In re Henry
In re Henry
Opinion of the Court
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Nobody likes deadlines, especially ones with consequences. In many ways, the bankruptcy system used in the United States of America is built upon notices, deadlines, and consequences. If a debtor fails to file required documents within the time set forth by rule or statute, his or her case is subject to dismissal. If a creditor fails to file a claim, it may not get paid from the bankruptcy estate. And, if a creditor fails to object to a plan, that creditor is likely to be stuck with its contents.
In this Chapter 13 case, the debtors filed a plan that provided for the claim of the creditor holding a first mortgage on their house. The creditor did not object, and the plan was confirmed.. In addition, the creditor did not file a proof of claim within the deadline set by rule. As a result, the debtors filed a claim on the creditor’s behalf. Now, some two years later, the creditor has filed an amended claim. In addition, the creditor expects the debtors to revise their confirmed plan to conform to the amended claim. The debtors cry foul, saying to the creditor, in effect, “where have you been all these years?” The question is whether the creditor should be allowed to file an amended claim, and, far more importantly, whether the debtors should be forced to amend their plan. The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are made pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052, made applicable to this contested matter by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9014.
Jurisdiction
The Court has jurisdiction over this bankruptcy case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(b).
Findings of Fact
The facts in this case are undisputed. Glenn Keith Henry and Joyce Fay Henry (“Debtors”) filed an original petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code with this Court on July 9, 2012. JPMorgan Chase Bank (“Chase”) is a creditor in this case, holding a note secured by a first mortgage on the Debtors’ residence. The Court established November 13, 2012, as the deadline for filing claims in this case. Chase received proper notice of the claims bar date but did not file a claim.
On December 14, 2012, Debtors filed their Second Amended Chapter 13 Plan (the “Plan”).
As a result of Chase’s failure to file a proof of claim, Debtors filed a proof of claim on Chase’s behalf on August 2, 2013 (the “Chase Claim”).
Debtors have filed four proposed modifications to the Plan since February 20, 2013. Notice of each proposed modification and the deadline for objection has been sent to Chase, and Chase has not objected
On March 4, 2015, . Chase filed' its amended proof of claim in this case (the “Chase Amended Claim”).
To the extent the “Conclusions of Law” contains items that should more appropriately be considered “Findings of Fact,” those findings of fact are incorporated into the Court’s findings of fact by this reference.
Conclusions of Law
Debtors acted well within their rights in filing the Chase Claim after Chase failed to timely file a claim on its own behalf.
Ordinarily, amendment’ of a proof of claim is freely permitted so long as the claim initially provided adequate notice of the existence, nature, and amount of the claim as well as the creditor’s intent • to hold the estate hable. The court should not allow truly new claims to proceed under the guise of amendment.14
The case cited by Chase also notes that a court should consider the prejudice to the objecting party in determining whether to allow the amendment.
The Plan has been confirmed, and the order confirming the Plan is a final order. In a Chapter 13 case, “[t]he provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and each creditor, whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by the plan, and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan.”
Lower courts have not hesitated to hold the creditor to the terms of a confirmed plan. In In re McLemore,
Section 1327 of the Code sets forth the effects of a confirmed plan. In particular, § 1327(a) states that “[t]he provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debt- or and each creditor, whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by the plan, and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a). This section has been widely interpreted as barring the relitigation of any issue which was or could have been decided at the time the plan was confirmed. In re Welch, 1998 WL 773999, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 11, 1998) (table decision). Underlying this principle is the need for finality that parties have after confirmation of a plan so that they may rely upon the terms of the plan and confirmation order “without concern that actions which they may thereafter take could be upset because of a later change or revocation of that order.” 8 Collier on Bankruptcy, 1327.02 (16th ed. 2009). This policy is so strong that a “creditor may not ignore the confirmation process.... A creditor who disregards a procedurally proper and plain notice that its interests are in jeopardy does so at its own risk.” Factors Funding Co. v. Fili, 257 B.R. 370, 374 (1st Cir. 2001).19
Similarly, in In re Alonso,
The court further finds that the secured creditor’s amended proof of claim # 8-2 fails to satisfy the other two (2) factors of the second prong because it constitutes a dilatory tactic by the claimant which would result in unfair prejudice not only to unsecured creditors which have already received their distributions but also to the Debtor who paid the secured creditor as requested in its original proof of claim. If the court were to allow this amended claim, this would result in the Trustee having to recover disbursements made for years to the unsecured creditors. The court also finds that such a tardily filed amended proof of claim constitutes a failed attempt by the secured creditor to correct a mistake which it had plenty of time to become aware of, but failed to diligently account for the Debtor’s prepetition mortgage arrears. BPPR should have been aware of the Debtor’s pre-petition mortgage arrears from the date the Debtor filed her bankruptcy petition or shortly thereafter. The secured creditor had ample time to correct its mistake but failed to do so, thus waiving its right to receive payment of those pre-petition mortgage arrears. “A party*849 may waive any right which it is legally entitled to, including rights secured by contract.” In re Taylor, 280 B.R. 711, 716 (Bankr.S.D.Al. 2001) citing Dooley v. Weil (In re Garfinkle), 672 F.2d 1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 1982). Therefore, this •court concludes that the secured creditor waived its right to receive payment of the pre-petition mortgage arrearages in the amount of $8,800 and the late charges in the amount of $654.50 for a total of $9,454.50.22
In both cases, the need for finality in Chapter 13 cases and the creditor’s acquiescence to the terms of the confirmed plan trumped the amended claim. This is the only logical result. Congress has mandated that the terms of a confirmed plan are binding upon the debtor and all creditors. Section 1327(a) provides both certainty and finality in every Chapter 13 case. The message to creditors could not be more clear: if you do not like how you are treated under a Chapter 13 plan, you must file an objection to the plan. Allowing a creditor to supercede or nullify a final, non-appealable order confirming a Chapter 13 plan by amending its claim and demanding that a debtor pay more based upon the amended claim would stand the Chapter 13 process on its head.
In this case, Chase had proper notice of the bankruptcy filing and the claims bar date and chose not to file a claim. In addition, Chase had a full and fair opportunity to object to the Plan to the extent Chase believed the amount of its claim was not accurately set forth therein. To the extent Chase now claims a greater arrear-age than the one set forth in the Chase Claim and the Plan, it has waived its right to do so. Moreover, it is bound by § 1327(a) to the treatment of its claim in the Plan. Allowing an amended claim at this late date would not nullify § 1327(a), and would therefore serve no purpose in the administration of this bankruptcy case.
Conclusion
If a creditor does not like how it is treated in a Chapter 13 plan, it must object to the plan within the time allowed for such an objection or forever hold its peace.
A separate judgment consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is entered concurrently herewith.
JUDGMENT
THIS MATTER comes before, the Court pursuant to Debtors’ Objection to Proof of Claim Number 9-2, at Docket No. 93, and the Response to the Objection filed by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., at Docket No. 99. The issues having been duly considered and a decision having been duly rendered, for the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Opinion filed concurrently herewith,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Debtors’ Objection to Proof of Claim Number
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. be, and the same hereby is, denied leave to file an amended proof of claim in this case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Claim Number 9-2 is stricken.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Claim Number 9-1 is allowed as filed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. is bound by the terms and provisions of the confirmed plan in this case in all respects, including but not limited to the amount of the ar-rearage set forth therein.
. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to sections of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq.
. Docket No. 32.
. Docket No. 34.
. Docket No. 39.
. Claim No. 9-1.
. Docket No. 48.
. Docket No. 90.
. Claim No. 9-2.
. Docket No. 93.
. Id.
. Docket No. 99.
. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3004 ("If a creditor does not timely file a proof of claim under Rule 3002(c) or 3003(c), the debtor or trustee may file a proof of the claim within 30 days
. In re Limited Gaming of America, Inc., 213 B.R. 369, 372 (Bankr.N.D.Okla. 1997).
. In re Unioil, Inc., 962 F.2d 988, 992 (10th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
. Id. at 993 ("In light of Unioil’s failure to demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from the requested amendment, which, as already noted, asserted the same substantive interest as the original proof of claim and merely substituted the Trust as the proper claimant, we cannot say the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in allowing the Trust’s claim”) (citations omitted).
. § 1327(a).
. 559 U.S. 260, 130 S.Ct. 1367, 176 L.Ed.2d 158 (2010).
. 426 B.R. 728 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 2010).
. 525 B.R. 195 (Bankr.D.P.R. 2015).
.Id. at 198.
. Id. at. 206-07.
. This is not to suggest that bankruptcy courts are not bound by the admonishment in Espinosa to refuse to confirm a plan that does not comply with the operative provisions of the Bankruptcy Code even in the absence of an objection. Such is not the case here. There is nothing about the Plan that is per se objectionable.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- IN RE: Glenn Keith HENRY and Joyce Fay Henry, Debtors
- Cited By
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- Published