[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Ellis v. Adult Parole Auth., Slip Opinion No. 

.]




                                           NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
      advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
      promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
      formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
      the opinion is published.




                          SLIP OPINION NO. 

 THE STATE EX REL. ELLIS, APPELLANT, v. OHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY,
                                         APPELLEE.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
   may be cited as State ex rel. Ellis v. Adult Parole Auth., Slip Opinion No.
                                     

.]
Prohibition—Adult Parole Authority has jurisdiction to hold parole proceedings
        for all parole-eligible inmates—Appellant has not shown that parole
        authority’s pending action is unauthorized by law—Appellant failed to
        prove elements of claim for a writ of prohibition—Court of appeals’
        dismissal of complaint affirmed.
      (No. 2024-0950—Submitted January 7, 2025—Decided May 8, 2025.)
               APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,
                             No. 23AP-775, 

.
                                   __________________
        The per curiam opinion below was joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER,
DEWINE, BRUNNER, DETERS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ.
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       Per Curiam.
       {¶ 1} Appellant, James P. Ellis, an inmate at Marion Correctional
Institution, has been in prison since his 1995 convictions for aggravated burglary
and aggravated murder. He avers that appellee, Ohio Adult Parole Authority,
unlawfully fixed an error in his sentencing entry and has been relying on that
correction in his parole hearings. So he petitioned the Tenth District Court of
Appeals for a writ of prohibition to “enjoin[ ] and restrain[ the parole authority]
from any future parole screening procedures” and instruct it to “contact the
committing court immediately to enable corrective procedures.”
       {¶ 2} The Tenth District dismissed Ellis’s complaint. It reasoned that he
did not sufficiently show that the parole authority lacked jurisdiction or relied on
erroneous information.     The court of appeals additionally pointed out that
compelling the parole authority to contact a court is outside the relief afforded by a
writ of prohibition. We affirm.
                   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       {¶ 3} Because we are reviewing the court of appeals’ judgment granting the
parole authority’s motion to dismiss, we accept as true the facts alleged in Ellis’s
complaint. See Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 

 (1988).
       {¶ 4} Ellis was convicted of aggravated murder and aggravated burglary
almost 30 years ago. He received consecutive prison sentences of 10 to 25 years
for the aggravated burglary and life in prison for the aggravated murder. The
sentencing entry makes no mention of parole eligibility. Ellis’s sentence has been
upheld on direct and collateral review. State v. Ellis, 

 (1st Dist.
Sept. 4, 1996); State v. Ellis, 

 (1st Dist.).
       {¶ 5} The parole authority and the Bureau of Sentence Computation are
both part of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“DRC”). In
2018, the Bureau of Sentence Computation informed Ellis that although his life


                                          2
                                 January Term, 2025




sentence would make him eligible for parole after serving 20 years, his sentence of
10 to 25 years for aggravated burglary added 10 years before parole eligibility.
Thus, it explained that Ellis would be eligible for parole after serving 30 years, and
it informed Ellis that the parole authority would hold his next parole hearing in
April 2025.
       {¶ 6} Ellis argued that the parole authority had effectively changed his
sentence from “life” to “20 years to life” and that such a modification was a judicial
function and beyond the parole authority’s jurisdiction. He sought a writ of
prohibition to prevent the parole authority from holding hearings and to direct it to
contact the sentencing court to correct the sentence.
       {¶ 7} The Tenth District dismissed the complaint. 

. It
first pointed out that prohibition lies only when a respondent has exercised or is
about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power that is unauthorized by law. Id.
at ¶ 30.   The court of appeals held that the parole authority, however, has
jurisdiction to conduct proceedings concerning duly convicted parole-eligible
inmates. Id. at ¶ 34. And second, the court of appeals noted that an order requiring
action (such as an order requiring the parole authority to contact a court) is not an
appropriate remedy to seek in a complaint for a writ of prohibition. Id. at ¶ 36. The
court of appeals suggested that if anything, a complaint seeking such an order could
sound in mandamus. Id. at ¶ 5. Ellis now appeals.
                                     ANALYSIS
       {¶ 8} When considering an appeal from a dismissal of a complaint seeking
a writ of prohibition for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), our review is de novo. Turner v. Kelsey, 

. We affirm only if, after all the factual allegations set forth in the complaint are
presumed true and all reasonable inferences are made in favor of the petitioner, it
appears beyond doubt that the petitioner can prove no set of facts that would support




                                           3
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




granting him the writ of prohibition. State ex rel. Welt v. Doherty, 

.
        {¶ 9} As an initial matter, we note that Ellis has petitioned for the wrong
writ. In his complaint, he makes two demands for relief. He first asks the court to
issue a writ prohibiting the parole authority from holding a hearing until his
sentence is corrected. Ellis cites no case in which a court granted a writ of
prohibition to prevent the parole authority from conducting a hearing.          And
although Ellis is right that the parole authority must ensure that an inmate’s
sentencing record is accurate for meaningful consideration of parole eligibility,
State ex rel. Keith v. Adult Parole Auth., 

, the proper writ to
correct an error in an inmate’s sentencing record is mandamus, see id. at ¶ 8, 15,
32.
        {¶ 10} Even assuming his case could be pleaded in prohibition, Ellis has not
proved the elements of prohibition. A writ of prohibition is proper only if (1) the
parole authority is about to exercise or has exercised judicial or quasi-judicial
authority, (2) the exercise of that authority is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying
the writ would result in injury without recourse in the ordinary course of law. State
ex rel. Fritz v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections, 

.
        {¶ 11} Ellis wants to prohibit the parole authority from holding his parole
hearing. But Ellis has failed to support his assertion that the parole authority’s
holding a hearing is not authorized by law. The parole authority has jurisdiction to
hold parole proceedings for all parole-eligible inmates. See R.C. 2967.02. Because
Ellis was sentenced before July 1, 1996, the parole authority applies R.C. Ch. 2967
as it existed at that time. R.C. 2967.021(A). Since Ellis was sentenced to serve life
in prison under R.C. 2929.03 and to serve that sentence consecutively to another
term of imprisonment, he would become eligible for parole after serving a term of
20 years, plus the minimum term of his consecutive sentence.                 Former
R.C. 2967.13(H); see Am.Sub.H.B. No. 571, 145 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 6342, 6431


                                         4
                                 January Term, 2025




(effective Oct. 6, 1994). Ellis has now been in prison for about 30 years and seems
to be parole eligible, so the parole authority has jurisdiction to hold hearings in his
case.
        {¶ 12} Yet Ellis argues that his sentencing order said nothing about parole
eligibility. He argues that changing his sentence from life (with parole eligibility
not specified) to life with parole eligibility after 20 years exceeds the authority of
the parole authority. So Ellis wants the court to prevent the parole authority from
holding another hearing in April 2025 and require the parole authority to first ask
the sentencing court to correct his sentence.
        {¶ 13} Ellis is correct that the sentencing entry does not mention his parole
eligibility. But Ellis’s parole eligibility is determined by operation of statute. Ellis
was found not guilty of the specifications charged in the indictment, so under the
law at the time of his sentencing, he would receive life imprisonment with parole
eligibility after serving 20 years. Former R.C. 2929.03(C)(1); see Am.Sub.S.B. No.
1, 139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1, 9-10 (effective Oct. 19, 1981). Had the sentencing
entry contradicted this statute, the sentence might have been contrary to law and
beyond the power of the parole authority to correct. See State ex rel. Fraley v. Dept.
of Rehab. & Corr., 

 (DRC may not correct a sentence in a
way that contradicts the entry); see also State v. Henderson, 

 (rejecting the argument that a statute automatically transformed a sentence
into what the legislature intended when a judgment entry specified something
contrary to statute).
        {¶ 14} But here, the sentencing entry did not contradict the statute. Rather,
the judge simply did not specify whether Ellis was parole eligible. Since the
sentencing entry is silent about parole, Ellis’s parole eligibility is fixed by operation
of statute, i.e., former R.C. 2929.03(C)(1) and former R.C. 2967.13(H). See State
ex rel. Thompson v. Kelly, 

 (sentences run consecutively by
operation of statute even in the sentencing entry’s silence). Therefore, the parole




                                           5
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




authority will not exceed its authority by holding a hearing. As Ellis has not shown
that the parole authority’s pending action is unauthorized by law, a writ of
prohibition is not proper and we need not consider the remaining elements that Ellis
would have to prove to obtain a writ of prohibition.
       {¶ 15} Ellis’s second request is that the court issue a writ ordering the parole
authority to contact the sentencing court for a correcting order. Prohibition, as its
name implies, is historically “negative in its nature and forbids the doing of certain
things which ought not to be done.” High, A Treatise on Extraordinary Legal
Remedies, Embracing Mandamus, Quo Warranto and Prohibition, § 763, at 707
(3d Ed. 1896). The writ typically prohibits or prevents a judicial or quasi-judicial
body from acting beyond the jurisdiction the law has given it. State ex rel. Booth
v. Robinson, 

 (1929). Ellis does not present any reason why the
writ of prohibition should be used to command the parole authority to take a
positive action in this case. We therefore deny his request to issue a writ of
prohibition ordering the parole authority to contact the sentencing court.
                                   CONCLUSION
       {¶ 16} Ellis asks us to prohibit action that the law permits and to use an
extraordinary writ of prohibition to order the parole authority to act. Because he
has not proved the elements of a claim for a writ of prohibition, we affirm the Tenth
District Court of Appeals’ judgment dismissing his complaint.
                                                                  Judgment affirmed.
                                 __________________
       James P. Ellis, pro se.
       Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Salvatore P. Messina, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
                                 __________________




                                          6