In re Gomes
In re Gomes
Opinion of the Court
"..., but at the length truth will out. "
It is an oft-stated maxim that attorneys are "officers of the court." What exactly does it mean to be an "officer of the court?" Is it enough for an attorney to obtain a desired result for his or her client, even if they mislead, fail to fully inform, or violate rules of the Court in the process? Is a United States Bankruptcy Court a place where, when it comes to the areas of attorney conduct and non-disclosure, no harm equals no foul? Does ignorance of the law excuse misconduct? All of these questions are raised in the seventeen cases presently before the Court. For each question, the answer is the same: absolutely, unequivocally, no.
Before the Court is the Motion for Review of Debtor's Transactions with J. Ken Gallon, Attorney (the "Motion"),
Jurisdiction
The Court has jurisdiction over these bankruptcy cases pursuant to
Findings of Fact
1. The BK Billing Model
Gallon is a consumer debtors' attorney based in Miami, Oklahoma. BK Billing, LLC ("BK Billing"), a Utah limited liability company, is a finance company that provides factoring services to bankruptcy counsel in Chapter 7 cases. On May 11, 2017, Gallon executed an Accounts Receivable Assignment Agreement (the "AR Agreement"), in which he established a factoring arrangement with BK Billing.
In addition to the factoring services, BK Billing provided Gallon with various pleadings and templates to effectuate a business model whereby Gallon would enter two separate retention agreements with his clients. The first, executed prior to filing a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, was for services up to and including filing the petition. The second, executed after the case was filed, was for all remaining services that were rendered to a debtor post-petition.
At a hearing in these matters, Gallon testified that upon meeting with a new client, if he determined that the client was in need of immediate bankruptcy relief but was unable to pay his fee prior to filing the case, Gallon would present them with the "BK Billing Model."
A. The debtors entered into a "Contract for Pre-Petition Legal Services in a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Case" (the "Pre-Petition Agreement")13 with Gallon.14
B. Under the Pre-Petition Agreement, the debtors were to pay Gallon a specified fee15 for various pre-petition bankruptcy services, including "meeting and consulting with [Gallon] as needed," a "detailed analysis of [ ] client questionnaire," and "preparation and filing of a Chapter 7 Voluntary Petition, Statement About Social Security Numbers[.]"16 The debtors agreed to pay additional fees for a "Pre-filing Credit Counseling Briefing Certificate" and a credit report.
C. The Pre-Petition Agreement gave the debtors the option to pay the Bankruptcy Court filing fee of $335 in full up front, apply to pay it in installments, or request that Gallon pay the fee and seek reimbursement from the debtors at a later time.
D. The Pre-Petition Agreement stated that Gallon's contractual responsibilities would end "upon completion of the filing of [the] bankruptcy case." It also stated that "the Law Firm will remain professionally obligated to serve as counsel for Client in the case until the Bankruptcy Court allows the Law Firm to formally withdraw."17
E. The Pre-Petition Agreement laid out various options regarding the completion of the debtors' bankruptcy case through discharge. The debtors could 1) retain Gallon under a second retainer agreement to be *74executed post-petition, where Gallon would complete the case for an additional specified fee;18 2) seek other counsel to complete the case; or 3) proceed without legal representation, i.e., pro se . If the debtors did not choose to retain Gallon for post-petition services within 10 days after filing the bankruptcy petition, they agreed to consent to Gallon's withdrawal as counsel in the case. The Pre-Petition Agreement also placed the responsibility on the debtors to notify their creditors once the bankruptcy case was filed.
F. After execution of the Pre-Petition Agreement, Gallon filed what is colloquially referred to as a "bare-bones" Chapter 7 petition on behalf of the debtors. That means the documents filed represent the bare minimum necessary to successfully open a bankruptcy case and invoke the automatic stay. In all cases, this consisted of Official Form 101, Voluntary Petition for Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy, required by Rule 1002(a); a Certificate of Counseling, required by Rule 1007(b)(3)(A); a list of creditors, required by Rule 1007(a)(1); and a Verification as to Official Mailing Matrix, required by Rule 1008.19 In the seven cases filed prior to August 24, 2017, the initial filing also included Official Form 106Sum, Summary of Your Assets and Liabilities and Certain Statistical Information, required by Bankr. N.D. Okla. Local Rule 1007-1(G); Official Form 106D, Schedule D: Creditors Who Have Claims Secured by Property, required by Rule 1007(b)(1)(A); Official Form 106E/F, Schedule E/F: Creditors Who Have Unsecured Claims, required by Rule 1007(b)(1)(A); and Official Form 106Dec, Declaration About an Individual Debtor's Schedules, required by Rule 1008.20
G. In eleven of the seventeen Captioned Cases, Gallon filed Bankruptcy Form 103A, Application for Individuals to Pay the Filing Fee in Installments (the "Installment Application"), on behalf of the debtors, requesting that they be allowed to pay the Court filing fee in installments of $83.75 per month for four months, beginning one month from the date the petition was filed. At the time the Installment Application was filed in each case, the Court had no information regarding the financial condition of the debtors, i.e., no schedules of current income or expenditure had been filed.
H. In each of the BK Billing Cases, Gallon and the debtors executed a "Contract for Post-Petition Legal Services in a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Case" (the "Post-Petition Agreement").21 In the Post-Petition Agreement, the debtors agreed to retain Gallon to represent them in the post-petition proceedings of their bankruptcy case in exchange *75for a specified fee,22 described as a non-refundable flat fee. Gallon agreed to perform the following services for debtors:
1) Preparation and filing of the Statement of Financial Affairs and Schedules;
2) Preparation for and attendance at the Section 341 Meeting of Creditors;
3) Review and attendance (if necessary) to motions for stay relief;
4) Review of any redemption agreements;
5) Review of any reaffirmation agreements;
6) Follow through with case administration and monitoring;
7) File motions to reopen (if necessary)[.]23
I. The Post-Petition Agreement included the following statements:
I acknowledge and agree that as all of these fees are for post-petition services, they are not dischargeable in my Chapter 7 case. In the event of nonpayment of the agreed-upon fees, the Law Firm may commence legal proceedings for collection.
I understand that the Law Firm may assign my post-petition accounts receivable to BK Billing, LLC. I authorize the Law Firm or BK Billing to communicate with me via e-mail, text, and/or telephone. I explicitly give my consent to the Law Firm to share my client file information with BK Billing, including my contact information and social security number. I acknowledge that my payments to BK Billing will be reported to credit bureaus. I acknowledge that on-time payments can help my credit and late payments can hurt my credit. I have been provided an opportunity to ask the Law Firm questions regarding the Law Firm's accounts receivable assignment agreement with BK Billing. The Law Firm has answered all such questions to my satisfaction.
I agree to submit to the personal jurisdiction of the Oklahoma courts with respect to such action, and Oklahoma law will apply. If such collection procedures shall become necessary, I agree to pay all reasonable costs of such collection, including reasonable attorney fees.
I understand that I am to notify my creditors of my bankruptcy case once my case is filed.24
J. Attached to the Post-Petition Agreement was a "Recurring Payment Authorization and Consent Form" in which the debtors authorized Gallon or BK Billing, LLC, referred to as an "independent billing company," to charge their debit card a specified fee per month until a specified amount was paid in full.25 That form included the following statement:
I give my consent that the Law Firm may sell or factor the accounts receivable associated with my contract to BK Billing. I acknowledge my payments would then be made directly to BK Billing on behalf of the Law Firm. I authorize the Law Firm or BK Billing to communicate with me via mail, e-mail, text, and/or telephone. I give *76my consent for the Law Firm to share my client file information, including my Social Security Number, with BK Billing for the purpose of processing and reporting my payments. I acknowledge that my payments may be reported to the Credit Bureaus. I acknowledge that on-time payments may help my credit and late payments may hurt my credit.26
K. In all of the Captioned Cases, Gallon filed the remaining schedules and statements required by § 521 and Rule 1007(b) sometime after the petition date.
L. Among the documents filed post-petition in each case was a Disclosure of Compensation of Attorney for Debtor ("Disclosure of Compensation"), which indicated that Gallon had agreed to accept a specified fee27 "for services rendered or to be rendered on behalf of the debtor(s) in contemplation of or in connection with the bankruptcy case."28 Gallon stated that he had received a specified fee29 prior to filing the statement, leaving a specified balance due.30 In every case, he checked the box next to the statement "I have not agreed to share the above-disclosed compensation with any other person unless they are members and associates of my law firm." Gallon also indicated that "by agreement with the debtor(s), the above-disclosed fee does not include the following service: 1) Lien Avoidance; 2) Adversary Proceeding; 3) Judgment Lien Removal; 4) Re-Affirmation (sic) Agreement; 5) Re-Affirmation (sic) Agreement Recession; 6) Amendment to Peition (sic), Schedules and Statements; 7) Objection to Discharge."31
2. The debtors
The facts in each of the Captioned Cases are as follows:
a. BK Billing Cases
Roberta Ellarae Wright, Case No. 17-11936-M
On September 12, 2017, Roberta Ellarae Wright ("Wright") retained Gallon under a Pre-Petition Agreement, where she agreed to pay $200 for pre-petition services in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, plus $9 for credit counseling and $33 for a credit report.
Ian Gomes and Stephanie Ann Gomes , Case No. 17-11172-M
On June 12, 2017, Ian Gomes and Stephanie Ann Gomes (the "Gomeses") retained Gallon under a Pre-Petition Agreement, where they agreed to pay $100 for pre-petition services in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case.
Ryan Michael Brown, Case No. 17-11411-M
On July 14, 2017, Ryan Michael Brown ("Brown") retained Gallon under a Pre-Petition Agreement, where he agreed to pay $158 for pre-petition services in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, plus $9 for credit counseling and $33 for a credit report.
Brittany Marie Dirkswager, Case No. 17-11410-M
Sometime in June 2017, Brittany Marie Dirkswager ("Dirkswager") retained Gallon under a Pre-Petition Agreement, where she agreed to pay $1,400 for pre-petition services in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, plus $9 for credit counseling and $53 for a credit report.
Tommy Lenard Guthrie and Debra Denise Guthrie, Case No. 17-11555-M
No Pre-Petition Agreement was offered to show when or the terms under which Tommy Lenard Guthrie and Debra Denise Guthrie (the "Guthries") retained Gallon. Their Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, *79Case No. 17-11555-M, was filed on August 4, 2017. On August 9, 2017, the Guthries executed a Post-Petition Agreement, where they agreed to pay $1,400 as a flat fee for Gallon to represent them in the completion of their case.
Karen Dawn Inman, Case No. 17-11559-M
On July 5, 2017, Karen Dawn Inman ("Inman") retained Gallon under a Pre-Petition Agreement, where she agreed to pay $1,400 for pre-petition services in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, plus $9 for credit counseling and $53 for a credit report.
Kiley Gene Lawrence, Case No. 17-11557-M
On August 1, 2017, Kiley Gene Lawrence ("Lawrence") retained Gallon under a Pre-Petition Agreement, where she agreed to pay $100 for pre-petition services in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, plus $9 for credit counseling and $53 for a *80credit report.
Michael Joe Lawson and Sara Lynne Lawson, Case No. 17-11558-M
On July 27, 2017, Michael Joe Lawson and Sara Lynne Lawson (the "Lawsons") retained Gallon under a Pre-Petition Agreement, where they agreed to pay $40 for pre-petition services in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, plus $9 for credit counseling and $53 for a credit report.
*81Gallon filed an Installment Application on behalf of the Lawsons.
Kimberly LeAnn Sullivan, Case No. 17-11690-M
An undated and unexecuted Pre-Petition Agreement was offered as evidence that Kimberly LeAnn Sullivan ("Sullivan") retained Gallon, where she agreed to pay $110 for pre-petition services in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, plus $9 for credit counseling and $33 for a credit report.
David Charles Williams, Case No. 17-11688-M
On August 22, 2017, David Charles Williams ("Williams") retained Gallon under a Pre-Petition Agreement, where he agreed to pay $200 for pre-petition services in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, plus $9 for credit counseling and $33 for a credit report.
*82leaving a balance due of $1,300. Williams's SOFA disclosed that he had paid Gallon $600 (date not indicated), and included the description "prepare petition, creditor matrix and verification [sic], obtain credit report, filing fee and credit counseling."
Daphne Leannette Robitaille, Case No. 17-11689-M
On August 1, 2017, Daphne Leannette Robitaille ("Robitaille") retained Gallon under a Pre-Petition Agreement, where she agreed to pay $100 for pre-petition services in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, plus $9 for credit counseling and $33 for a credit report.
Daniel Bruce Bowers and Janie Mae Bowers, Case No. 17-11932-M
On September 22, 2017, Daniel Bruce Bowers and Janie Mae Bowers (the "Bowers") retained Gallon under a Pre-Petition Agreement, where they agreed to pay $500 for pre-petition services in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, plus $9 for credit counseling and $53 for a credit report.
Dale Daniel Burris, Jr. and Sheila Mae Burris, Case No. 17-11933-M
An undated and unexecuted Pre-Petition Agreement was offered as evidence that Dale Daniel Burris, Jr. and Sheila Mae Burris (the "Burrises") retained Gallon, where they agreed to pay $90 for pre-petition services in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, plus $9 for credit counseling and $53 for a credit report.
Brett Wayne Murphy and April Irene Conder, Case No. 17-11930-M
On September 28, 2017, Brett Wayne Murphy ("Murphy") and April Irene Conder ("Conder"), retained Gallon under a Pre-Petition Agreement, where they *84agreed to pay $100 for pre-petition services in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, plus $9 for credit counseling and $53 for a credit report.
b. Non-Factored Cases
Kenneth Charles Burton, Case No. 17-12028-M
On October, 12, 2017, Kenneth Charles Burton ("Burton") filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, Case No. 17-12028-M. The bare bones petition was filed by Gallon as counsel. A receipt shows that Gallon received $150 in cash from Burton on October 3, 2017."
*85Darin Dwane Miller and Kathy Jo Miller, Case No. 17-12027-M
On October, 12, 2017, Darin Dwane Miller and Kathy Jo Miller (the "Millers") filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, Case No. 17-12027-M. The bare bones petition was filed by Gallon as counsel. No receipt was offered to show the amount received by Gallon. No Pre-Petition Agreement was offered to show the terms under which the Millers retained Gallon. According to Gallon, no Post-Petition Agreement was executed with the Millers because Gallon had ceased doing business with BK Billing and had agreed to complete the Miller case pending further Court review.
Kirby Dwayne Smith and Rebecca Leann Smith, Case No. 17-12029-M
On October, 12, 2017, Kirby Dwayne Smith and Rebecca Leann Smith (the "Smiths") filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, Case No. 17-12029-M. The bare bones petition was filed by Gallon as counsel. A receipt shows that Gallon received $200 by check from Kirby Smith on October 9, 2017.
*86c. Conventional Cases
Between June 13, 2017, the date Gallon filed the first BK Billing Case, and October 17, 2017, the date of the hearing where Gallon first disclosed his relationship with BK Billing to the Court, Gallon filed nineteen cases that did not utilize the services of BK Billing (the "Conventional Cases").
3. Court proceedings
Completely unaware of the bifurcated contractual relationships Gallon had entered into with his clients, the Court set the Disclosure of Compensation in the Wright case for hearing, noting that the Court had previously ruled that some of the excluded services were required to be performed by counsel for debtors in every Chapter 7 case.
MR. GALLON: Well, it might -- the reason I did not disclose it, Your Honor, in my mind, is that once -- I mean, what, what is happening here is there, is a bifurcation process.
So the client hires you to perform, to, to file the petition and the creditors and the verification. Then once that's done, *87you have a second meeting, which is the bifurcation, where they rehire you to finish the, the schedules, statements, and all that. Then once that's done, that's whenever it is factored. And so it is just my way of receiving, I mean, I could collect it from the debtor instead of BK Billing. And so I didn't, I mean, I just didn't think it was something that I was required to disclose. It's my receivable. It's monies that's owed me.147
Two days after the October 17 Hearing, Gallon filed an amended Disclosure of Compensation in the Wright case (the "Amended Disclosure"), which added the following statement:
Counsel may receive financing from a third-party via a financing or factoring facility. Although in undersigned counsel's view such financing or factoring facility should not be considered an agreement to share compensation, the terms of such agreement will include the granting by undersigned counsel of an interest in the undersigned counsel's accounts and the creditor may have rights to receive payment from the client. Any such financing or factoring facility agreement will clearly provide that client must first give consent to the party relationship and under no circumstances will any of the terms of the financing or factoring facility agreement require counsel to disclose any information that is either confidential or may be considered a privileged communication with the client. The actual agreement will be made available upon request by a party-in-interest.148
Gallon has since filed the same Amended Disclosure in all of the BK Billing Cases.
The Court continued the hearing to allow the UST to gather more information regarding Gallon's relationship with BK Billing and decide on a course of action. At the continued hearing, the Court heard from the UST and Gallon, and discussed the UST's Motion filed in the Wright case.
On May 10, 2018, the Court held a hearing (the "May 10 Hearing") on these matters. Gallon's arguments and defenses were presented in a pre-hearing brief.
1. Use of the BK Billing Model made Gallon financially worse off than if he had used a conventional, pre-petition billing method.154
2. Gallon relied on BK Billing, based on the vigor and sophistication used to induce him to adopt the BK Billing Model. BK Billing appeared to be a highly professional organization, presented a polished sales pitch, and was a high-level sponsor of the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys annual meeting. Gallon was given the impression that its model was widely and successfully used.155
3. Gallon did not disclose the BK Billing Model because 1) he relied on BK Billing to advise him of the need to change his usual procedures; 2) he was not aware that BK Billing provided a specific form of disclosure to be filed with the Court; and 3) "it just did not occur to him that such disclosure was required."156
4. Gallon did not understand that participating in the BK Billing program might involve violation of bankruptcy law.157
5. A significant motivation for Gallon to offer the BK Billing Model "was to allow clients to obtain relief from their debt problems more quickly."158
6. Gallon's long-time bankruptcy legal assistant was distracted and ultimately quit during the period he was utilizing the BK Billing Model. He states that many of the mistakes in the disclosures and statements were due to that distracted assistant, his own inept efforts at learning the software, and finally the learning curve of training a new assistant.159
7. Each of the debtors in the Captioned Cases received a discharge without complaint or complication. Gallon suggests that this is a vindication of any charge that his pre-petition investigation and analysis of the debtors' cases, without preparing schedules and statements, was inadequate.160
When questioned about the reason for the bifurcation and performance of services post-petition, Gallon admitted that the practice was not for the benefit of debtors, but was done solely to facilitate the BK Billing Model of collection, by making all fees attributed to post-petition work non-dischargeable.
Gallon testified that he immediately stopped using the services of BK Billing as soon as he became aware of the concerns of the Court and the UST. The UST stipulated that Gallon cooperated fully in amending disclosures and providing documents and information during their investigation of these matters.
Conclusions of Law
1. Counsel's duty of disclosure pursuant to § 329
Section 329 of the Bankruptcy Code lies at the heart of these cases. Under that section, if a debtor pays or makes an agreement to pay an attorney for services related to a bankruptcy case,
Counsel's duties of disclosure apply whether or not the attorney applies for compensation from the estate.
Rule 2017 directs the court to review any payments or transfers, or agreements for either, made directly or indirectly by debtors to an attorney, either before or after the filing of the bankruptcy case, to determine if those payments or transfers are excessive.
This rule ... is premised on the need for and appropriateness of judicial scrutiny of arrangements between a debtor and his attorney to protect the creditors *91of the estate and the debtor against overreaching by an officer of the court who is in a peculiarly advantageous position to impose on both the creditors and his client.176
If the payment or agreement is found to exceed the reasonable value of the services provided by the attorney, the Court may cancel the agreement or disgorge any such payment to its source.
The consequences of an attorney's failure to comply with the disclosure requirements of § 329 can be severe, including forfeiting the right to receive any compensation for services rendered to the debtor.
This Court takes the requirement of full disclosure under § 329 seriously, for to do less is to judicially repeal the statute....Were the Court to require less than full disclosure, the purpose behind § 329(a) would be defeated. Counsel could avoid disclosure of any or all of the fees paid to them by making a covert decision that the undisclosed fee was so unrelated to the bankruptcy case that its disclosure was not required, and eliminating the possibility of Court review in the process. The Court's ability to make a meaningful review of attorney's fees would be hindered if not destroyed. Such a result can be neither condoned nor allowed.182
Nothing presented to the Court in these matters suggests that any lesser standard should prevail. Nor does the Court find that a "pure heart," without a subjective intent to violate the Code or Rules, provides counsel any defense to the failure to file the proper disclosures under § 329.
The Court finds Gallon's original Disclosure of Compensation in each of these cases to be grossly misleading and indicative of a wanton disregard-to the point of negligence -for the level of candor required under § 329. Some of Gallon's errors defy comprehension. For example, in the Wright case, Gallon disclosed that he had agreed to accept $1,500 for legal services with a balance due of $1,425, when he actually had agreed to receive $855, plus $213.75 paid to escrow, from BK Billing.
Other errors demonstrate the general level of sloppiness evident in much of Gallon's record keeping. For example, in the Wright case, Gallon disclosed that "prior to the filing of this statement I have received $75," even though his Pre-Petition Agreement indicated Ms. Wright had agreed to pay $200 plus an additional $42 in fees. An internal office memo indicated that she had actually paid $200. Although Gallon blamed such mistakes on the loss of his long-time assistant and the difficulty in training a new one, Gallon has duties of competence to his clients that transcend bankruptcy law.
Of equal concern is that Gallon indicated in each Disclosure of Compensation that he had not shared his fee with any other person. Both in his written brief and testimony, Gallon insisted on his understanding that he was not sharing fees because "it was his receivable" that he could dispose of or sell in any way he wanted, and that BK Billing was simply a collection agency. The Court is not particularly concerned here with the legal or ethical violations involved with any possible sharing arrangement.
Gallon filed an Amended Disclosure in each of the cases in an effort to remedy the deficiencies in the original. His efforts fell woefully short. His statement that "counsel may receive financing from a third-party" does not adequately disclose that in each of the affected cases he did in fact receive such financing, and on what terms. He goes on to state his view that the arrangement does not involve sharing of fees, but gives no particulars of the arrangement. Offering to make the agreement available upon request does not satisfy Rule 2016(b)'s requirement of disclosing "the particulars of any such sharing or agreement to share."
2. Counsel's duty of candor to the tribunal
In addition to the statutory duties provided in the Bankruptcy Code, Gallon has other duties to his clients and the Court based on his role as an officer of the court. An attorney becomes an officer of the court upon taking an oath and meeting other requirements imposed by state law.
The Court is troubled by Gallon's practice of charging a higher fee to his clients that use the BK Billing Model than to his conventional clients. Gallon charged his average conventional client $1,250 when the fee was fully paid prior to filing a debtor's petition. Under the BK Billing Model, a debtor was charged a total of $1,500 for attorney fees. From the debtor's perspective, that is a $250 premium, or 20% above the fee charged in a conventional case, for the convenience of paying the fee over 12 months. From Gallon's perspective, the math is even worse. For example in the Wright case, Gallon invoiced Wright's account to BK Billing for $1,425. He actually received $855 from BK Billing. That means Wright agreed to pay a 66% markup over *94the amount Gallon actually received for providing her services.
It is clear to the Court that a prominent feature of the BK Billing Model is the designation of the bulk of services as "post-petition" in order to render them beyond the Chapter 7 discharge and therefore collectable by BK Billing. There are (at least) two problems with this approach. First, by waiting until after the petition is filed to perform most of the actual services, such as filing out schedules and statements, counsel risks overlooking essential information regarding the debtors' financial condition, which may have been missed in the cursory interview conducted pre-petition. Counsel may discover too late that he or she should have chosen a different chapter, or not filed the case at all. Second, the amount of Gallon's fees designated pre- or post-petition was motivated by how much money the debtor was able to pay up front, and not related in any way to when Gallon's services were actually performed. Valuing his time at $250 per hour, Gallon admitted that in several cases he spent much more time pre-petition than he was paid for, but then designated the remaining fee as "post-petition," thus turning an otherwise dischargeable pre-petition claim into a non-discharged claim.
Of additional concern to the Court is that Gallon indicated that the source of the compensation to be paid to him was the debtor, even though Bankruptcy Form 2030 presented him with another option. Courts have consistently held that payment of funds from a third-party payor to pay a debtor's legal fees does not alter counsel's obligation of proper disclosure.
Gallon tries to rationalize his failures by citing the blind faith he put in BK Billing as a company. He suggests that he was induced to adopt the BK Billing Model based on the company's slick sales pitch and high-profile sponsorship of a leading bankruptcy conference. While the Court does not doubt that BK Billing rolled out a persuasive marketing campaign, the Court believes that any reasonable attorney would have at least questioned the "too good to be true" aspect of the model. Instead, Gallon blindly adopted the BK Billing Model, without conducting even a minimal inquiry into the legal or ethical issues that such a system might raise. The Court finds that such abdication of his professional judgment is unreasonable.
This Court has previously noted the bankruptcy system is a fragile one, built on the principles of full and candid disclosure.
3. Debtors' violations of Rule 1006
Section 1930 of title 28 of the United States Code sets out the schedule of fees to be collected by the clerk when a bankruptcy case is filed. The statute explicitly allows a debtor in a voluntary case to pay the required fee in installments.
In eleven of the seventeen Captioned Cases, Gallon filed an Installment Application. In each of those cases, the application included a statement executed by both the debtors and Gallon that the debtors understood they must pay their entire filing fee before they make any more payments or transfer any more property to an attorney or anyone else for services in connection with their bankruptcy case.
Gallon, as an attorney admitted to practice before this Court, is charged with knowing and understanding the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, as well as the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. His signature on the Installment Application was a violation of both his ethical and statutory duties. Rule 9011(b)(3) outlines counsel's ethical duty of candor in signing an application submitted to the Court:
(b) Representations to the court
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a petition, pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,-
* * *
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery[.]207
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA") was enacted "to correct perceived abuses of the bankruptcy system."
(a) A debt relief agency shall not-
* * *
(2) make any statement , or counsel or advise any assisted person or prospective assisted person to make a statement in a document filed in a case or proceeding under this title, that is untrue or misleading , or that upon the exercise of reasonable care, should have been known by such agency to be untrue or misleading[.]211
Considering he set these events in motion by factoring his fee to BK Billing, Gallon knew or should have known that BK Billing would begin collection activity prior to the debtors' court fees being paid in full. He is also charged with knowing that such payment to BK Billing was a violation of the debtors' duties under Rule 1006. His signature on the Installment Agreements is a violation of his duty of candor under both Rule 9011(b)(3) and § 526(a)(2). Gallon compounded the violation of § 526(a)(2) by advising his clients to sign the Installment Agreements and causing them to make misleading statements regarding their payment of his fees.
The Court does not take these violations lightly. The bankruptcy system requires complete candor from both debtors and their engaged professionals.
4. Counsel's duties under BAPCPA
As soon as Gallon became aware of his missteps in these cases, he worked diligently to assist the UST to investigate this matter and cut ties with BK Billing. As such, he offered no defense of the BK Billing Model of bifurcating services into pre- and post-petition categories or its factoring practice, which required debtors to incur debt to pay their attorney's fee. Several courts across the country have faced variations on this theme. Some have offered advice and recommendations in order to craft an acceptable scheme whereby attorneys may offer bifurcated services.
*98Others have noted that various provisions added to the Code by BAPCPA appear to thwart such schemes.
Conclusion
Gallon must disgorge the value of all fees actually collected by BK Billing from the debtors after their petitions were filed in each of the Captioned Cases. Such funds shall be remitted by Gallon to the debtor that made the payment. The Post-Petition Agreements in each case are found to be void, and neither Gallon nor BK Billing may enforce any claim against the debtors under those contracts. A separate order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is entered concurrently herewith in each of the Captioned Cases.
William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice act 2, sc. 2.
Case No. 17-11936-M, at Docket No. 38 .
Although not all of the Captioned Cases were originally assigned to the undersigned Judge, they were transferred to him after the facts described herein came to light, so that counsel's conduct could be reviewed by the Court in a comprehensive manner.
See Order Scheduling Hearing and Directing Counsel for the Debtor to Address Issues of Compensation, Case No. 17-11936-M, at Docket No. 60 . An Order and Notice of Hearing was entered in each of the other Captioned Cases, alerting each debtor to their opportunity to appear and be heard in this matter.
The Court will recite the factual differences for each specific case, but notes that those differences are immaterial to the Court's analysis and resolution of these matters.
Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to sections of the United States Bankruptcy Code,
Trial Ex. 22.
Trial Ex. 23 at 1, § 2.1. Except for Case No. 17-11172-M, Gomes , all of the BK Billing Cases were submitted pursuant to the amended AR Agreement. All further references to the AR Agreement will refer to the agreement as amended.
Trial Ex. 22 at 2, § 4.2.
Gallon did not use this terminology, but the Court will use the term "BK Billing Model" to refer to the two contract bifurcated filing system provided by BK Billing, which included the factoring of Gallon's attorney fees.
See, e.g. , Trial Ex. 14.1 (Wright ). Substantially similar agreements were entered with each of the debtors in the Captioned Cases.
In the contracts with debtors, Gallon represented himself as the "Law Firm." The Court will use the term "Gallon" to refer to both J. Ken Gallon, as attorney, and any law firm he may represent.
This amount varied by debtor. Details for each debtor are discussed in the next section.
Trial Ex. 14.1 at 1.
See supra note 15. As far as the Court is aware, all of the debtors that executed a Pre-Petition Agreement chose this option.
The Sullivan case included this list of documents plus the Official Form 106Sum, Summary of Your Assets and Liabilities and Certain Statistical Information, required by Bankr. N.D. Okla. Local Rule 1007-1(G).
These cases were Gomes , Dirkswager , Brown , Inman , Lawrence , Guthrie , and Lawson .
Trial Ex. 14.2.
See supra note 15.
Trial Ex. 14.2 at 1.
Id. at 2-3 (emphasis added). The last sentence was included in each of the Post-Petition Agreements, but it was set out separately in bold and underlined, with instruction for the debtor to initial the clause, only in the Wright case.
See supra note 15.
Motion , Case No. 17-11936-M, at Docket No. 38 at 9.
See supra note 15.
Bankruptcy Form 2030.
See supra note 15.
Trial Ex. 14.5.
Trial Ex. 14.1.
Trial Ex. 14.2.
Trial Ex. 14.3.
Trial Ex. 14.4. This is based on an invoice amount of $1,425, which BK Billing was to collect from Wright.
Trial Ex. 14.6.
Trial Ex. 14.7.
Case No. 17-11936-M, at Docket No. 4 .
Trial Ex. 14.4.
Trial Ex. 1.1.
Trial Ex. 1.2.
Trial Ex. 1.3.
Trial Ex. 1.4. See supra note 13.
Trial Ex. 1.6.
Trial Ex. 1.7.
Trial Ex. 2.1.
Trial Ex. 2.2.
Trial Ex. 2.3.
Trial Ex. 2.4.
Case No. 17-11411-M, at Docket No. 2 .
Trial Ex. 2.4.
Trial Ex. 3.1. The Court hesitates to refer to the $1,400 as a "typo" because it was written into a blank by hand, but it does appear to be a mistake.
Trial Ex. 3.2.
Trial Ex. 3.4.
Trial Ex. 3.6.
Trial Ex. 3.7.
Case No. 17-11410-M, at Docket No. 2 .
Trial Ex. 3.4.
Trial Ex. 4.2.
Trial Ex. 4.3.
Trial Ex. 4.4.
Trial Ex. 4.6.
Trial Ex. 4.7.
Trial Ex. 5.1.
Trial Ex. 5.2.
Trial Ex. 5.3. The method of payment was not indicated.
Trial Ex. 5.4.
Trial Ex. 5.6.
Trial Ex. 5.7.
Case No. 17-11559-M, at Docket No. 2 .
Trial Ex. 5.4.
Trial Ex. 6.1. Handwriting obscures the amount of $53 for a credit report on the exhibit submitted to the Court, but its intent in changing the meaning of the printed text is unclear.
Trial Ex. 6.2.
Trial Ex. 6.3.
Trial Ex. 6.4.
Trial Ex. 6.6.
Trial Ex. 6.7.
Case No. 17-11557-M, at Docket No. 2 .
Trial Ex. 6.4.
Trial Ex. 7.1.
Trial Ex. 7.2.
Trial Ex. 7.3.
Trial Ex. 7.4.
Trial Ex. 7.6.
Trial Ex. 7.7.
Case No. 17-11558-M, at Docket No. 2 .
Trial Ex. 7.4.
Trial Ex. 8.1. The document was executed by Gallon, but not by Sullivan.
Trial Ex. 8.2.
Trial Ex. 8.3.
Trial Ex. 8.4.
Trial Ex. 8.6.
Trial Ex. 8.7.
Trial Ex. 9.1.
Trial Ex. 9.2.
Trial Ex. 9.3.
Trial Ex. 9.4.
Trial Ex. 9.7.
Trial Ex. 10.1.
Trial Ex. 10.2.
Trial Ex. 10.3.
Trial Ex. 10.4.
Trial Ex. 10.6.
Trial Ex. 10.7.
Case No. 17-11689-M, at Docket No. 3 . An amended application was filed at Docket No. 10 to change the due dates for payments. This amended application was later granted by the Court. See Docket No. 16.
Trial Ex. 10.4.
Trial Ex. 11.1.
Trial Ex. 11.2.
Trial Ex. 11.3.
Trial Ex. 11.4.
Trial Ex. 11.6
Trial Ex. 11.7
Trial Ex. 12.1. The document was not executed by any party.
Trial Ex. 12.2.
Trial Ex. 12.4. This is based on an invoice amount of $1,400, which BK Billing was to collect from the Burrises.
Trial Ex. 12.6. On October 20, 2017, an amended Disclosure of Compensation was filed, which recited that, for legal services, Gallon had agreed to accept $1,500; had received $100; leaving a balance due of $1,400. See Case No. 17-11933-M, at Docket No. 18 .
Trial Ex. 12.7.
Case No. 17-11933-M, at Docket No. 3 .
Trial Ex. 12.4.
Trial Ex. 13.1.
Trial Ex. 13.2.
Trial Ex. 13.3.
Trial Ex. 13.4.
Trial Ex. 13.6.
Trial Ex. 13.7.
The Non-Factored Cases are those initiated by Gallon under the BK Billing Model, but whose accounts were never submitted to BK Billing because of the issues raised at the October 17 Hearing. See infra text accompanying note 150.
Trial Ex. 15.3.
Trial Tr. at 25-26, May 10, 2018, Case No. 11936-M, at Docket No. 71 .
Trial Ex. 15.6.
Trial Ex. 15.7.
Case No. 17-12028-M, at Docket No. 3 . An amended application was filed at Docket No. 13 to change the due dates for payments. This amended application was later granted by the Court. See Docket No. 15 .
Trial Tr. at 25-26, May 10, 2018, Case No. 11936-M, at Docket No. 71 .
Trial Ex. 16.6.
Trial Ex. 16.7.
Case No. 17-12027-M, at Docket No. 3 . An amended application was filed at Docket No. 14 to change the due dates for payments. This amended application was later granted by the Court. See Docket No. 15.
According to Gallon, "Mrs. Miller called me up and basically told me that she had received her income tax return and that she wanted me to get paid and I told her I didn't really know what was going on, but she said that she wanted to pay me. And so I accepted the payment." See Trial Tr. at 27 ll . 12-16, May 10, 2018, Case No. 11936-M, at Docket No. 71 . See also Trial Ex. 19 (note regarding Miller case).
Trial Ex. 17.3.
Trial Tr. at 25-26, May 10, 2018, Case No. 11936-M, at Docket No. 71 .
Trial Ex. 17.6.
Trial Ex. 17.7.
Case No. 17-12029-M, at Docket No. 3 . An amended application was filed at Docket No. 11 to change the due dates for payments. This amended application was later granted by the Court. See Docket No. 13 .
The Conventional Cases are Case Nos. 17-11177-M; 17-11179-M; 17-11180-M; 17-11181-M; 17-11182-M; 17-11183-M; 17-11407-M; 17-11408-M; 17-11409-M; 17-11561-M; 17-11562-M; 17-11683-M; 17-11684-M; 17-11685-M; 17-11686-M; 17-11831-M; 17-11934-M; 17-12025-M; 17-12026-M. In addition, Gallon filed one case during this period that had the hallmarks of a BK Billing Case, e.g., an Installment Application was filed, attorney fees of $1,500 were disclosed, etc., but it was dismissed because the debtor was ineligible for a discharge due to § 727(a)(8) (debtor had received a discharge within 8 years before the filing date). See Case No. 17-11556-M, Tracie Lynn Tennant.
These amounts are taken from the Disclosure of Compensation filed in each of the Conventional Cases. These amounts differ from that disclosed on the SOFA in every case.
This number represents the attorney fee collected by Gallon, and does not include any amounts for filing fees or other fees Gallon collected for credit reports, counseling, etc.
The only required pleading Gallon failed to consistently attach to the petition in the Conventional Cases was the Payment Advice Certification, which was sporadically submitted as a later pleading.
See In re Minardi ,
See Trial Tr. at 7 ll . 4-18, October 17, 2017, Case No. 17-11936-M, at Docket No. 29 .
Trial Ex. 14.6.
Case No. 17-11936-M, at Docket No. 38 .
These are the Burton , Miller , and Smith cases.
Case No. 17-11936-M, at Docket No. 60 . An order giving the debtors an opportunity to appear and be heard at the hearing was also entered in each of the other 16 Captioned Cases.
J. Ken Gallon's Brief Regarding Issues of Compensation, Case No. 17-11936-M, at Docket No. 65 .
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 6-7.
Trial Tr. at 58 ll . 9-24, May 10, 2018, Case No. 11936-M, at Docket No. 71 .
Id. at 60.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 64.
The language of the statute requires disclosure of compensation paid or agreed to be paid "for services rendered or to be rendered in contemplation of or in connection with the case by such attorney." § 329(a). There is no issue in this case that the services rendered by Gallon to the various debtors were not related to their bankruptcy cases.
(a) Any attorney representing a debtor in a case under this title, or in connection with such a case, whether or not such attorney applies for compensation under this title, shall file with the court a statement of the compensation paid or agreed to be paid, if such payment or agreement was made after one year before the date of the filing of the petition, for services rendered or to be rendered in contemplation of or in connection with the case by such attorney, and the source of such compensation.
§ 329(a).
(b) Disclosure of compensation paid or promised to attorney for debtor
Every attorney for a debtor, whether or not the attorney applies for compensation, shall file and transmit to the United States trustee within 14 days after the order for relief, or at another time as the court may direct, the statement required by § 329 of the Code including whether the attorney has shared or agreed to share the compensation with any other entity. The statement shall include the particulars of any such sharing or agreement to share by the attorney, but the details of any agreement for the sharing of the compensation with a member or regular associate of the attorney's law firm shall not be required. A supplemental statement shall be filed and transmitted to the United States trustee within 14 days after any payment or agreement not previously disclosed.
Rule 2016(b).
§ 329. See In re Brown ,
See Turner v. Davis, Gillenwater & Lynch (In re Inv. Bankers, Inc.) ,
In re Woodward ,
In re Perrine ,
See In re Brown , 371 B.R. at 497. Rule 2017 reads:
(a) Payment or transfer to attorney before order for relief
On motion by any party in interest or on the court's own initiative, the court after notice and a hearing may determine whether any payment of money or any transfer of property by the debtor, made directly or indirectly and in contemplation of the filing of a petition under the Code by or against the debtor or before entry of the order for relief in an involuntary case, to an attorney for services rendered or to be rendered is excessive.
(b) Payment or transfer to attorney after order for relief
On motion by the debtor, the United States trustee, or on the court's own initiative, the court after notice and a hearing may determine whether any payment of money or any transfer of property, or any agreement therefor, by the debtor to an attorney after entry of an order for relief in a case under the Code is excessive, whether the payment or transfer is made or is to be made directly or indirectly, if the payment, transfer, or agreement therefor is for services in any way related to the case.
Rule 2017.
Rule 2017 advisory committee's note (citing 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 329.02 (15th ed. 1980); MacLachlan, Bankruptcy 318 (1956) ).
§ 329 (b) reads:
(b) If such compensation exceeds the reasonable value of any such services, the court may cancel any such agreement, or order the return of any such payment, to the extent excessive, to-
(1) the estate, if the property transferred-
(A) would have been property of the estate; or
(B) was to be paid by or on behalf of the debtor under a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of this title; or
(2) the entity that made such payment.
In re Inv. Bankers ,
In re Brown , 371 B.R. at 499. See also In re Stewart ,
In re Brown , 371 B.R. at 499 (citing In re Hackney ,
In re Smitty's Truck Stop ,
In re Woodward ,
In re Stewart ,
In re Smitty's Truck Stop ,
Trial Ex. 14-4, 14-6.
Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Rule 1.1, Okla. Stat. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.").
See, e.g. , § 504(a) ("Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a person receiving compensation or reimbursement under section 503(b)(2) or 503(b)(4) of this title may not share or agree to share-(1) any such compensation or reimbursement with another person[.]") This statute suggests that while sharing of fees is prohibited in some circumstances, not every receipt of fees related to a bankruptcy case is affected. But see Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Rule 5.4(a), Okla. Stat. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A ("A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer[.]") (listing several exceptions that do not apply here).
In re Stewart ,
Rule 2016(b).
Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Preamble cmt. 1, Okla. Stat. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A ("A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.") (emphasis added).
The oath required to practice law in Oklahoma reads as follows:
I do solemnly swear that I will support, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma; that I will do no falsehood, or consent that any be done in court, and if I know of any I will give knowledge thereof to the judges of the court, or some one of them, that it may be reformed; I will not wittingly, willingly or knowingly promote, sue, or procure to be sued, any false or unlawful suit, or give aid or consent to the same; I will delay no person for lucre or malice, but will act in the office of attorney in all courts according to my best learning and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the court as to my client, so help me God.
Okla. Stat. tit. 5, ch. 1, § 2. See also
Rule 3.3. Candor Toward The Tribunal:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer[.]
Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Rule 3.3, Okla. Stat. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A. See also
Even if Gallon had received the additional escrow payment, Wright would have paid a 33% markup over the amount Gallon received.
Trial Tr. at 60, May 10, 2018, Case No. 11936-M, at Docket No. 71 .
In re Stewart ,
Under the original AR Agreement, Gallon received 70% of the invoiced Gomes account, with no escrowed payment.
See, e.g. , Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Rule 5.4(c), Okla. Stat. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A ("A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services .") (emphasis added);
In re Woodward ,
In re Lewis ,
In re Brown , 371 B.R. at 499 ; In re Stewart ,
To be abundantly clear, these fees are ordered disgorged from Gallon , and not from BK Billing, over which the Court has not exercised jurisdiction. In addition, the Court will not disturb the voluntary payment of $1,325 made directly to Gallon from the Millers in Case No. 17-12027-M.
The Court offers no opinion on how this ruling affects the contractual duties between Gallon and BK Billing.
Rule 1006(b)(3)("All installments of the filing fee must be paid in full before the debtor or chapter 13 trustee may make further payments to an attorney or any other person who renders services to the debtor in connection with the case.").
See, e.g. , Case No. 17-11936-M, at Docket No. 4 .
Rule 9011(b)(3) (emphasis added).
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States ,
§ 526 (as amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-327, § 2(a)(2),
See Grogan v. Garner ,
Bethea v. Robert J. Adams & Assocs. ,
See In re Jackson , No. 14-11415,
Relevant subsections of § 526 read as follows:
(a) A debt relief agency shall not-
(1) fail to perform any service that such agency informed an assisted person or prospective assisted person it would provide in connection with a case or proceeding under this title;
(2) make any statement, or counsel or advise any assisted person or prospective assisted person to make a statement in a document filed in a case or proceeding under this title, that is untrue or misleading, or that upon the exercise of reasonable care, should have been known by such agency to be untrue or misleading;
(3) misrepresent to any assisted person or prospective assisted person, directly or indirectly, affirmatively or by material omission, with respect to-
(A) the services that such agency will provide to such person; or
(B) the benefits and risks that may result if such person becomes a debtor in a case under this title; or
(4) advise an assisted person or prospective assisted person to incur more debt in contemplation of such person filing a case under this title or to pay an attorney or bankruptcy petition preparer a fee or charge for services performed as part of preparing for or representing a debtor in a case under this title.
(b) Any waiver by any assisted person of any protection or right provided under this section shall not be enforceable against the debtor by any Federal or State court or any other person, but may be enforced against a debt relief agency.
(c)(1) Any contract for bankruptcy assistance between a debt relief agency and an assisted person that does not comply with the material requirements of this section, section 527, or section 528 shall be void and may not be enforced by any Federal or State court or by any other person, other than such assisted person.
(2) Any debt relief agency shall be liable to an assisted person in the amount of any fees or charges in connection with providing bankruptcy assistance to such person that such debt relief agency has received, for actual damages, and for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs if such agency is found, after notice and a hearing, to have-
(A) intentionally or negligently failed to comply with any provision of this section, section 527, or section 528 with respect to a case or proceeding under this title for such assisted person;
(B) provided bankruptcy assistance to an assisted person in a case or proceeding under this title that is dismissed or converted to a case under another chapter of this title because of such agency's intentional or negligent failure to file any required document including those specified in section 521; or
(C) intentionally or negligently disregarded the material requirements of this title or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure applicable to such agency.
* * *
(5) Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal law and in addition to any other remedy provided under Federal or State law, if the court, on its own motion or on the motion of the United States trustee or the debtor, finds that a person intentionally violated this section, or engaged in a clear and consistent pattern or practice of violating this section, the court may--
(A) enjoin the violation of such section; or
(B) impose an appropriate civil penalty against such person.
§ 526 (as amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-327, § 2(a)(2),
Section 528 provides in part:
(a) A debt relief agency shall-
(1) not later than 5 business days after the first date on which such agency provides any bankruptcy assistance services to an assisted person, but prior to such assisted person's petition under this title being filed, execute a written contract with such assisted person that explains clearly and conspicuously-
(A) the services such agency will provide to such assisted person; and
(B) the fees or charges for such services, and the terms of payment;
(2) provide the assisted person with a copy of the fully executed and completed contract;
§ 528(a)(1-2).
Reference
- Full Case Name
- IN RE: Roberta Ellarae WRIGHT, Debtor. In re: Ian Gomes and Stephanie Ann Gomes, Debtors. In re: Brittany Marie Dirkswager, Debtor. In re: Ryan Michael Brown, Debtor. In re: Tommy Lenard Guthrie and Debra Denise Guthrie, Debtors. In re: Kiley Gene Lawrence, Debtor. In re: Michael Joe Lawson and Sara Lynne Lawson, Debtors. In re: Karen Dawn Inman, Debtor. In re: David Charles Williams, Debtor. In re: Daphne Leannette Robitaille, Debtor. In re: Kimberly Leann Sullivan, Debtor. In re: Brett Wayne Murphy and April Irene Conder, Debtors. In re: Daniel Bruce Bowers and Janie Mae Bowers, Debtors. In re: Dale Daniel Burris, Jr. and Sheila Mae Burris, Debtors. In re: Darin Dwane Miller and Kathy Jo Miller, Debtors. In re: Kenneth Charles Burton, Debtor. In re: Kirby Dwayne Smith and Rebecca Leann Smith, Debtors.
- Cited By
- 8 cases
- Status
- Published