The opinion of the court was delivered by

The contention of appellant in his first assignment of error is that “the account claimed by the appellee having been presented to the county commissioners for allowance on the seventeenth day of November, 1894, and $150 having been allowed thereon and the balance disallowed, and the $150 so allowed having been accepted by appellee and no appeal having been taken from the order of the county commissioners at that time made such action of the county commissioners was a bar to any further proceedings for the collection of the amount *75 disallowed.” This contention of appellant cannot be sustained in this case. Where a claimant - presents his claim to the commissioners for allowance and it is in part allowed by the board and he accepts the amount thus allowed in satisfaction of his claim he will not be permitted to maintain an action for the part disallowed. Of course where one accepts a partial payment of a disputed account in full settlement and satisfaction he cannot thereafter assert the right to recover for the balance. But in the case at bar there is no evidence in the record tending to show that the amount allowed by the county commissioners was accepted or intended to be accepted in full satisfaction of the claim presented; on the contrary the record shows by the proceedings of the board of county commissioners that the amount allowed and accepted was in partial payment and intended to be only in partial payment of the claim presented, and we must hold that such partial payment did not deprive the defendant in error of the right to subsequently present his claim for the balance of said account to said commissioners for allowance, or to appeal from their order subsequently made disallowing said balance.

On the trial of this cause the appellee introduced in evidence the contract set forth in the statement of facts in this case, and then introduced proof to show that the election tickets for the printing of which he claimed the sum of $560.99 as a balance against said county, were ordered by the board of election commissioners; that there was no special agreement between said board and the appellee as to the price that should be paid for such printing. He also offered some evidence to show that it was understood by one of said election commissioners and himself that the price should be determined by the *76 aforesaid contract; and for the purpose of bringing such printing within said contract, he offered testimony, which was admitted, that such tickets, by the understanding and custom of the printers’ craft, was tabulated matter. There was no evidence whatever showing the actual value of the work done, or of the tickets furnished, but appellee’s contention was, and is, that said work was done under the contract aforesaid, and that the price to be paid therefor was governed by said contract. The cause was tried upon that theory and the court below sustained this contention. The findings of the court were that the charge and account claimed by said appellee against said county was made by and in conformity and accordance with the schedule prices contained in said contract. In this, we think the court erred. Whether the said work came within the said contract and whether its value was to be measured thereby, was a question of law for the court to determine from all the facts shown. There is nothing in this contract or in the evidence shown in the record to establish that this work was done under such contract. It is not of the class, kind or character of work that such contract provides for. This contract was not a general contract for the doing of all classes and kinds of printing for said county for the year it was to cover. It was a special contract, relating, by its very terms, to special classes of printing. The only work which the contract covers or that was included therein, or for which the price to be paid was thereby fixed and determined, was the printing of “the proceedings of the board of county commissioners and all notices or advertisements desired or required to be published” and which should be published in the newspaper or newspapers of the Oklahoma Publishing company; and the furnishing of blanks and stationery *77 for tbe various offices of tbe county. It certainly would not be contended that election tickets could come under tbe specification of “Notices or advertisements,” or that they were to be published as such in any newspaper; or that they are included in the terms “blanks and stationery;” tbe term “stationery” has a well-defined and well-understood meaning.

“Under the name of stationery are embraced all writing materials and implements together with the numerous appliances with the desk, and of mercantile and commercial offices. In addition to the use, the term ‘fancy stationery’ covers a miscellaneous assembly of leather and other goods, such as pocket books, bags, card cases and many kindred articles, which can not be classified.” (Americanized Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. 9, page 5555).

“Stationery; articles sold by a stationer as paper, etc.” (Webster).

The proofs, in the record, tending to show that election tickets were tabulated matter, were incompetent, as the price fixed in the contract upon tabulated matter referred to and included only the tabulated matter expressly specified in the contract, namely: blanks and stationery.

The appellee having furnished to the appellant the election tickets at the special instance and request of the appellant’s election commissioners, and such tickets having been used by the appellant, the appellee was entitled to payment therefor; but there having been no agreement as to the price that should be paid, a contract for the doing of other work or the furnishing of other articles or material, and providing the prices that should be paid therefor, and which contract did not include election tickets would hot aid in determining the prices to be • paid for such election tickets nor *78 furnish any basis for a recovery therefor. The furnishing of such tickets was clearly outside of said contract and in the absence of an agreement fixing the price, the appellee must recover, if at all, upon the quantum meruit. It follows, therefore, that the said seventh, eleventh and twelfth assignments of error were well taken.

For the reasons stated, the judgment in this cause must be be reversed and the cause remanded for new trial. It is so ordered.