[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 

.]




             THE STATE EX REL . MAUK v. SHELDON, SHERIFF, ET AL.
             [Cite as State ex rel. Mauk v. Sheldon, 

.]
Mandamus—Public Records Act—R.C. 149.43—Relator failed to show by clear
        and convincing evidence that sheriff did not produce public records
        responsive to request No. 3—Sheriff failed to produce evidence to determine
        whether the information redacted from sheriff’s responses to request Nos.
        6, 10, and 11 is exempt from disclosure—Writ denied in part and held in
        abeyance in part as to sheriff, and sheriff ordered to file under seal for in
        camera inspection unredacted copies of sheriff’s responses to request Nos.
        6, 10, and 11—Because Ohio Department of Public Safety produced all
        records responsive to request No. 13, request for writ against department
        and its director is moot—Department produced all records responsive to
        request No. 13 within reasonable period and did not act in bad faith—Writ
        and requests for statutory damages, attorney fees, and court costs denied
        as to department and its director.
      (No. 2023-1300—Submitted January 7, 2025—Decided April 9, 2025.)
                                     IN MANDAMUS.
                                  __________________
        The per curiam opinion below was joined by DEWINE, BRUNNER, DETERS,
HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ. FISCHER, J., concurred in judgment only. KENNEDY,
C.J., concurred in part and dissented in part, with an opinion.


        Per Curiam.
        {¶ 1} This is an original action in mandamus brought under Ohio’s Public
Records Act, R.C. 149.43, by relator, Andrea Mauk, against respondents, the
Richland County Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Steve Sheldon (collectively, “the
                                SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




sheriff”) and the Ohio Department of Public Safety and its director, Andy Wilson
(collectively, “ODPS”).1 In addition to seeking a writ of mandamus compelling the
release of public records, Mauk requests awards of statutory damages, attorney
fees, and court costs and has filed a combined “motion to compel and motion for
sanctions” against the sheriff.
        {¶ 2} As to the sheriff, we deny Mauk’s combined “motion to compel and
motion for sanctions” and deny in part Mauk’s request for a writ of mandamus. We
order the sheriff to file under seal within 14 days for in camera inspection certain
unredacted records and hold in abeyance our decision on Mauk’s other requests for
relief against the sheriff. As to ODPS, we deny Mauk’s request for a writ of
mandamus and all other requests for relief.
                                   I. BACKGROUND
        {¶ 3} According to Mauk, in June 2023, members of the Richland County
Sheriff’s Office, the Mifflin Township Fire Department, and the Ohio State
Highway Patrol responded to an automobile accident in Richland County that
claimed the life of Mauk’s son, Damon. Mauk alleges that a sheriff’s deputy found
in Damon’s vehicle Damon’s iPhone and wallet, which contained approximately
$1,500 in cash, and that the deputy took those effects to the hospital and gave them
to a man who had presented himself as Damon’s father. Mauk claims that Damon’s
father was largely absent from Damon’s life and that neither Mauk nor law
enforcement had notified him of Damon’s death. Mauk states that she has been
trying to recover Damon’s property, confirm whether it was given to Damon’s
father, and “lobby the sheriff’s office to tighten up its policies and ensure strangers
cannot steal the property of accident victims.”




1. The Mifflin Township Fire Department and its fire chief, David Markel (collectively, “Mifflin
Fire”), were also named as respondents. Mauk settled her claims against Mifflin Fire, and we
granted her application to dismiss Mifflin Fire from this action, 

.




                                               2
                               January Term, 2025




       {¶ 4} From July through October 2023, Mauk requested multiple public
records from the sheriff and ODPS. As explained herein, request Nos. 1 through
11 were submitted to the sheriff and request Nos. 12 through 20 were submitted to
ODPS. The specific requests at issue are request Nos. 3, 6, 10, 11, and 13.
       {¶ 5} Mauk filed this original action on October 13, 2023. She filed an
amended complaint on April 29, 2024. Mauk alleges that the sheriff and ODPS
have committed multiple violations of the Public Records Act and asks us to issue
a writ of mandamus directing them to produce the requested public records
promptly and without improper redactions. She also seeks awards of statutory
damages, attorney fees, and court costs.
       {¶ 6} We ordered the sheriff and ODPS to answer Mauk’s amended
complaint, issued an alternative writ, and set a schedule for the presentation of
evidence and filing of briefs. 

. The sheriff and ODPS have
submitted sworn affidavits and copies of correspondence to and from Mauk. Mauk
appended to her amended complaint sworn affidavits averring the truth of the
allegations therein and attached copies of correspondence between herself and the
sheriff or ODPS; she has not presented other evidence.
                                 II. MOTIONS
       {¶ 7} Mauk served discovery requests on the sheriff on January 18, 2024,
while this matter was under a mediation stay, see 

. We returned
this matter to the regular docket on February 13. 

. On March 27,
the sheriff filed a motion to stay discovery pending this court’s ruling on a motion
to dismiss that had not yet been filed. The sheriff subsequently filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint and, after Mauk filed an amended complaint, a motion to
dismiss the amended complaint. Mauk opposed the sheriff’s motion to stay
discovery and motion to dismiss the amended complaint. On September 18, we
denied the motion to dismiss the amended complaint and denied as moot the motion
to stay discovery. 

.




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        {¶ 8} On September 30, Mauk filed a combined “motion to compel and
motion for sanctions” against the sheriff, stating that the sheriff has refused to
respond to her interrogatories, requests for inspection, and requests for admissions.
She therefore asks that we order the sheriff to produce all documents responsive to
her discovery requests. However, on October 8, the sheriff timely filed evidence
and simultaneously responded to Mauk’s discovery requests. Mauk does not claim
that she has not received the sheriff’s discovery responses. We therefore deny as
moot Mauk’s motion to compel against the sheriff. See State ex rel. Fluty v. Raiff,

.
        {¶ 9} Mauk additionally asks that we impose sanctions against the sheriff
for refusing to respond to her discovery requests. Specifically, Mauk asks that we
issue an order under Civ.R. 37(D) establishing certain facts alleged in her amended
complaint and discovery requests and directing the sheriff to pay her attorney fees.
Assuming without deciding that these types of discovery requests are proper in
mandamus actions originating in this court, see S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.06(A), Mauk fails
to prove that the sheriff’s delay in responding to her discovery requests warrants
the imposition of these sanctions. Accordingly, we deny Mauk’s motion for
sanctions against the sheriff.
                                  III. ANALYSIS
                             A. Mandamus Standard
        {¶ 10} R.C. 149.43(B)(1) establishes that any person has a clear legal right to
request identifiable public records be made available for inspection or copying and
imposes on public offices and persons responsible for public records a corresponding
clear legal duty to make a requested public record available for inspection or copying.
Welsh-Huggins v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 

. “Public
record” means any record that is kept by a public office unless it falls squarely within
a specific statutory exemption. R.C. 149.43(A)(1).




                                           4
                                January Term, 2025




       {¶ 11} Mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel compliance with the
Public Records Act. R.C. 149.43(C)(1)(b). The requester’s burden of production is
to plead and prove facts showing that she requested a public record under R.C.
149.43(B)(1) and that the public office or person responsible for public records did
not make the record available. 

. The requester’s burden of
persuasion is to establish entitlement to the extraordinary writ by clear and
convincing evidence. 

               B. Mauk’s Mandamus Claims Against the Sheriff
                       1. Civ.R. 36 Requests for Admissions
       {¶ 12} On January 18, 2024, Mauk served the sheriff with requests for
admissions, designating a period of 28 days for the sheriff to respond. The sheriff
did not answer the requests until October 8, the same day that the sheriff filed
evidence in accordance with this court’s alternative writ. Mauk contends that the
sheriff’s failure to answer the requests within 28 days resulted in conclusive
admissions of facts that are dispositive of her mandamus claim and that the sheriff
has not made the required motion to withdraw or amend the admissions. Specifically,
Mauk asserts that the sheriff has admitted that (1) all the allegations in the amended
complaint are true, (2) the sheriff is in possession of responsive public records that
have not yet been produced to Mauk, and (3) the sheriff has acted in bad faith in
failing to produce responsive public records.
       {¶ 13} “Civ.R. 36 requires that when requests for admissions are filed by a
party, the opposing party must timely respond either by objection or answer. Failure
to respond at all to the requests will result in the requests becoming admissions.”
Cleveland Trust Co. v. Willis, 

 (1985). “Any matter admitted
under Civ.R. 36 is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits
withdrawal or amendment of the admission.” 

 citing Civ.R. 36(B). However,
Civ.R. 36(B) does not require that a written motion be filed, nor does it specify when
such motion must be filed. Balson v. Dodds, 

 (1980).




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Instead, the rule leaves such matters to the court’s discretion. Id.; see also Cleveland
Trust Co. at 67 (“Under compelling circumstances, the court may allow untimely
replies to avoid the admissions.”). In Balson, we noted that the trial court could have
reasonably found that a party satisfied the Civ.R. 36(B) requirement simply by
contesting the truth of the Civ.R. 36(A) admissions for summary-judgment purposes.

.
        {¶ 14} Under Civ.R. 36(B), a court may permit withdrawal or amendment of
the admissions when (1) doing so will aid in presenting the merits of the case and (2)
the party who obtained the admissions fails to prove that withdrawal or amendment
will prejudice her in maintaining the action or defense on the merits. See 

 at
paragraph two of the syllabus. “This provision emphasizes the importance of having
the action resolved on the merits, while at the same time assuring each party that
justified reliance on an admission in preparation for trial will not operate to [her]
prejudice.” Cleveland Trust Co. at 67; see also Perotti v. Ferguson, 

 (1983) (it is a “basic tenet of Ohio jurisprudence that cases should be decided on
their merits”).
        {¶ 15} Here, the sheriff has satisfied the Civ.R. 36(B) requirement. Mauk
served her discovery requests while this matter was referred to mediation and all
filing deadlines had been stayed by the court. See 

; 

.
On multiple occasions, the parties purportedly corresponded about scheduling a
meeting to confer regarding Mauk’s discovery requests, but no meeting ever took
place. And the sheriff answered the requests for admissions within a reasonable time
following our September 18, 2024 order denying the sheriff’s motion to dismiss and
issuing an alternative writ. Moreover, withdrawal or amendment of the admissions
will clearly aid in presenting the merits of the case, and Mauk does not argue, let
alone demonstrate, that doing so will prejudice her ability to maintain the action.




                                           6
                                January Term, 2025




        {¶ 16} We conclude that the sheriff’s failure to respond to Mauk’s requests
for admissions within 28 days of service has not resulted in the conclusive admissions
of facts.
                 2. Mauk’s Public-Records Requests to the Sheriff
                            a. Request Nos. 1, 2, and 3
        {¶ 17} Mauk claims that on July 10, 2023, she hand-delivered a written
request for records to the sheriff, seeking access to all reports related to Damon’s
accident (“request No. 1”). Mauk also alleges that she orally requested a copy of
the inventory of property recovered from Damon’s vehicle (“request No. 2”) and
body-camera footage from the deputies who gave away Damon’s property
(“request No. 3”). Mauk does not contest the sheriff’s responses to request Nos. 1
and 2. She contends, however, that the sheriff has not produced any records in
response to request No. 3, “though [the sheriff] admit[s] those records exist.”
        {¶ 18} The sheriff has submitted the affidavit of Captain James P. Sweat,
who oversees the records and public-records requests as captain of the support
bureau within the sheriff’s office. Captain Sweat avers that “[t]here was no body-
worn camera footage available from the hospital” and that “[w]hile body-worn
camera footage was recorded and uploaded from officers assisting at the crash
scene, Ms. Mauk never specifically requested [that] footage.”
                              b. Request Nos. 4 and 5
        {¶ 19} On August 1, 2023, Mauk electronically submitted a request for
records directly to Sheriff Sheldon, seeking access to the sheriff’s office’s policies
under R.C. 4501.80 for notifying a victim’s next of kin following a fatal motor-
vehicle accident (“request No. 4”) and the sheriff’s office’s policies for handling
recovered property (“request No. 5”). Although the parties dispute whether Sheriff
Sheldon ever replied to Mauk’s email, Captain Sweat avers that the sheriff’s
office’s records department never received these requests and that “no attempted




                                          7
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follow-up was made to inform [the sheriff] that Ms. Mauk was still awaiting any
responsive records.”
       {¶ 20} It is uncontested that responsive documents to request Nos. 4 and 5
were provided to Mauk on November 10, 2023—almost one month after Mauk
initiated this mandamus action.
                           c. Request Nos. 6, 7, 8, and 9
       {¶ 21} On September 21, 2023, Mauk’s counsel electronically submitted a
request for records directly to Sheriff Sheldon, seeking access to all public-records
requests the sheriff received from September 1 through 14, 2023 (“request No. 6”),
the sheriff’s office’s log of public-records requests (“request No. 7”), the sheriff’s
office’s policy for complying with public-records requests (“request No. 8”), and
the sheriff’s office’s records-retention schedule (“request No. 9”).
       {¶ 22} Mauk concedes that the sheriff produced records responsive to
request Nos. 8 and 9. And she does not contest that there is no responsive record
to request No. 7.
       {¶ 23} As to request No. 6, the sheriff produced a set of redacted public-
records requests and an explanation for the redactions.         Mauk disputed the
explanation given for the redactions, and the sheriff responded by email on October
13, 2023. Whereas Mauk alleges that this email “offered entirely new justifications
for the[] redactions,” the sheriff asserts that the email offered clarification and
corrected a “minor citation mistake.”
                            d. Request Nos. 10 and 11
       {¶ 24} On October 2, 2023, Mauk’s counsel electronically submitted a
request for records directly to Sheriff Sheldon, seeking access to all public-records
requests the sheriff received from July 1 through 14, 2023 (“request No. 10”) and
from August 1 through 14, 2023 (“request No. 11”). The sheriff produced a set of
redacted public-records requests and an explanation for the redactions on October
20, 2023—seven days after Mauk initiated this mandamus action.




                                          8
                                 January Term, 2025




              3. Whether Mauk Is Entitled to a Writ for Request No. 3
       {¶ 25} Mauk contends that she is entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling
the sheriff to produce body-camera footage in response to request No. 3. Mauk
alleged in her amended complaint that she requested “footage from the body-worn
cameras of the deputies who gave away Damon’s property” and that the sheriff did
not provide the requested records. Captain Sweat avers that Mauk requested “body-
worn camera footage from the hospital when Damon’s property was given to his
father” but that there is no such footage. Captain Sweat further avers, “While body-
worn camera footage was recorded and uploaded from officers assisting at the crash
scene, Ms. Mauk never specifically requested [that] footage.”
       {¶ 26} In her merit brief, Mauk contends that she requested “body-camera
footage from the deputies who responded to her son’s crash.” However, Mauk has
failed to rebut Captain Sweat’s affidavit with clear and convincing evidence that she
orally requested body-camera footage from the scene of the accident as opposed to
footage from the hospital when Damon’s property was allegedly given to his father.
Thus, Mauk has not shown that the sheriff failed to provide a record she requested.
See State ex rel. Griffin v. Doe, 

 (relator in public-records
mandamus action must prove that relator requested a public record and that the public
office did not make the record available in response to the request). Therefore, Mauk
is not entitled to a writ of mandamus based on her claim that the sheriff failed to
produce responsive public records to request No. 3.
       4. Whether Mauk Is Entitled to a Writ for Request Nos. 6, 10, and 11
       {¶ 27} Mauk contends that she is entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling
the sheriff to produce unredacted responses to request Nos. 6, 10, and 11, in which
she requested access to all public-records requests the sheriff received during three
separate time periods.
       {¶ 28} “A redaction shall be deemed a denial of a request to inspect or copy
the redacted information, except if federal or state law authorizes or requires a public




                                           9
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office to make the redaction.” R.C. 149.43(B)(1). R.C. 149.43(A)(1) excludes
certain information from the definition of a public record, some of which is prohibited
from release to the public by law. State ex rel. Shaughnessy v. Cleveland, 2016-
Ohio-8447, ¶ 12. The public office bears the burden of proving that the requested
records fall squarely within an exception. See State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v.
Jones-Kelley, 

, paragraph two of the syllabus.
       {¶ 29} Here, the sheriff asserts that the redacted information is exempt from
disclosure as (1) “personal information” in the form of Social Security numbers under
R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(dd) and 149.45(A)(1), (2) victims’ telephone numbers under R.C.
149.43(A)(1)(mm), and (3) “confidential law enforcement investigatory records”
under R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(h) and (A)(2)(d). The sheriff also claims that “personal
notes” were redacted, and the sheriff, in support of those redactions, cites State ex
rel. Steffen v. Kraft, 

 (holding that trial judge’s personal,
handwritten notes made during the course of trial were not public records under R.C.
149.43(A)(1)), and State ex rel. Cranford v. Cleveland, 

, ¶ 21
(holding that public official’s personal notes were not public records subject to
disclosure under R.C. 149.43). Apart from the apparent redactions of Social Security
numbers, Mauk challenges each of the sheriff’s asserted exemptions.
       {¶ 30} It is well-settled that “[w]hen a governmental body asserts that public
records are excepted from disclosure and such assertion is challenged, the court must
make an individualized scrutiny of the records in question.” State ex rel. Natl.
Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 

 (1988), paragraph four of the
syllabus. “If the court finds that these records contain excepted information, this
information must be redacted and any remaining information must be released.” 

       {¶ 31} Mauk argues that the sheriff has produced no evidence on which we
can rely to determine whether the redacted information is exempt from disclosure.
We agree. First, the applicability of the asserted exemptions is not apparent from the
records themselves, and the sheriff did not file a motion for leave to submit copies of




                                          10
                                 January Term, 2025




the unredacted records for in camera review, like the sheriff’s office did in State ex
rel. Mack v. Richland Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 

. Second, Captain
Sweat avers that “[a]ll requested documents were . . . reviewed for any applicable
exemptions or necessary redactions,” but he does not state which specific exemptions
apply. Third, the letters in evidence that counsel for the sheriff sent to Mauk when
responding to request Nos. 6, 10, and 11 contain unsworn statements and do not
support denial of the writ.      See, e.g., id. at ¶ 17 (disregarding the unsworn
representation of the respondent’s counsel).
       {¶ 32} Accordingly, we order the sheriff to file under seal within 14 days for
in camera inspection unredacted copies of the responses to request Nos. 6, 10, and
11, see, e.g., State ex rel. Besser v. Ohio State Univ., 

(2000), and we hold in abeyance our decision on Mauk’s requests for awards of
statutory damages, attorney fees, and court costs against the sheriff.
                  C. Mauk’s Mandamus Claims Against ODPS
       {¶ 33} On July 18, 2023, Mauk submitted an electronic request for records
to ODPS, seeking access to several categories of records related to her son’s
accident, including “photos” (“request No. 12”), “body cams” (“request No. 13”),
“reports” (“request No. 14”), “communications to the OhioHealth hospital
(Mansfield)” (“request No. 15”), “everything [ODPS has] on file for this case”
(“request No. 16”), the “policy on turning off body cams during an investigation”
(“request No. 17”), information on “who makes the determination for med flights”
(“request No. 18”), the sheriff’s office’s policies on releasing personal property and
“cooperat[ing] with EMS and Ohio State Patrol” (“request No. 19”), and “all
documentation from the EMS and fire department that were called to the scene for
the crash” (“request No. 20”).
       {¶ 34} Mauk concedes that ODPS produced records responsive to request
Nos. 12, 14, and 17. And she is not seeking to enforce any further compliance with




                                          11
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request Nos. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20. Therefore, the only request that remains at issue
is request No. 13 for body-camera footage.
        {¶ 35} ODPS has submitted the affidavit of Nia Jones, who is employed by
ODPS as a customer-service assistant in the central-records audio/video-redactions
unit. According to Jones, her unit receives a significant number of public-records
requests for audio and video recordings and 1,422 requests were pending as of the
date of her affidavit.
        {¶ 36} Jones avers that Mauk’s request for records was made through the
public-portal “GovQA” system, which is the program ODPS uses to manage and
track public-records requests, and that ODPS acknowledged receipt of the request
that same day. On July 21, 2023, ODPS downloaded the footage that Mauk had
requested. On September 15, ODPS sent Mauk messages through the GovQA
system providing a link to access crash reports and photographs and advising Mauk
that (1) the requested footage had been sent for review and redaction, (2) ODPS had
“an extensive backlog and requests are processed in the order they are received,” (3)
ODPS’s crash-reconstruction section was not involved in the accident investigation
and therefore no crash-reconstruction files had been generated, and (4) she needed to
contact Richland County for the Richland County records she had requested. On
November 16, four months after ODPS received Mauk’s request, another customer-
service assistant for ODPS sent Mauk an email with a link through which she could
download the redacted body-camera footage and a document that listed the applicable
disclosure exemptions. The footage provided to Mauk contained a total of 6 hours
and 17 minutes of video from three body-worn cameras and one dashboard camera,
as well as 25 minutes of audio.
        {¶ 37} Because Mauk initiated this original action on October 13, 2023, and
ODPS subsequently responded to her request No. 13, her mandamus claim against
ODPS regarding that request is now moot. See State ex rel. Payne v. Rose, 2023-
Ohio-3801, ¶ 8 (public-records mandamus claims generally become moot when the




                                         12
                                January Term, 2025




public office provides the requested records after the requester brings an action in
mandamus), citing State ex rel. Martin v. Greene, 

; see also State
ex rel. Gaylor, Inc. v. Goodenow, 

 (mootness doctrine applies
when an event occurs after the action is commenced that renders it impossible for a
court to grant relief).
        {¶ 38} Mauk nevertheless contends that she is entitled to a writ of mandamus
compelling ODPS to comply with the obligation to organize and maintain public
records in such a manner that they may be made available for inspection or copying
within a reasonable period. See R.C. 149.43(B)(1) and (2). Although Mauk alleged
in her amended complaint that ODPS violated R.C. 149.43(B)(2), she did not
specifically request in her prayer for relief that this court compel ODPS to comply
with R.C. 149.43(B)(2). See State ex rel. Gilreath v. Cuyahoga Job & Family Servs.,

, quoting S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.02(B)(3) (“‘All relief sought [in an
original action] shall be set forth in the complaint.’” [Bracketed text in original.]).
Regardless, any such request must fail because a violation of R.C. 149.43(B)(2) is
actionable only when it prevents the public office from producing a public record,
State ex rel. Ames v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 

, which is
not the case here. Accordingly, Mauk is not entitled to a writ of mandamus
compelling any action from ODPS.
                     D. Other Requested Relief Against ODPS
                               1. Statutory Damages
        {¶ 39} Even when a public-records mandamus action is mooted by the
production of records, a requester may still be entitled to statutory damages under
R.C. 149.43(C)(2). State ex rel. Suggs v. McConahay, 

. A
requester shall be entitled to statutory damages if (1) she transmitted her request by
hand delivery, electronic submission, or certified mail, (2) her request was
transmitted to the public office or person responsible for the public records, (3) she
fairly described the public records being sought, and (4) the public office or person




                                          13
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responsible for public records failed to comply with an obligation under R.C.
149.43(B). R.C. 149.43(C)(2). The requester must prove these elements by clear
and convincing evidence. State ex rel. Mobley v. Toledo, 

. The
amount of damages is fixed at $100 for each business day, beginning with the day on
which the requester filed the mandamus action, up to a maximum of $1,000. R.C.
149.43(C)(2).
        {¶ 40} Mauk maintains that she is entitled to $1,000 in statutory damages
from ODPS because ODPS failed to comply with the obligations that are set forth in
R.C. 149.43(B)(2). R.C. 149.43(B)(2) requires a public office or person responsible
for public records to “organize and maintain public records in a manner that they can
be made available for inspection or copying” in accordance with R.C. 149.43(B).
R.C. 149.43(B)(1) requires a public office or person responsible for public records to
“make copies of the requested public record available to the requester at cost and
within a reasonable period of time.” “What constitutes a reasonable period of time
‘depends upon all of the pertinent facts and circumstances,’ including the scope of a
public-records request, the volume of responsive records, and whether redactions are
necessary.” State ex rel. Brinkman v. Toledo City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2024-
Ohio-5063, ¶ 32, quoting State ex rel. Morgan v. Strickland, 

.
“For example, in a case in which a large number of murder-investigation documents
needed to be carefully redacted and the public office had provided initial responses,
[this court] concluded that two months was a reasonable amount of time.” 

 citing
State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Pike Cty. Coroner’s Office, 

.
        {¶ 41} Here, four months passed between when Mauk requested body-
camera footage and ODPS produced the redacted footage. During that time, ODPS
communicated with Mauk about the progress of the review of the footage and the
reasons for the delayed response. Considering the nature of the request, the quantity
of responsive footage, and the necessity for a thorough review of the footage to make




                                         14
                                January Term, 2025




any required redactions, we conclude that the redacted body-camera footage was
produced within a reasonable period. Therefore, Mauk has not met her burden to
show by clear and convincing evidence that she is entitled to statutory damages.
                                  2. Attorney Fees
        {¶ 42} Because Mauk is not entitled to a writ compelling ODPS to comply
with the Public Records Act, her contention that she is entitled to attorney fees under
R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b) must fail. Mauk also argues that she is entitled to attorney fees
because ODPS “acted in bad faith” by voluntarily making the body-camera footage
available to her for the first time after she commenced this mandamus action but
before we issued an order determining whether ODPS was required to comply with
R.C. 149.43(B). See R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b)(iii).
        {¶ 43} We have said:


               The term “bad faith” generally implies something more than
        bad judgment or negligence. Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose,
        moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known duty
        through some ulterior motive or ill will partaking of the nature of
        fraud. It also embraces actual intent to mislead or deceive another.


(Cleaned up.) State ex rel. McDougald v. Greene, 

.
        {¶ 44} The record does not show that ODPS tried to mislead or deceive Mauk
about the reasons for the delay in producing the body-camera footage, nor does the
record show a dishonest purpose by ODPS in placing Mauk’s request at the end of
“an extensive backlog” of other requests. Rather, the record establishes that ODPS
was obligated to review the footage for the purpose of making redactions required by
law and that ODPS conveyed this information to Mauk. We therefore conclude that
ODPS did not act in bad faith, and we deny Mauk’s request for an award of attorney
fees.




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                                    3. Court Costs
        {¶ 45} We also deny Mauk’s request for an award of court costs. Under R.C.
149.43(C)(3)(a), an award of court costs is contingent on a court’s ordering the
respondent to comply with R.C. 149.43(B) or a showing of bad faith on the part of
the respondent. Because Mauk is not entitled to a writ compelling ODPS to comply
with the Public Records Act and there is no evidence of ODPS having acted in bad
faith, Mauk is not entitled to court costs.
                                 IV. CONCLUSION
        {¶ 46} For the foregoing reasons, as to the sheriff, we deny Mauk’s
combined “motion to compel and motion for sanctions” and Mauk’s request for a
writ of mandamus regarding request No. 3. We order the sheriff to file under seal
within 14 days for in camera inspection unredacted copies of the responses to
requests Nos. 6, 10, and 11 and hold in abeyance our decision on Mauk’s other
requests for relief against the sheriff. As to ODPS, we deny Mauk’s request for a
writ of mandamus and all other requests for relief.
                                                                Writ denied in part
                                                      and held in abeyance in part.
                                __________________
        KENNEDY, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
        {¶ 47} I concur in the court’s judgment, with one exception. I disagree with
the majority’s decision to deny relator, Andrea Mauk, an award of statutory
damages for the public-records request she sent to respondent the Ohio Department
of Public Safety (“ODPS”). (Mauk also named ODPS Director Andy Wilson and
the Richland County Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Steve Sheldon as respondents in
this action.) I would award Mauk statutory damages in the amount of $1,000.
Therefore, I concur in part and dissent in part.
        {¶ 48} On July 18, 2023, after her son’s fatal car crash on June 24, 2023,
Mauk submitted a public-records request to ODPS, seeking the production of




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photos, body-camera footage, reports, communications to the OhioHealth hospital
in Mansfield, and other files related to her son’s accident. She also sought ODPS’s
policy about turning off body cameras during an investigation, records containing
information about who at ODPS makes medical-flight determinations, certain
policies of the Richland County Sheriff’s Office, and records from the EMS and
fire department that responded to the crash. Except for the body-camera footage
and the policies of the sheriff’s office, ODPS produced records responsive to
Mauk’s request on September 15. On that date, Mauk was also informed that she
would receive a notification when the requested body-camera footage was available
for release. Almost one month later, on October 13, Mauk commenced this writ
action. The redacted body-camera footage was released on November 16.
       {¶ 49} ODPS claims that this four-month response time for producing the
body-camera footage was reasonable. And the majority agrees. See majority
opinion, ¶ 41. In support of its assertion, ODPS provided an affidavit from Nia
Jones—a customer-service assistant in ODPS’s central-records audio/video-
redactions unit (“redactions unit”). The redactions unit was tasked with reviewing
and redacting the body-camera footage and then providing that footage to Mauk.
Jones avers that the redactions unit “typically [has] around 1,400 requests” for
audio and video records pending at any given time. Based on that averment, ODPS
provided the following hypothetical in its merit brief: if each public-records request
involves five hours of footage, then the amount of footage requiring review at any
time amounts to 7,000 hours. But this hypothetical is just that—a hypothetical.
ODPS has not provided any evidence of the average length of time it takes the
redactions unit to process public-records requests or the average amount of footage
that must be reviewed for each request. Nor has ODPS presented any evidence of
how many employees in the redactions unit work on responding to these types of
requests.




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       {¶ 50} As evidence, ODPS has provided the audit log from the “GovQA”
system for Mauk’s request; GovQA is the program ODPS uses when responding to
public-records requests. The audit log shows every activity performed in the
system for a particular request, who performed it, and when. And in this case, the
audit log and Jones’s affidavit indicate that the body-camera footage was
downloaded by an ODPS staff member on July 21, 2023. However, it appears from
the evidence that it was not until September 15 that the requested body-camera
footage was actually sent to the redactions unit for review. The audit log also does
not indicate how much time ODPS staff members spent preparing the footage for
release to Mauk during the two-month period between September 15 and November
16.
       {¶ 51} Further, Jones states in her affidavit that the redactions unit uses the
Evidence.com digital system to review and redact audio and video files. But ODPS
has not provided the audit log from the Evidence.com system as evidence, even
though the Ohio State Highway Patrol’s policy OSP-103.22, revision No. 16—
which was provided as evidence by ODPS—indicates that the Evidence.com
system keeps an “audit trail” documenting access to and actions performed in the
system regarding particular audio and video files. Because the Evidence.com audit
log was not provided as evidence by ODPS, I would infer that the contents of the
Evidence.com audit log show that ODPS did not timely review and redact the
requested body-camera footage. See Nation-Wide Check Corp., Inc. v. Forest Hills
Distribs., Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 1982) (“When the contents of a document
are relevant to an issue in a case, the trier of fact generally may receive the fact of
the document’s nonproduction or destruction as evidence that the party which has
prevented production did so out of the well-founded fear that the contents would
harm him.”). The GovQA audit log alone does not support ODPS’s claim that its
response time was reasonable.




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                                January Term, 2025




       {¶ 52} Moreover, the fact that a public office receives a large volume of
public-records requests, standing alone, does not relieve it of the duty to respond to
each request within a reasonable period of time. See R.C. 149.43(B)(1). “‘No
pleading of too much expense, or too much time involved, or too much interference
with normal duties, can be used by the respondent to evade the public’s right to
inspect and obtain a copy of the public records within a reasonable time.’” State ex
rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Seneca Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 

, ¶ 36,
quoting State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Andrews, 

 (1979). Here, ODPS’s claim that 1,400 pending audio and video requests
equates to 7,000 hours of footage requiring review is not supported by anything
more than a hypothetical number of hours of footage requiring review for each
pending public-records request. And this “typical” number of pending requests also
does not reflect how many requests the redactions unit actually had pending when
it received Mauk’s request. Therefore, ODPS has not provided sufficient evidence
to prove that the four months it took ODPS to respond to Mauk’s public-records
request for the body-camera footage was reasonable under R.C. 149.43(B)(1). See
also Black’s Law Dictionary (12th Ed. 2024) (“reasonable” means “[r]eflecting
good judgment; fair and proper under the circumstances; rational, sound, and
sensible”).
       {¶ 53} The caselaw cited by ODPS does not support the four-month
response time either. In State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Deters, this court
concluded that six business days constituted a reasonable response time to a public-
records request for body-camera footage, given that the respondent was entitled to
review the footage to determine whether any redactions were necessary before
producing the requested record.      

.       In State ex rel.
Cincinnati Enquirer v. Pike Cty. Coroner’s Office, this court concluded that two
months constituted a reasonable response time to a request for final autopsy reports,
given the “magnitude of the investigation” and the respondent’s “corresponding




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need to redact the reports with care.” 

. And in State ex rel.
Patituce & Assocs., L.L.C. v. Cleveland, the Eight District Court of Appeals
determined that a period of almost three months constituted a reasonable response
time to a request for personnel files of police officers, given the voluminous nature
of the requested records that had to be reviewed for any necessary redactions. 2017-
Ohio-300, ¶ 2, 7-10 (8th Dist.).
       {¶ 54} In Deters, Pike Cty. Coroner’s Office, and Patituce & Assocs., each
of the respondents needed time to review voluminous records to complete required
redactions. And in each of those cases, the respondents did so in less than the four-
month period it took ODPS to do the same thing in this case. Accordingly, none of
those cases justify the four-month response time here. Further, ODPS does not
point to any case in which this court has concluded that a four-month response time
constituted a reasonable response time for a public office to produce records
requested under the Public Records Act. This case should not change that.
       {¶ 55} For the foregoing reasons, I would conclude that ODPS’s response
time for producing the redacted body-camera footage was unreasonable. I therefore
concur in part and dissent in part and would award Mauk statutory damages in the
amount of $1,000 pursuant to R.C. 149.43(C)(2).
                               __________________
       Speech Law, L.L.C., and Brian D. Bardwell, for relator.
       Fishel Downey Albrecht & Riepenhoff, L.L.C., David C. Moser, and
Makenzie E. McAfee, for respondents Steve Sheldon and Richland County
Sheriff’s Office.
       Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Ann Yackshaw and Heather L.
Buchanan, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondents Andy Wilson and Ohio
Department of Public Safety.
                               __________________




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