OPINION

¶ 1 Appellant, John William Malaske, was tried by jury in the District Court of Kay County, Case Number CF-2001-221, and convicted of Second Degree (Felony) Murder, in violation of 21 O.S.1991, § 701.8(2). The jury set punishment at ten (10) years imprisonment, and the trial judge sentenced Appellant accordingly. Appellant now appeals his conviction and sentence.

¶ 2 Appellant raises the following propositions of error in this appeal:

I. The trial court erred in overruling Appellant’s motion to quash the information because the facts alleged did not constitute the crime of second-degree felony murder. Additionally, the evidence presented was insufficient to support a conviction for second-degree felony murder;

II. Instruction number 2, the homicide causation instruction, was extremely misleading, especially in light of the prosecutor’s argument. A reasonable jury could have interpreted the instruction as allowing conviction of second degree felony murder under a proximate cause theory, contrary to Oklahoma statutory and case law;

III. The prosecutor’s closing argument improperly misled the jury about the law, shifted the burden of proof to the defendants, and commented on Appellant’s failure to testify;

IV. Detective Marshall’s improper comment on Appellant’s post-arrest invocation of his rights to counsel and to remain silent violated Appellant’s constitutional rights and requires a new trial;

V. Appellant was denied a fair trial by the introduction of irrelevant evidence and evidence of prior crimes, which the prosecutor repeatedly emphasized throughout closing argument;

VI. The trial court committed fundamental error in failing to give Oklahoma uniform jury instruction CR-10-27, as recently revised; and

VII. The trial errors cumulatively deprived Appellant of a fair trial and reliable verdict.

¶ 3 After thoroughly considering these propositions and the entire record before us, including the original record, transcripts, and briefs of the parties, we find reversal or modification is not required.

¶4 With respect to propositions one and two, we find the crime of furnishing alcohol to a minor is a felony that is “potentially dangerous in light of the facts and circumstances surrounding both the felony and the homicide.” Wade v. State, 1978 OK CR 77, 581 P.2d 914, 916; 37 O.S.2001, § 538(F). In so finding, we observe that our state legislature, by making the furnishing of alcoholic beverages to persons under the age of twenty-one a felony punishable by up to five years in prison, has made “alcoholic beverage” a controlled substance and persons under twenty-one years of age a protected class. Thus, it can be fairly said that in Oklahoma, the proscribed felony is “inherently dangerous as determined by the elements of the offense.” Wade, 581 P.2d at 916. Therefore, under the facts of this case,1 Appellant can be said to have perpetrated the homicide of Dena Emery, while he was engaged in the commission of a continuing felony.2 21 O.S.2001, § 691; 21 O.S.2001, § 701.8(2).

¶ 5 While our cases have, perhaps, used proximate cause terminology a bit *1118loosely over the years,3 our overall ease law requires a nexus between the underlying felony and the victim’s death in order for the felony murder doctrine to be applicable. Wade specifically warned “there must be a nexus between the underlying felony and the death of the victim. The felony must be inherently or potentially dangerous to human life, inherently dangerous as determined by the elements of the offense or potentially dangerous in light of the facts and circumstances surrounding both the felony and the homicide.” 581 P.2d at 916.

¶ 6 Moreover, Franks, supra, cited to Wade’s nexus language with approval. 636 P.2d at 364-65. See also Lampkin v. State, 1991 OK CR 33, 808 P.2d 694, 695 (“It is true that there must be a nexus between the underlying felony and the death of the victim in order for the felony-murder doctrine to apply.”); Diaz v. State, 1986 OK CR 167, 728 P.2d 503, 509 (finding a nexus between the death and the underlying felony); Irvin v. State, 1980 OK CR 70, 617 P.2d 588, 597 (nexus recognized). This is the approach taken by OUJI-CR 2d 4-60, which requires the defendant’s conduct to be a “substantial factor in bringing about the death and the conduct is dangerous and threatens or destroys life.” We find this instruction was appropriately given in this case, an accurate description of Oklahoma law as it currently stands, and not confusing, given Appellant’s defense. Accordingly, we deny relief with respect to propositions one and two.

¶ 7 With respect to proposition three, we find the prosecutor made a series of improper and potentially prejudicial arguments during his closing.4 In addition to misstating the applicable law on several occasions, the prosecutor challenged defense counsel to answer a series of questions regarding the trial evidence. For example, the prosecutor told defense counsel to “address these questions, yes or no; not any kind of sidestepping answers, but direct answers, just like the witnesses give on the stand. Yes or no.” The prosecutor then asked defense counsel; did Appellant give vodka to 8th graders; did Appellant commit a felony by doing so; did Dena Emery chug the vodka; did Dena die of alcohol poisoning.5

*1119¶ 8 The clear implication here was that defense counsel, at all times Appellant’s representative, had a duty to answer these questions, and if he did not Appellant was sandbagging, not taking responsibility, hiding the ball. To some extent, the prosecutor was taking a hard look at the evidence, but such a confrontational bullying approach arguably begins to shift the burden of proof. Also, as Appellant further claims, such argument is at least an indirect comment on Appellant’s constitutional right to remain silent. See United States v. Skandier, 758 F.2d 43, 44-45 (1st Cir.l985)(addressing how such questioning can result in burden shifting and comment improperly on the right to remain silent).

¶ 9 In this case, defense counsel did not initially object to the questions, as he could have done, and thereby denied the trial court the opportunity to cure the error. However, there is no indication the trial court would have ruled in his favor, for counsel did ultimately object, and the trial court ruled this was not improper argument.6 We disagree.

¶ 10 Regarding the portions of this argument to which defense counsel did not object, we find no plain error occurred; although this is, at least arguably, a close question. Simpson v. State, 1994 OK CR 40, 876 P.2d 690, 693. We find, however, that the trial court erred by overruling defense counsel’s objection once it was made and by allowing the prosecutor to continue this line of improper argument. Moreover, we find the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Simpson, 876 P.2d at 705. Defense counsel explained to jurors that he had no duty to answer the prosecutor’s questions, that the State had the burden of proof. Later, the trial judge told jurors that argument was not evidence. Also, jurors received proper instructions on the burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, Appellant’s right not to testify, and that their decision had to be based upon evidence. Jurors were also instructed that “[n]o statement or argument of the attorneys is .evidence.” And finally, the improper questions posed by the prosecutor really were, for the most part, obvious from the evidence presented at trial.

¶ 11 With respect to proposition four, we find the trial judge did not abuse his' discretion by overruling defense counsel’s motion for mistrial concerning Detective Marshall’s comments. Knighton v. State, 1996 OK CR 2, 912 P.2d 878, 894. Although the comments were improper, they sprang forth from somewhat careless questioning, primarily by counsel for the co-defendant. However, both counsel had the opportunity to approach the bench when the first comment (to which Appellant does not raise error) occurred and have Detective Marshall warned against such comments. They chose not to. The jury was properly instructed that the defendants had no duty to testify and the fact that they did not testify could not be used against them in the “slightest degree,” nor could it even enter into their deliberations. Thus, we find no plain error occurred.

¶ 12 With respect to proposition five, we find the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing evidence to be admitted at trial concerning Appellant writing on Dena Emery while she was passed out.7 See Powell v. State, 2000 OK CR 5, 995 P.2d 510, 527 (Court will not disturb a trial court’s decision to admit evidence absent a clear abuse of discretion accompanied by prejudice). We further find no plain error occurred in the admission of testimony regarding the fact that Appellant had previously provided .alcohol to his sister and her friend. Furthermore, this testimony came about as a result of questioning by defense counsel for both defendants.

¶ 13 We do, however, find the prosecutor made improper arguments concerning the *1120fact that Appellant had written on Dena Emery, essentially asking the jury to consider that fact as an aggravating circumstance worthy of stricter punishment. This argument was improper and a violation of the trial court’s ruling with respect to Appellant’s pretrial motion in limine. Standing alone, it is not entitled to any relief, however, especially when counsel failed to make a contemporaneous objection. We will, however, consider it as part of proposition seven, relating to cumulative error.

¶ 14 In proposition six, Appellant claims the trial court committed fundamental error by failing to give the revised version of OUJI-CR 2d 10-27, as it was revised in Graham v. State, 2001 OK CR 18, 27 P.3d 1026, 1028, n. 5. The previous version of the instruction was given, however, and this case is clearly distinguishable from Graham. Moreover, Graham was handed down on June .21, 2001, the very same day that jury instructions were given in this case. It appears doubtful that Graham was available to the parties at the time jury instructions were crafted, and there is no indication the new instruction was brought to the trial judge’s attention. We find relief is not warranted.

¶ 15 Concerning proposition seven, we find the prosecutor made several improper closing arguments, as shown in propositions three and five above. (Most, however, were not objected to.) Also, the lead investigator commented on the right to remain silent, as a result of questioning by the co-defendant’s counsel. In considering the effect, if any, these errors may have had on the jury’s decision to choose between second-degree felony murder, second-degree manslaughter, and the underlying felony in the felony murder, we find the issue is a close call. However, after considering the jury instructions, the sentence imposed, and our decision with respect to propositions one and two, we find no relief is required.

DECISION

¶ 16 The judgment and sentence are hereby AFFIRMED.

dissenting.

¶ 1 I dissent. I find merit in Proposition III. The prosecutor, in his closing arguments, made a continuing series of improper arguments. The prosecutor’s confrontational and bullying approach directed towards the defense attorney was not only inappropriate but absurd; however, when the defense counsel objected, the trial court improperly overruled the objection. Additionally, the prosecutor misstated the law on several significant occasions. These errors cannot be considered harmless. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

dissenting:

¶ 1 I disagree with the majority’s insistence on expanding the felony-murder doctrine past all recognizable bounds. In Wade v. State this Court noted that the purpose of the felony murder doctrine is “to relieve the prosecution of the necessity of proving [a defendant’s] actual malice or premeditated intent”; the intent element of the underlying felony is transferred to the homicide “so that the accused can be found guilty of murder even though the killing is unintentional.”1 This definition suggests a policy which applies felony murder to punish a defendant more severely where a death occurs during a felony.2 This ability to hold a person liable for murder, without regard for the defendant’s intent or actual cause of death, should be used with great care. The imposition of liability for unintended deaths erodes the relationship between criminal liability and moral culpability.3 The majority appears determined to further erode this relationship.

*1121¶ 2 Our homicide statutes provide that second-degree felony murder is any murder perpetrated by a person engaged in any felony other than a felony enumerated in the first-degree felony murder statute.4 Wade v. State explained that, to qualify as second-degree felony murder, a felony “must be inherently or potentially dangerous to human life, inherently dangerous as determined by the elements of the offense or potentially dangerous in light of the facts and circumstances surrounding both the felony and the homicide.”5 The majority relies on this to support its conclusions. However, Wade also provides the description of the purpose of the felony murder doctrine I quote above. When I consider this underlying purpose of felony murder, I cannot agree that finding liability for murder based on furnishing alcohol to a minor is an appropriate application of the doctrine.

¶ 3 Indisputably, there must be a nexus between the underlying felony and the victim’s death.6 The question is how we determine that link.7 The two most common methods of finding causation are through agency theory or proximate cause. Rather than answer that question, the majority appears to refer to “nexus” as a replacement for causation — an option this Court has not before exercised.8 As the cases cited by the majority suggest, in the past this Court has danced around adoption of the proximate cause theory, which requires that the death in question is foreseeable and proximately related to the commission of the felony.9 However, in Kinchion v. State this Court used a version of proximate cause analysis to conclude that a defendant is liable for first degree felony murder when his accomplice is killed by their victim during the course of an armed robbery.10 While Kinchion interpreted the first degree felony murder statute, *1122there is no analytical difference in causation requirements for first and second degree murder.11

¶4 The majority concludes that the law prohibiting giving alcohol to a minor is an “inherently dangerous” offense. Malaske gave a bottle of vodka to his teenage sister, who shared it (along with other alcoholic beverages not provided by Malaske) with her underage friend. The friend died of alcohol poisoning. The majority determines that Malaske has committed second degree felony murder. Absolutely nothing in the statutory language of either the felony murder or furnishing alcohol to a minor statutes, or both taken together, suggest the Legislature intended such a stunningly broad result.

¶ 5 The key question here is whether the underlying felony, furnishing alcohol to a minor, can support a second degree felony murder charge. The law provides that any person who knowingly sells, provides or furnishes alcohol to a person under 21 is guilty of a felony punishable by a fine and imprisonment.12 The majority finds that this statute makes alcoholic beverages a controlled substance, and puts minors into a protected class.13 I agree with those conclusions but cannot read into them the significance the majority assigns them. Under this statute, alcohol is “controlled” in the sense that its disposition is regulated. Alcohol is also regulated by limitations on its manufactured strength and the method of its sale to adults, and by prohibitions against driving, operating machinery, or misbehaving in public while under its influence. However, alcoholic beverages in themselves are not, under Oklahoma law, treated as dangerous. Within regulatory limits, it is legal to make, sell, own and consume alcoholic beverages. The Legislature has made a policy decision to control this substance not because it poses any inherent threat, but because its misuse can, as we see in this case, have tragic consequences. This is in keeping with other legislative decisions to control substances that are not, in themselves, threats to human life.14

¶ 6 The majority’s conclusion that this felony is inherently dangerous “as determined by the elements of the offense” is explicitly based on the conclusion that minors are a protected class. However, this justification has harsh consequences. The decision also extends liability for murder to bartenders and convenience store clerks who sell alcohol to a minor, if that minor then shares the *1123alcohol with another minor who drinks too much and dies (perhaps by alcohol poisoning, perhaps in an accident after driving under influence of the alcohol sold by the clerk). Fraternities and other organizations who provide alcohol at parties, and parents who give or supervise graduation parties, will be hable for murder if the alcohol they supply is shared with minors and a death results.15

¶ 7 According to the majority Malaske committed second degree felony murder when (a) he gave his teenage sister an alcoholic beverage, (b) she shared the alcohol with her underage friend, (c) the friend drank too much, and (d) the friend died. However, given the explicit premise on which this decision rests, Malaske could not be guilty of second degree felony murder if he had given vodka to his 22-year-old friend, who then shared the bottle with another adult who died of alcohol poisoning. That is, Malaske could have given the same controlled substance to another adult, and if an adult died after ingesting too much of that substance, it would be legal.

¶ 8 Perhaps recognizing this distinction, the majority suggests that the crime of furnishing alcohol to a minor is designed to protect people who cannot exercise good judgment in its use.16 The majority compares this with “the act of distributing or dispensing CDS or trafficking in illegal drugs”, which are predicate crimes for first-degree felony murder. The acronym “CDS”, as used here, stands for illegal controlled dangerous substances.17 That is, the majority is comparing the Legislature’s regulation of alcohol — a legal substance — with its prohibition against manufacture, distribution, possession or use of illegal drugs. This suggestion shows either the majority’s lack of perspective regarding the facts of this case, or its misunderstanding of the differing nature of various controlled substances. The issue regarding controlled dangerous substances is not one of exercising good judgment; the Legislature has enacted a flat prohibition against these inherently dangerous substances. Put another way, the CDS statutes presume that nobody, regardless of age, can exercise good judgment when illegal drugs are concerned. This is not the case with alcohol. “Trafficking” in large amounts of alcohol is legal and routinely done in the course of business by package stores and convenience stores across Oklahoma.

¶ 9 This opinion is an extension of the majority’s decision in Kinchion. Both cases rest, finally, on the notion that where a death occurs, someone must be liable for murder. In Kinchion, the victim killed Kinchion’s accomplice in self-defense. Here, a young woman died of alcohol poisoning. Felonies occurred near in time to both deaths: Kin-chion and the accomplice were committing armed robbery, while Malaske illegally gave his sister vodka. Kinchion and Malaske should be punished for the crimes they committed. There can be no doubt about that. The majority here, however, are not content with that result, and have invented a way to ensure someone is punished for murder in both cases. This can only be described as the ultimate version of the extremists blame game. There are times when somebody dies and nobody can be liable for murder. This was a sad and senseless episode. Malaske, along with the persons present while the victim drank too much, passed out, and died, should regret every step of his part in it, and suffer the consequences for having commit*1124ted a felony. He should not be branded a murderer. I dissent.