The plaintiffs, citizens and residents of Wagoner County, Oklahoma, urge, in essence, that because of their race and color they are being denied, by the- defendants, the right to freely attend the public school located in their district (the Coweta School) as enjoyed by other children living in the same district.1 Plaintiffs specifically allege “that they have been, ánd' -are now being; denied equal rights under the Constitution and-laws of the United State's and thus de-. prived of their civil rights in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States”; and, that this is “an action for the redress of the deprivation under color of law, of rights, privileges, and immunities secured to them” by the federal constitution.2 The defendants deny that plaintiffs are in any way being discriminated against because of their race *261or color, and assert that the grievance advanced by plaintiffs is one involving purely local law over which this court has no jurisdiction.

The essential facts are not in dispute. Prior to Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,3 the defendant Red Bird Dependent School District No. 35 (herein referred to as “Red Bird”) was operated as a school for colored children; and, the defendant Coweta Independent School District No. 17 (herein referred to as “Coweta”) was operated as a school for white children, in conformity with the then existing Oklahoma law providing for “separate but equal” racially segregated educational facilities. Inasmuch as there was no colored school in the Coweta District it was necessary for all Negro children living within the geographic boundaries of such district to attend some out-of-district school; and, the plaintiffs, previous to the present school year, attended Red Bird. Under Oklahoma law, to attend a school located outside the resident district (regardless of the reason for so attending) a formal transfer procedure need be followed, which includes the filing of an applieation for transfer by the May 15th which immediately precedes the school year for which the transfer is desired and approval by the County Superintendent of Schools, after notice and opportunity for hearing.4 In the spring of 1955, pursuant to the custom of transferring to an out-of-district colored school, each of the plaintiffs indicated they desired to attend Red Bird during the 1955-1956 term and completed the requisite transfer formalities. Subsequent to such transfers, but prior to the commencement of the fall school term, the final opinion in the Brown case was handed down.5 As a result of such decision Coweta announced a willingness to accept colored as well as white students. The plaintiffs enrolled in Coweta (the school nearest their homes) and attended classes for several weeks in September. At the close of such time the plaintiffs were notified they could no longer attend Coweta for the 1955-1956 term, without the payment of tuition, inasmuch as they had already been officially transferred to Red Bird for such school term.6 Inasmuch as specific financial *262commitments were made by the Red Bird school board based upon the anticipated attendance of plaintiffs (and the accompanying financial aid.)7 Red Bird will not voluntarily permit the revocation or cancellation of plaintiffs’ transfers.

In the light of these facts the court is of the opinion the controverted issue is not one which basically involves racial discrimination, and consequently the court is without jurisdiction to grant the requested relief. There is no disposition on the part of Coweta (the former all white school) to not now accept colored children and, the school’s present colored enrollment confirms this fact.8 Coweta’s request for tuition from plaintiffs was not due to plaintiffs’ race or color, but because plaintiffs, for school purposes, were not official residents of the Coweta District during the 1955-1956 term. Plaintiffs ask this court to exercise federal authority to annul or cancel duly consummated transfers made under state law, which transfer law, of itself, applies equally to all races. Doubtless, it is true that the plaintiffs would not have transferred to Red Bird for this school term had they known that Coweta would be open to them, and there is a certain moral inequity in requiring plaintiffs to pay tuition to attend the school located in their own home district. However, even though plaintiffs’ motives for transferring to Red Bird grew out of a pattern established by unconstitutional segregation, nonetheless, the basic controversy before this court is one between two separate colored factions over local fiscal policies. Simply stated, the question is, “Shall previously entered into transfers be annulled to enable plaintiffs to attend the school nearest their homes where the transferee district has made definite financial commitments based upon the existence of such transfers ?” This issue is purely one of local law.

Although not necessary for the disposition of this case, the court feels constrained to observe that even if it had jurisdiction over the contested issue because of its segregation background, the court would not grant the sought-after affirmative relief. All parties before the court have evidenced the highest degree of good faith as touching the problem of racial integration in education, and the circumstances giving rise to this controversy will no longer exist by the close of the present school term. Because of the defendant school districts’ good faith strides toward complete integration, this court would have no disposition to use its equitable authority to compel Red Bird to renounce all financial rights flowing from the transfers in question for the present school term, in order to force complete and immediate integration. Under the conditions existing in *263the defendant districts, such districts are entitled to this added time to complete, in orderly fashion, their desegregation program.9

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is hereby sustained.