¶ 1 Bank of America, N.A. (BANA) appeals from the district court's dismissal of its action to enforce a federal foreclosure judgment it obtained against W. Jeffrey Dasovich and Sally W. Dasovich. Based on our review of the law and the record presented, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In 2007, BANA filed a foreclosure action against the Dasoviches in Oklahoma County District Court. The Dasoviches were served and filed an answer. However, prior to filing their answer, the case was removed, on diversity grounds, to the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. Thereafter, BANA filed a motion for summary judgment in the federal case, to which the Dasoviches filed an objection and response. In August 2008, the federal court granted BANA's motion as to its right to foreclose, but denied the motion as to the amount of damages. On February 13, 2009, BANA filed another motion for summary judgment as to the amount of damages. The federal court sustained that motion by separate order and on March 19, 2009, the federal court entered its foreclosure judgment awarding judgment to BANA in rem and in personam against the Dasoviches in the amount of $201,597.82 with interest on that amount from November 2006 at the rate of 6.875% per annum, and a reasonable attorney's fee and costs.

¶ 3 In the foreclosure judgment, the federal court stated:

[T]his case [is] remanded to the District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma [,] and a Special Execution and Order of Sale *549issue out of the office of said District Court Clerk, directed to the Sheriff to levy upon, advertise and sell, after due and legal appraisement, the [subject] real estate and premises ..., subject to unpaid real estate ad valorem taxes and/or special assessments, if any, and pay the proceeds of said sale to the Clerk of the District Court of Oklahoma County, as provided by law, for application as follows: [to payment for the costs of the sale, to BANA for payment of its foreclosure judgment, and to payment of the junior lien holders.]

Said order reserving the right of [BANA] to recall said execution by oral announcement and/or further order of the District Court of Oklahoma County prior to the sale.

The foreclosure judgment stated "[i]ncluded in the remand are all matters pertaining to the enforcement of this judgment, including but not limited to confirmation of the sale."

¶ 4 On June 23, 2010, the federal court clerk for the western district sent a letter to the Oklahoma County Court Clerk that was filed in the Oklahoma County court case on July 6, 2010. The letter stated that pursuant to the March 2009 foreclosure judgment, "this case was remanded to your court for all matters pertaining to the enforcement of [the foreclosure] judgment, including but not limited to confirmation of the sale." It also stated that "enclosed" was a certified copy of the remand order and a certified copy of the docket sheet in the foreclosure action.

¶ 5 On July 30, 2010, BANA issued a Special Execution and Order of Sale out of the office of the Oklahoma County Court Clerk and Sheriff's Sale was set for September 16, 2010, but was later recalled. An alias special execution and order of sale was issued in October 2010, and Sheriff's Sale was set for December 2010. On November 24, 2010, the Dasoviches filed an application for temporary restraining order in which they admitted they were made aware of the foreclosure judgment in mid-August 2010 when they received notice of the Sheriff's Sale. Among other matters, they claimed they had no notice of the filing of the motion for summary judgment in the federal case, had made attempts to get certain financial information from BANA in November 2010 via subpoena duces tecum but had received no documentation from BANA's attorneys, and were "desirous of resolving their continuing dispute with [BANA]."

¶ 6 On May 25, 2016, the Dasoviches filed a motion to dismiss BANA's action for lack of jurisdiction and failure to properly register the foreclosure judgment pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, 12 O.S. 2011 §§ 719 - 726. Between November 2010 and May 2016, BANA had issued two other alias special executions and order of sale, the Dasoviches filed three other applications for temporary injunction, the court entered an order sustaining the Dasoviches' fourth application for temporary restraining order, and the court granted BANA's motion to vacate the temporary restraining order and set an evidentiary hearing for March 2016 to determine the amount needed to satisfy the debt obligation, but that hearing was postponed until August 2016.

¶ 7 The hearing apparently did not occur; however, on August 18, 2016, having previously received the briefs and arguments of the parties, the trial court heard arguments on the Dasoviches' motion to dismiss. On November 2, 2016, the Oklahoma district court entered its order sustaining the Dasoviches' motion finding that the "certified copy" of the foreclosure judgment filed by the federal court clerk did not satisfy the requirements of the UEFJA "of filing an 'authenticated' copy of the judgment. Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction over any further post-judgment execution proceedings in this matter."

¶ 8 BANA appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9 The trial court dismissed BANA's action because it determined it lacked jurisdiction to proceed in the matter. "The standard of review for questions concerning the jurisdictional power of the trial court to act is de novo." Dilliner v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Okla. , 2011 OK 61, ¶ 12, 258 P.3d 516 (citation omitted). Similarly, this Court subjects a trial court's order granting a motion to dismiss to de novo review.

*550Wilson v. State ex rel. State Election Bd. , 2012 OK 2, ¶ 4, 270 P.3d 155. Motions to dismiss are generally disfavored. Id.1

ANALYSIS

I. Nature of Foreclosure Judgment: Foreign Judgment

¶ 10 In its statement of the issues to be adjudicated on appeal, BANA asserts, "Whether the docket of the federal action is automatically incorporated into the state court docket is a matter of first impression for the Oklahoma Supreme Court and is likely the determinative issue in this appeal."2 In its supplemental briefing in opposition to the Dasoviches' motion to dismiss, BANA cites a number of cases from other jurisdictions in which those state appellate courts gave effect upon remand to pleadings and motions filed in federal cases prior to remand. As BANA states, the reason many of these courts do so is because "interests of efficiency and judicial economy favor a policy of giving continued effect to pleadings and motions filed in federal court prior to remand. This rule mirrors the federal post-removal procedure of picking the case up where it left off and avoids the necessity of duplicative filings." Crumpton v. Perryman , 956 P.2d 670, 675 (Colo. App. 1998) (citations omitted).

¶ 11 In all of the cases cited by BANA, however, the cases were remanded because *551the federal court determined it did not have subject matter jurisdiction, either because it lacked diversity of citizenship or a federal question,3 or because the federal court exercised its discretion to remand state claims properly removed with the federal jurisdiction claim after the federal claim was resolved.4 In none of those cases did the federal court render final judgment on the claim and remand for enforcement of its judgment in the state court and no pendant state claim remained.5 BANA has not cited, nor have we found, statutory or decisional authority that gives a federal court the discretion, under the circumstances presented here, to remand a case over which the federal court properly exercised jurisdiction.6

¶ 12 We, therefore, conclude the foreclosure judgment in this case is a foreign judgment that BANA may seek to enforce in Oklahoma.

II. District Court's Jurisdiction

¶ 13 As BANA concedes, it may seek enforcement of a foreign judgment in Oklahoma courts either through filing a lawsuit to enforce that judgment or through the provisions of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, 12 O.S. 2011 §§ 719 - 726.7 It asserts it "substantially complied with the spirit of the UEFJA" and, thus, the trial court erred in dismissing the case because the court determined it lacked jurisdiction. BANA claims it substantially complied because the clerk of the court from which the foreclosure judgment was entered filed a certified copy of that judgment along with a certified copy of the docket sheet from the federal action on July 6, 2010.

¶ 14 The motion and arguments made by the Dasoviches in support of their motion call *552for dismissal "with prejudice" of BANA's "action" because, they claim, it did not comply with the mandatory requirements of the UEFJA. They argue the foreclosure judgment was not "properly registered" because it was not properly authenticated; it was not separately filed or file-stamped; the court clerk did not file proof of mailing of notice of the filing of the foreign judgment to them; BANA did not file proof of mailing of notice of the filing of the foreign judgment to them; BANA did not make or file an affidavit setting forth the name and last-known post office address of the judgment debtor and of the judgment creditor; and BANA did not pay the required filing fees to register a foreign judgment. The Dasoviches argue the trial court lacked jurisdiction to domesticate the foreclosure judgment because the UEFJA requirements are mandatory.

¶ 15 While the trial court sustained the Dasoviches' motion, the trial court did not expressly dismiss BANA's claim "with prejudice." The court determined an "authenticated" copy of the foreclosure judgment had not been filed; thus, it lacked jurisdiction "over any further post-judgment execution proceedings in this matter." The trial court did not grant BANA leave to amend or otherwise cure the defective registration as provided in 12 O.S. 2011 § 2012(G).8 As explained by this Court in Pellebon :

The [Oklahoma] Supreme Court has interpreted this obligation in § 2012(G) to grant leave to amend "as a mandatory duty placed on trial courts, as long as the defect can be remedied." [ Fanning v. Brown , 2004 OK 7, ¶ 23, 85 P.3d 841 ]. The trial court must as a general rule specify the deficiencies as to each claim which subject that claim to dismissal and either state that no amendment of the claim could cure the stated defect(s) or set a reasonable time for Plaintiff to amend in accordance with 12 O.S. 2011 § 2012(G).

2015 OK CIV APP 70, ¶ 16, 358 P.3d 288.

¶ 16 The question presented for our review is whether the trial court correctly determined as a matter of law that the authentication requirement is jurisdictional and whether the defect was curable.

¶ 17 The Dasoviches argue the defect is jurisdictional and cannot be cured relying on Vaughan v. Graves , 2012 OK 113, 291 P.3d 623, in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated:

A court may enforce a foreign judgment as if it had rendered it but only after the statutory registration requirements have been satisfied. This is true whether the attempt at enforcement of the foreign judgment is in the nature of execution or contempt. Until such time, the trial court lacks the authority to act. The fact that this matter was brought pursuant to the [Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] does not change the registration requirements. The foreign judgment must be filed in the county of the court from which remedies in the nature of execution will issue before that court can acquire jurisdiction.

Id. ¶ 16. The Dasoviches argue the trial court lacked the power to enforce the foreclosure judgment and BANA cannot "attempt to rescue an unregistered foreign judgment by belated registration," citing Vaughan , ¶ 17.

¶ 18 At issue in Vaughan was "the jurisdiction of the trial court to enforce orders in aid of execution of a foreign judgment or judgment collection remedies before a creditor has registered the foreign judgment in the county of the court from which execution issues." Id. ¶ 10.9 In discussing the UEFJA, *553the Oklahoma Supreme Court explained that pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011 § 721, "the mere act of filing [the foreign judgment], in substance, transfers the properly authenticated foreign judgment into an Oklahoma judgment." The judgment may be enforced against the judgment debtor "in the same manner as any intra-state judgment." Vaughan , ¶ 12 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Producers Grain Corp. v. Carroll , 1976 OK CIV APP 3, ¶ 8, 546 P.2d 285 ). The Supreme Court further explained, however, that 12 O.S. § 706(A)"applies to all judgments of courts of record of this state, and judgments of courts of the United States ... which award the payment of money, regardless of whether such judgments also include other orders or relief"; however, § 706(D)"specifically requires that '[e]xecution shall be issued only from the court which granted the judgment being enforced.' " Vaughan , ¶ 13. "Thus, while domestication of a foreign judgment may be obtained by its filing in any county, execution of that foreign judgment requires that it be filed in the county of the court that enforces the judgment." Id. (footnote omitted).

¶ 19 In Vaughan , while the bankruptcy judgments were domesticated in July 2002 in Oklahoma upon their filing in Payne County, the county in which the debtors owned property, they were not filed in the Oklahoma County case until after the 2007 and 2010 orders in that case. It was in this context the Supreme Court stated, "The belated registration of the foreign judgment in 2011 did not authorize the trial court to retroactively enforce orders which were void for lack of jurisdiction." Id. ¶ 17. The Court further stated,

The 2011 judgment registration did not make the void portions of the prior orders any less so. "A trial court may not take judicial notice of findings of fact and conclusions of law encompassed within a void judgment." New findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding any attempt to enforce the bankruptcy judgments are required.

Id. ¶ 18 (citation omitted).

¶ 20 The issue presented in Vaughan is different from the one presented in the current appeal. Unlike the facts in Vaughan , here the foreclosure petition was filed in Oklahoma County against the Dasoviches in April 2007 and they filed an answer in June 2007. The case was then removed to the federal district court and a foreclosure judgment was entered in March 2009 against the Dasoviches and in favor of BANA. The foreclosure judgment also remanded the case to the Oklahoma County District Court for enforcement of its foreclosure judgment. On July 6, 2010, a letter to the Oklahoma County Court Clerk from the Deputy Court Clerk of the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma dated June 23, 2010, was filed in the present case. That letter informed the Oklahoma County Court Clerk that pursuant to the foreclosure judgment the case was remanded to the state court for all matters pertaining to enforcement of the foreclosure judgment and stated "a certified copy of the remand order and a certified copy of the docket sheet" were enclosed. A copy of the foreclosure judgment was attached with an attestation from the Deputy Court Clerk that the judgment was "[a] true copy of the original." Thereafter, BANA repeatedly sought special execution on that judgment, an attempt at execution that the Dasoviches successfully thwarted over more than five years of litigation prior to the filing of their motion to dismiss. Unlike the bank in Vaughan , BANA does not seek to enforce any orders of the state district court entered prior to registration of the foreclosure judgment. Further, unlike the bank in Vaughan , a copy of the foreclosure judgment was filed in the very Oklahoma County court from which enforcement of that judgment was sought. The jurisdictional infirmity *554present in Vaughan is not present here.

¶ 21 While we agree that authentication of the foreign judgment pursuant to the UEFJA is a requirement to registering that judgment, we do not agree that lack of authentication is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived by a party. In Concannon v. Hampton , 1978 OK 117, 584 P.2d 218, the Oklahoma Supreme Court was presented with an argument similar to the argument raised by the Dasoviches. There, the defendant argued a sister-state judgment was not authenticated as required by § 721 and, therefore, the district court lacked authority-jurisdiction-to enforce it under the UEFJA. Concannon , ¶ 3. In addressing the lack of authentication argument, the Supreme Court stated: "Authentication may be defined as the act of giving legal authority to a written instrument or a certified copy thereof, so as to render it legally admissible into evidence.... Authentication is evidentiary, not jurisdictional." Id. ¶ 7 (footnotes omitted). The Court held the defendant, who did not raise the issue of authentication at trial and who stipulated to the judgment's admissibility, "waived any objections to the lack of authentication[.]" Id.10

¶ 22 BANA asserts the Dasoviches waived any objections they might have had to authentication because during over five years of litigation in this action, they never objected to the lack of authentication. Further, we note, the Dasoviches do not, in fact, claim the foreclosure judgment is not authentic, though *555they argue they contest the "validity" of the foreclosure judgment, because they " 'never received notification of the filing of the Motion for Summary Judgment' that led to the 'Foreclosure Judgment' and ... they had not been aware that the 'Foreclosure Judgment' had been entered."11 While the Dasoviches, unlike the defendants in Concannon , raised the issue of authentication below, their failure to raise that evidentiary defect for more than five years in the present case and their failure to assert what prejudice they suffered thereby-as opposed to asserting some legal argument they may have about whether the foreclosure judgment is void or otherwise subject to collateral attack-leads us to conclude they waived that evidentiary defect and the trial court has jurisdiction to proceed with this action.

¶ 23 Consequently, we conclude the trial court erred as a matter of law in dismissing BANA's action.12

CONCLUSION

¶ 24 We conclude the trial court erred in dismissing BANA's action on the federal foreclosure judgment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the cause for further proceedings.

¶ 25 REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS .

THORNBRUGH, V.C.J., and WISEMAN, J., concur.