[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
Disciplinary Counsel v. Kegley, Slip Opinion No. 

.]




                                        NOTICE
     This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
     advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
     promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
     South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
     formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
     the opinion is published.




                         SLIP OPINION NO. 

                        DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. KEGLEY.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
        may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Kegley, Slip Opinion No.
                                    

.]
Judges—Misconduct—Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct—Conditionally
        stayed six-month suspension.
    (No. 2024-1721—Submitted January 7, 2025—Decided March 20, 2025.)
   ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme
                                 Court, No. 2024-014.
                                 __________________
        The per curiam opinion below was joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER,
DEWINE, DETERS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ. BRUNNER, J., did not participate.
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       Per Curiam.
       {¶ 1} Respondent, Russell Dee Kegley, of Portsmouth, Ohio, Attorney

 was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1982. He
has been a judge of the Portsmouth Municipal Court since January 2003.
       {¶ 2} In a June 2024 complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, alleged that
Kegley committed four ethical violations by acting to secure his son’s release from
law-enforcement custody before his son’s initial court appearance on charges of
domestic violence and resisting arrest. The parties entered into stipulations of fact,
misconduct, and aggravating and mitigating factors and submitted 26 stipulated
exhibits. They also recommended that Kegley be publicly reprimanded for his
misconduct.
       {¶ 3} Kegley was the sole witness to testify at a hearing before a three-
member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct. After the hearing, the panel
issued a report finding that Kegley committed the charged misconduct and
recommending that he be sanctioned with a public reprimand. With the exception
of one mitigating factor, the board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and recommended sanction. The parties jointly waived any objections to
the board’s report and recommendation.
       {¶ 4} After     independently     reviewing    the    board’s    report    and
recommendation, the record, and our applicable precedent, we conclude that
Kegley’s misconduct warrants a sanction more severe than the public reprimand
recommended by the board. For the reasons that follow, we suspend Kegley from
the practice of law in Ohio for six months fully stayed on the condition that he
engage in no further misconduct.
                                 MISCONDUCT
       {¶ 5} At all times relevant to this proceeding, Kegley’s son, Case Kegley,
was married to E.K., who was employed as a secretary at the Scioto County
Prosecutor’s Office.




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                                 January Term, 2025




          {¶ 6} The stipulated evidence shows that on May 25, 2023, at
approximately 11:00 p.m., Case was arrested at the Portsmouth home he shared
with E.K. He was charged with domestic violence, a first-degree misdemeanor,
and resisting arrest, a second-degree misdemeanor. See State v. Kegley, Portsmouth
M.C. No. 23 CRB000650.
          {¶ 7} Case had allegedly struck E.K. several times, causing swelling to her
face, along with a bloody nose and lip. After assessing the situation, the law-
enforcement officers who responded to the scene were unable to control Case, who
appeared to be intoxicated. They stunned him with a taser three times before they
could restrain him for transport to the Scioto County Jail, where he was booked on
the above charges.
          {¶ 8} Case was scheduled to appear the next morning at 9:00 before Judge
Steven L. Mowery, the only other judge of the Portsmouth Municipal Court. Under
the bond schedule adopted by Judges Kegley and Mowery, the Scioto County
Sheriff was required to hold all defendants charged with domestic violence without
bond until their initial appearance before a judge or magistrate. Moreover, it was
standard procedure in domestic-violence cases for the arraigning judge or
magistrate in the Portsmouth Municipal Court to issue a temporary protection order
to preclude a defendant from returning to the home where the victim was residing.
          {¶ 9} After Case was booked into the jail, he called Kegley several times;
Kegley was asleep and did not answer the phone. However, at approximately 1:05
a.m., about two hours after Case’s arrest, Kegley called the jail, identifying himself
as “Judge Kegley” and asking to speak with Case. A corrections officer answered
the call and permitted Kegley to speak with his son. During that conversation, Case
told Kegley his version of the events leading to his arrest, claiming among other
things that E.K. had “started hittin’ on” him and that he had never obstructed the
police.




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                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       {¶ 10} When Kegley learned that Case had been charged with domestic
violence and resisting arrest, he said, “Let me talk to the officer.” Case handed the
phone to the corrections officer, who confirmed the charges. At that point, Kegley
stated, “Okay.   Let him sign his bond.       He’ll be there tomorrow morning.”
Uncomfortable with Kegley’s order and recognizing that it was contrary to the bond
schedule that the court had adopted, the officer stated, “Okay. Uh, you mind if I
try and get ahold of somebody real quick?” Kegley asked, “Who?” After the
officer indicated his supervisor, Kegley responded, “Yeah. Yeah.”
       {¶ 11} The corrections officer contacted his supervisor, Sergeant Keri
Kelley, at her home, and apprised her of the situation. Sergeant Kelley told the
officer to obey Kegley’s order even though it was contrary to the bond schedule.
She also instructed the officer not to release Case before he became sober unless
someone picked him up from the jail. The officer relayed that information to
Kegley, who responded, “Absolutely. Do that. I’m not coming to pick him up.”
A few hours later, Case was released on his own recognizance. No one notified
E.K. of Case’s release.
       {¶ 12} Following his release, Case returned to his home, where E.K. was
present. Upon learning of Case’s release, the office administrator for the Scioto
County Prosecutor’s Office requested that the Portsmouth Police Chief, Debra
Brewer, conduct a welfare check on E.K., who had not appeared for work that
morning. Chief Brewer immediately dispatched officers to the home and then went
to Judge Mowery’s courtroom, where she learned that Case had not appeared for
his 9:00 a.m. arraignment. At Chief Brewer’s request, Judge Mowery issued a
warrant for Case’s arrest.
       {¶ 13} A police officer responded to E.K. and Case’s home and found E.K.
sitting on the front porch. E.K. told the officer that she was fine, and when asked,
she informed the officer that Case was inside the house. Knowing that Case was
inside and had been released from jail on a domestic-violence charge earlier that




                                         4
                                January Term, 2025




day, the officer sought direction from his supervisor as two additional officers
arrived on the scene. E.K., who had gone into the house, returned and informed the
officers that Case was no longer inside. When asked how that was possible, E.K.
stated that he had left through a back door. But when the officer checked the house,
he discovered that there was no back door. After the officers informed E.K. that
she could be charged with obstruction of justice if Case was in the house, she
admitted that he was still there. Meanwhile, Chief Brewer advised all officers to
remain on the scene until she arrived with the warrant for Case’s arrest.
Recognizing the potential volatility of the situation, the police requested assistance
from a SWAT unit.
       {¶ 14} At some point, Case called Kegley from inside the home and told
him that the police were outside. After encouraging Case to surrender, Kegley
drove to the scene.
       {¶ 15} When Chief Brewer arrived, the police officers entered the home and
arrested Case without deploying the SWAT team, which had remained on the scene.
By the time Kegley arrived, Case had been arrested and placed in the back of a
police cruiser.
       {¶ 16} The police transported Case to the Scioto County Jail and charged
him with failure to appear, a first-degree misdemeanor. See State v. Kegley,
Portsmouth M.C. No. 23CRB00067. His arraignment was scheduled for four days
later, Tuesday, May 30. After leaving the scene, Kegley went to the jail to speak
with Case. When he was informed that a sheriff’s-office policy prohibited family
contact with an inmate during the booking process, Kegley stated that he
understood. After leaving the jail, Kegley spoke with Judge Mowery to discuss the
particulars of when Case would appear in court.
       {¶ 17} Shortly thereafter, Case called Kegley again to request his assistance
in securing Case’s release from jail. During that call, Kegley told Case, “I probably
overstepped my bounds letting you sign a bond last night.” Later in the call, Case




                                          5
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




again asked Kegley to get him out of jail; Kegley refused, stating, “Well, I can’t get
you out . . . I already overstepped my boundaries last night. I’m not supposed to
have anything to do with your cases.” (Ellipsis in original.) He also told Case,
“You . . . probably don’t have a bond because I talked to Judge Mowery and he said
you’re showing up Tuesday and you’re gonna get your bond Tuesday. My guess
is he told them to hold you because you didn’t show up.”
       {¶ 18} On Tuesday, May 30, Case appeared for arraignment before Judge
Mowery on the original domestic-violence case and the second case arising from
his failure to appear. Judge Mowery set a $1,000 recognizance bond and issued a
temporary protection order in favor of E.K. before recusing himself from Case’s
pending matters.
       {¶ 19} On September 28, 2023, Case pleaded guilty to amended charges of
disorderly conduct and attempted resisting arrest—misdemeanors of the fourth and
third degree, respectively—and the charge of failure to appear was dismissed. Case
was sentenced to 60 days in jail, suspended, and six months of probation.
       {¶ 20} The parties stipulated and the board found that Kegley’s interference
in his son’s case violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 (requiring a judge act at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and
impartiality of the judiciary), 1.3 (prohibiting a judge from abusing the prestige of
judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or others),
2.4(B) (prohibiting a judge from permitting family, social, political, financial, or
other interests or relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or
judgment), and 2.9(A) (generally prohibiting a judge from initiating, receiving,
permitting, or considering ex parte communications).
       {¶ 21} The board explained that Kegley’s contact with jail personnel
constituted an impermissible ex parte communication in violation of Jud.Cond.R.
2.9(A). But it declined to find that Kegley’s later conversation with Judge Mowery,
which did not touch on any of the substantive issues in the case, constituted an




                                          6
                                January Term, 2025




improper ex parte communication.          Instead, the board concluded that that
conversation fell within an exception to Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(A)’s general prohibition
against ex parte communications.              See Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(A)(1) (“When
circumstances require it, an ex parte communication for scheduling, administrative,
or emergency purposes, that does not address substantive matters or issues on the
merits, is permitted, provided the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain
a procedural, substantive, or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte
communication.”).
       {¶ 22} We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct.
                         RECOMMENDED SANCTION
       {¶ 23} When imposing sanctions for judicial misconduct, we consider all
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the judge violated, the aggravating
and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions imposed in
similar cases.
       {¶ 24} The parties stipulated that two aggravating factors are present in this
case. Specifically, they agreed that Kegley had committed multiple offenses and
caused harm to a vulnerable victim. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(4) and (8). The
panel and board accepted the parties’ stipulation that E.K. had been a vulnerable
victim and faced significant harm when Case, after being charged with domestic
violence against her, was released from jail and immediately returned to their home.
       {¶ 25} Although the board acknowledged that Kegley violated multiple
ethical rules, it concluded that those violations arose from a single act or incident
of misconduct in that his misconduct “stem[med] primarily from [his] telephone
conversation with the jail wherein he released his son on a personal bond.” The
board therefore rejected the parties’ stipulation that Kegley had committed multiple
offenses. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Gaul, 

 (making no
finding of multiple offenses and concluding that the respondent-judge’s




                                          7
                            SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




misconduct, which occurred on two consecutive days in a single criminal trial, was
“isolated”).
        {¶ 26} As for mitigating factors, the parties stipulated and the panel and
board found that Kegley had had a clean disciplinary record, made full and free
disclosure to the board and exhibited a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary
proceedings, and presented evidence of his good character and reputation. See
Gov.Bar R. V(13)(1), (4), and (5).
        {¶ 27} The panel expressly found that Kegley’s misconduct “was directed
at helping his son who had just been arrested for domestic violence and thus, was
unable to secure a bond.” However, the panel concluded that Kegley “did not
engage in any dishonest act nor did he proceed to help his son for personal gain or
with a selfish motive.” The panel therefore attributed mitigating effect to the
absence of a dishonest or selfish motive in this case. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(2).
The board rejected that finding without explanation.
        {¶ 28} In determining the appropriate sanction to recommend for Kegley’s
misconduct, the board considered nine cases in which we imposed sanctions
ranging from public reprimands to six-month suspensions for similar acts of
judicial misconduct.
        {¶ 29} The board concluded that three of those cases involved judicial
misconduct that was significantly more egregious than Kegley’s misconduct in this
case.    See Disciplinary Counsel v. Salerno, 

 (imposing a
conditionally stayed one-year suspension on a judge who reduced a criminal
defendant’s bond following defense counsel’s ex parte communications with her
bailiff); Disciplinary Counsel v. Marshall, 

 (imposing a six-month
suspension on a judge who repeatedly and inappropriately injected himself into his
daughter’s juvenile speeding case and made disparaging remarks about the law-
enforcement officer involved in the case); Disciplinary Counsel v. Hale, 2014-
Ohio-5053 (imposing a six-month suspension on a judge who unilaterally




                                         8
                                January Term, 2025




dismissed a speeding ticket for his personal attorney and falsely represented that
the dismissal was made at the prosecutor’s request).
       {¶ 30} In four cases considered by the board—Disciplinary Counsel v.
Elum, 

; Disciplinary Counsel v. Winters, 

;
Disciplinary Counsel v. Goulding, 

; and Disciplinary Counsel v.
Porzio, 2020-Ohio-1569—we imposed conditionally stayed six-month suspensions
on judges and a magistrate who, like Kegley, engaged in improper ex parte
communications.
       {¶ 31} In Elum, a municipal-court judge interceded in a matter that was
within the province of the probation department and used vulgar and intemperate
language while lecturing the probationer outside the presence of the probationer’s
counsel and the prosecutor. Elum also needlessly injected himself into an internal
police-department investigation related to a case that was pending in his court and,
in an open courtroom, suggested that the police department was engaging in a
cover-up.
       {¶ 32} In Winters, a common-pleas-court judge became Facebook “friends”
with a man shortly after sentencing him on several criminal offenses and then
engaged in inappropriate ex parte communications with him through Facebook for
nearly five months. 

. The inappropriate communications related to
four cases over which the judge was presiding and in which the friend had an
interest—including the friend’s pending child-custody case and a case involving
civil stalking protection orders that had been issued against him.
       {¶ 33} Like Kegley, Winters violated rules that required him to behave in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and
impartiality of the judiciary and that prohibited him from engaging ex parte
communications. See 

. But unlike Kegley, Winters
also violated a rule requiring him to promptly disclose the substance of those ex
parte communications to other parties to the litigation, he failed to recuse himself




                                         9
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




from three cases in which his impartiality might reasonably have been questioned,
and he failed to uphold and apply the law and perform all of his judicial duties fairly
and impartially. See id. at ¶ 28-30.
       {¶ 34} Here, the parties agreed that the facts of this case most closely align
with the facts of Goulding, 

.          At the request of his friends,
Goulding, a common-pleas-court judge, interfered in a criminal case assigned to
another judge of the same court. The defendant in that case was the boyfriend of
the friends’ daughter who was being held without bail pending arraignment
following his indictment on three counts of illegal use of a minor in a nudity-
oriented performance.
       {¶ 35} Goulding called the county pretrial-services department to obtain
information about the defendant’s case, and the officer who answered knew that he
was a common-pleas-court judge. Goulding ordered that the defendant be released
on a recognizance bond with a no-contact order two days before his scheduled
arraignment—even though he had been informed that the defendant was already on
probation for an aggravated-menacing conviction. Goulding then spoke twice with
the defendant before he was released from jail on Goulding’s order. He sent
messages to the defendant’s attorney and the judge assigned to the case to let them
know that he had ordered the defendant’s release. But he did not inform the
prosecutor of his actions, nor did he inform the attorneys that he had engaged in ex
parte communications with the defendant.
       {¶ 36} Goulding violated three of the four rules that Kegley violated. See
id. at ¶ 18. But the parties to this case and the board emphasized that whereas
Goulding attempted to downplay his misconduct and exhibited “an attitude of
denial,” id. at ¶ 22, Kegley quickly acknowledged his misconduct.
       {¶ 37} Although the parties in this case agreed that Goulding is most
analogous to this case, the board found Porzio, 

, and two cases in
which we publicly reprimanded judges who engaged in similar acts of




                                          10
                                January Term, 2025




misconduct—Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley, 

, and Disciplinary
Counsel v. Stuard, 2009-Ohio-261—to be most instructive.
       {¶ 38} Porzio, a magistrate, engaged in ex parte communications with a
party to litigation over which she was presiding that gave the appearance of bias
against the opposing party and created the appearance of impropriety, in violation
of Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(A) and 1.2—two of the four violations at issue in Kegley’s case.
See 

. Porzio also violated Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A) (requiring a judge
to disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s partiality
might reasonably be questioned). Id. at ¶ 11. And a few months after Porzio
engaged in improper ex parte communications, she granted a civil protection order
to the party with whom she had improperly communicated and denied the excluded
party’s counterpetition. Id. at ¶ 7. We imposed a conditionally stayed six-month
suspension for Porzio’s misconduct. Id. at ¶ 20.
       {¶ 39} In Medley, a municipal-court judge spoke by telephone with a
woman who had recently been arrested on a DUI charge. The judge then picked
the woman up from the police station and drove her home without discussing her
case. He later accepted the woman’s guilty plea in the resulting criminal case.
Medley’s conduct violated three canons of the former Code of Judicial Conduct,
see 78 Ohio St.3d CLXIV, that required judges to (1) act in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, (2) avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities, and (3) recuse
themselves from a proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. Id. at ¶ 10. In the presence of six mitigating factors and no aggravating
factors, we publicly reprimanded Medley. 

.
       {¶ 40} Finally, in Stuard, 

, we publicly reprimanded a judge
for engaging in several ex parte conversations with a prosecutor in a capital murder
case. Stuard asked the prosecutor to prepare the court’s sentencing opinion and
gave him two pages of notes on the aggravating circumstances and mitigating




                                         11
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




factors that he had weighed in deciding to sentence the defendant to death. He later
reviewed the prosecutor’s draft opinion and communicated with the prosecutor
regarding proposed revisions without including defense counsel in any part of the
process. In addition to finding that Stuard, like Kegley, engaged in prohibited ex
parte communications and failed to act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary, we found that Stuard’s conduct was
prejudicial to the administration of justice. See id. at ¶ 10. In the presence of three
mitigating factors and no aggravating factors, we publicly reprimanded Stuard for
his misconduct. Id. at ¶ 13-14, 16.
       {¶ 41} Relying primarily on Porzio, Medley, and Stuard, the board
recommends that we publicly reprimand Kegley for his misconduct. The parties
and the board maintain that Kegley “acknowledged almost immediately that he
should not have interfered in his son’s case” and that his misconduct was a “one-
time mistake of poor judgment as opposed to the repeated ex parte contacts in
Goulding.” While that may be true, the sanction proposed by the parties fails to
account for Kegley’s disregard of the personal safety of his daughter-in-law, who
had been a victim of domestic violence.
       {¶ 42} Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the public reprimand
recommended by the board would not reflect the gravity of Kegley’s misconduct
in this case. Instead, we find that the facts of this case are most comparable to those
of Goulding and that a conditionally stayed six-month suspension is the appropriate
sanction for Kegley’s misconduct.
                                  CONCLUSION
       {¶ 43} Accordingly, Russell Dee Kegley is hereby suspended from the
practice of law in Ohio for six months with the entire suspension stayed on the
condition that he engage in no further misconduct. If Kegley fails to comply with
the condition of the stay, the stay will be revoked and he will serve the entire six-
month suspension. Costs are taxed to Kegley.




                                          12
                                January Term, 2025




                                                         Judgment accordingly.
                              __________________
       Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Cara L. Dawson, Assistant
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.
       Charles J. Kettlewell, for respondent.
                              __________________




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