Opinion of the court by

The questions involved, with one or two exceptions, have been passed upon by the court at this term in the case of School District v. Hopkins, 54 Pac. 437, this volume, p-; and the same views will determine the conclusion of the court in this cause.

*164 Chapter 17 of the Session Laws of 1897 is not legislation for private purposes, in such a manner as to make that legislation unconstitutional. It does not seek to appropriate the proceeds of the territorial school fund to private purposes. The territorial school fund is derived from the sales and leases of sections 16 and 36 of the public lands of Oklahoma, and it is expressly provided by congress, after making the appropriation, that the proceeds of such sales and leasing shall be under rules provided by the secretary of the interior and by the territorial legislature. The whole matter is left to the territorial legislature to determine whether the insurance of the public school buildings, fixtures, and furniture was a proper application of the territorial apportionment of the school fund for school purposes. The legislature has hitherto expressly indicated in the Statutes of 1893, (section 5754,) that the insurance of school property was, in the view of that legislature, a proper object to be considered in the appropriation of money for school purposes, and we must so hold.

The complaint in this case, however, does show that, in the application of the law, the total territorial apportionment for school purposes may, for the years 1897 and 1898, be exhausted by this assessment, and that the plaintiff in error would be entirely deprived of the benefit of it, except of such benefit as it would derive from the protection of its school property under the enforcement of the statute providing insurance for its school property. We cannot hold that this result would be adequate to disturb an(l destroy the effect of the legis lation complained of, but must hold that the legislation was effective to the extent of the territorial apportionment fund, set aside to the school district here complaining.

*165 It was also contended in this cause that the complainant below was under the control and management of the board of education of a city of the first class, and that it had control of its own school funds, and of the territorial apportionment fund, as a part thereof, and that the act provided for was an unjust and wrongful■ appropriation of its funds; and that the law was also unjust, because it was an extravagant method of insurance, inasmuch as it provided a much larger and heavier rate of insurance than that provided for by established insurance companies. The cities of the first class are comprehended in the legislation under consideration. It is made the duty of the superintendent for each county, under the first section of the act .in question, “to cause each school house, and the furniture and fixtures therein, located in his county, to be appraised at the actual cash value thereof;” and the first, second, ■ and third sections of the act, as well as all the other sections thereof, in providing for the appraisement, assessment, and insurance of school houses, furniture, and fixtures belonging to any school district, speak in comprehensive terms of “any” and every school house in the county.

While the application of this law may work an injustice in some cases, and may apparently press relatively harder upon some districts than upon others, we yet cannot see any ground upon which the provisions of the act can be declared void by this court, or any reason why we should be authorized, by granting the relief prayed for here, to set aside the legislation. It is for the legislature to act within its proper province, and for this court, when the legislation is called in question, to determine only whether it is constitutional, and whether, therefore, the legislature has kept within its legitimate *166 province. If the act is found to be inequitable, discriminating, and extravagant, in the manner of insurance which it provides, it is for the legislative department to adjust, and not for this court.

The judgment of the district court is reversed, and direction given to the district court to sustain the demurrer.