Opinion of the court by

After a careful and somewhat extended consideration of the question involved in this case and an examination of such authorities as could be found bearing thereon, I have, with some degree of doubt and hesitation, finally arrived at the conclusion that tms court cannot say the district court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the plaintiff’s amended petition. Our statutes provide that “the injunction may be granted at the time of commencing the action, or any time afterwards, * * upon its appearing satisfactory to the court or *397 judge, by the affidavit of the plaintiff, or his agent, that the plaintiff is entitled thereto.” (Sec. 251 Procedure Civil. Okla. St. 1893.)

Counsel for plaintiff in this case seems to have taken particular pains to allege and reiterate in his said amended petition that no action had been commenced and, in fact, no steps taken necessary to the commencement thereof at the time the order of injunction complained of therein was granted, and the bond sued on executed, notwithstanding the bond itself recites that an action .had been commenced and, consequently, the principal and sureties thereon would probably have been estopped from disputing this recital.

A civil action is commenced “by filing in the office of the clerk of the proper court a petition and causing summons to be issued thereon.” (Sec. 57, Procedure Civil.) And I am of the opinion that, at least, the first of the two necessary steps in the commencement of an action must have been performed before the time of the commencement thereof could possibly be held to have arrived, and no court has authority to grant an injunction prior to “the time of commencing the action;” hence, if an injunc-tional order is granted and a bond executed to protect the defendant named therein from damages resulting Éecause of the granting of said order, before either of these necessary steps in the commencement of an' action has been taken, and neither of said steps are, subsequently thereto, taken, both the order and bond are, in my judgment, nullities and no right of action can ever accrue upon the latter.

Just such a state of facts is shown by the petition in this case, although there are certain averments following *398 the positive allegations that no action was ever commenced, in which said injunction bond could have been required, which might possibly, by inference, be construed to mean that a petition had, in fact, been filed before the execution of said bond. But, while a general demurrer admits the truthfulness of all the material allegations of a pleading and under the liberal provisions of our civil code the common law rule, requiring that such allegations be construed most strongly against the pleader, is abolished, or, at least, modified to the extent of requiring them to “be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties,” (sec. 115,) yet the court cannot supply a necessary averment by inferences drawn from the other facts alleged, unless such averment must logically and necessarily be so inferred therefrom. (Carroll v. Swift, [Ind.] 37 N. E. 1061; Czezewska v. Railway Co., 121 Mo. 201, 25 S. W. 911; Thompson & Son Mfg. Co. v. Perkins, [Io.] 66 N. W. 874; Thomas v. Sweet, [Kan.] 14 Pac. 545.)

In the opinion of,the case last cited, át page 553, it is said: “This form of pleading will not be permitted, and in this case, the pleading being attacked by. demurrer, the rule is that its language is to be construed against the pleader.”

One of the conditions recited therein, as an inducement for the execution of the bond sued on in this case, is that “plaintiff has commenced an action of injunction against said defendant, and an order of injunction has been allowed in pursuance of the statute in such case made and provided” and, at least, the sureties on an injunction bond can only be held liable in strict pursuance of the conditions thereof. (See High on Injunction, 2nd Ed., secs. 1635 and 1630.)

*399 But even if it were conceded that the amended petition in this case sufficiently shows the taking of the first necessary step in the commencement of an action, to-wit, the filing of a petition, it fails to show a final determination of the entire proceeding wherein the injunction order was granted and the bond executed and filed, which is absolutely necessary before a cause of action can acrue, upon-the bond, in favor of the plaintiff herein. (Dowling v. Polack, 18 Cal. 626; Fox v. Hudson, 20 Kan. 246; Mitchell v. Sullivan, [Kan.] 1 Pac. 518.)

It is true that the plaintiff in this case alleges in his amended petition that the order, requiring him to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt in said pretended injunction proceeding, was dismissed and finally disposed of and that Webb, the moving party in said proceeding, abandoned same and commenced a new action, but these averments are not sufficient to show the final disposition of the whole case or proceeding; this can only be done by a judgment or order of the court, dismissing said entire cause or proceeding, or deciding same ■in favor of the defendant therein.

For the reasons stated, the order of the district court sustaining a demurrer to plaintiff’s amended petition is affirmed and the cause remanded with directions that said petition be dismissed at plaintiff’s cost.