OPINION

The State of Oklahoma appeals on a reserved question of law pursuant to 22 O.S. 1991, § 1053. Chris C. Polk, Appellee, was charged with parking his vehicle without a trailer in an area of Quartz Mountain State Park clearly posted for use only by vehicles with boat trailers in violation of 47 O.S.1991, § ll-1003(a)14 in the District Court of Greer County, Case No. TR-95-486. In a Bench Trial held July 24, 1995, the Honorable Charles L. Schwabe, Associate District Judge, dismissed the charge against Appel-lee, finding, in part:

4. In section 11-1009, the [Legislature makes parking contrary to the instructions of official signs a civil offense with a civil penalty of $5.00. In sections ll-1003(a)14 and 17 — 101(b), the [L]egislature makes the same conduct at any other state property a misdemeanor crime with a fine ranging from $10.00 to $100.00 or confinement for up to ten days, plus court costs of $80.00. Clearly, there is significant discrimination in classifying the same behavior as criminal in one location and as a mere civil offense in another with a vast disparity in consequences.

6. The fact that the law treats all violators at Quartz Mountain State Park equally and all violators at the three locations specified in section 11-1009 equally does not justify different treatment of the same behavior in different *526locations subject to the [Legislature’s authority.

7. Although equal treatment under the law is a norm and an ideal, there is authority for rationally based discrimination. There appears to be no rational basis in this situation.

8. Presuming no intent on the part of the [Ljegislature to irrationally discriminate between visitors to Quartz Mountain State Park and other locations, it is found that by classifying parking violations on state property as civil offenses in section 11-1009, the [Legislature did by implication reclassify similar parking violations on state property covered by section 17-101(b) as civil offenses. It is further found because section 11-1009 is limited in the civil penalties it prescribes to three specified locations, that the penalties therein may not be applied at Quartz Mountain State Park.

The State has perfected this appeal.

The State of Oklahoma asks this Court to find that the Oklahoma Legislature did not, by its passage of 47 O.S.1991, § 11-1009, by implication, reclassify all parking violations on State property as civil offenses without prescribing a penalty. A review of the legislative history of the statutes in question reveal that 47 O.S.1991, § 11-1003, entitled “Stopping, standing or parking prohibited in specified places,” was enacted in 1961 with no substantial changes to date.1 The Legislature set out fourteen designated prohibited

areas. Penalties for violation of this act are set forth in 47 O.S.1991, § 17-101.2 Title 47 O.S.1991, § 11-1009, entitled “Parking on certain state property prohibited — Procedure for enforcement and appeal,” was enacted in 1982 with no substantial changes to date.3

First, it is presumed that a law passed by the Legislature is constitutional. State v. Hunter, 787 P.2d 864, 865 (Okl.Cr. 1990). Further, it should be noted that the Legislature carved out a specific area but did not treat any people differently. This is clearly not a violation of the equal protection clause. It makes common sense that areas may well be different (such as those set out in 47 O.S.1991, § 11-1009) versus people. A clear rational basis applies to these statutes. The Legislature did not intend to treat persons differently but only places; no violation.

By the enactment of § 11-1009, it is clear the Legislature intended to carve out specific exceptions for the State Capitol Complex, the Cowboy Hall of Fame Park, and the State Capitol Complex in Tulsa. All other violations are contemplated under the purview of § ll-1003(a)14. We do not agree with the trial court’s characterization of these legislative enactments as constituting unequal treatment under the law. Nor do we agree with the trial court that the imposition of different penalties for similar offenses is “irrationally discriminatory.”

The imposition of the penalty applies to all individuals who violate the statutes. Any and all individuals who violate a parking *527prohibition at the State Capitol, the Cowboy Hall of Fame, or the State Capitol Complex in Tulsa are subject to a civil penalty. Similarly, any and all individuals who violate the provisions of § ll-1003(a)14, under which Appellee was charged, are subject to the penalties provided in § 17-101. The trial court misunderstands the application of equal protection if it bases its rationale on the different treatment of the parking areas. The equal protection clause does not protect parking lots, it protects people. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394, 72 L.Ed.2d 786, 798 (1982). We find that the Legislature did not, implicitly or otherwise, reclassify all parking violations on State property as civil offenses by its enactment of § 11-1009. The “Findings and Judgment” of the trial court is in error.

RESERVED QUESTION OF LAW ANSWERED.