the trial court of
jurisdiction,” State ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking Cty. Common Pleas Court, 

, 

, 

; see id. at ¶ 20, citing Waley v.
Johnston, 

, 

, 

 (1942).
       {¶ 12} The trial court unquestionably had subject-matter jurisdiction over
Boyd’s criminal cases. See R.C. 2931.03 (vesting courts of common pleas with
jurisdiction over all felony cases). Accordingly, Boyd’s claim alleges an error only
in the trial court’s exercise of its jurisdiction.    “An error in the exercise of
jurisdiction ‘renders the court’s judgment voidable, not void.’ And extraordinary
relief is not available to attack a voidable judgment.” (Emphasis sic.) 

, quoting State v. Harper, 

, 

, 

; see Boyd, 

, 

, 

 (violation of a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights may be reversible
error on appeal, but it does not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction),
citing 

.
       {¶ 13} Because Boyd had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of the
law to challenge the alleged defect in the 2006 plea colloquy and because the trial
court did not patently and unambiguously lack subject-matter jurisdiction to convict




                                          5
                            SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




him, Boyd is not entitled to a writ of prohibition. The Sixth District correctly
dismissed the prohibition action.
                                    CONCLUSION
       {¶ 14} We affirm the Sixth District Court of Appeals’ judgment sua sponte
dismissing Boyd’s complaint for a writ of prohibition.
                                                             Judgment affirmed.
       KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER,
and DETERS, JJ., concur.
                              _________________
       Deonta Boyd, pro se.
       Kevin J. Baxter, Erie County Prosecuting Attorney, and Gerhard R. Gross,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
                              _________________




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