*541 Opinion of the court by

The judgment in this case became dormant more than two years before the plaintiff filed his motion to revive.

“If a judgment become dormant, it may be revived in the same manner as is prescribed for reviving actions before judgment.” (Wilson’s Statutes, sec. 4630.)

“The revivor shall be by an order of the court, if made in term, or by a judge thereof, if in vacation. * * * *” (Wilson’s Statutes, sec. 4616.)

“The order may be made on the motion of the adverse party. * * *” (Wilson’s Statutes, sec. 4617.)

“If the order is made by the consent of the parties, the action shall forthwith stand revived ; and, if not made by consent, notice of the application for such order shall be served in the same manner and returned at the same time as a summons, upon the party adverse to the one making the motipn; and if sufficient cause be not shown against the revivor, the order shall be made.” (Wilson’s Statutes, sec. 4618.)

“An order to revive an action against the representatives or successor of a defendant shall not be made without the consent of such representatives or successor, in one year from the time it could have been first made.” (Section 4623.)

Under the laws of this Territory, a party may, by causing execution to issue every five years, keep a judgment alive indefinitely, and without execution it remains in force for five years. The plaintiff maj revive it. at any time within one year thereafter by proper proceedings, so that the plaintiff may permit his judgment to stand without execution for six years lacking one day, and then by proper proceedings put it in force for five years more, but if he permits his judgment to become dormant, and to so remain for more *542 than one year, then it is his own fault, and he has no right to complain. The statutes authorizing these proceedings are a part of the code of civil procedure adopted by this Territory from the State of Kansas. The supreme court of Kansas before the adoption of the code by this Territory, had occasion to construe the statute upon this identical ■question. In the case of Angell v. Martin, 24 Kan. 334, it is held, quoting from the syllabus:

“A dormant judgment cannot be revived without the consent of the defendant, unless such revivor is applied for within one year after .the same has become dormant.”

See also case of Tefft v. Citizens Bank, 36 Kan. 457.

Plaintiff in error argues that the fact that the defendants in error were absent from the Territory for a period of time, rendered the statute inoperative during the time of such absence fom the Territory, and directs our attention to section 3893 of the Statutes of Oklahoma, 1893. The statute referred to has no application to proceedings to revive a dormant judgment, but only as to the time of commencing civil actions. By reference to section 4619, Wilson’s Statutes, being the section authorizing proceedings for reviving actions and judgments, it is provided that in ease the defendant is a non-resident of the Territory, by filing an affidavit to that effect service of the notice may be made by publication, so that if the defendants in this case were noñ-residents of the Territory during the period in which plaintiff might have filed his motion to revive the judgment, it would be no excuse for his failure to file it within the time limited, for if be could not have obtained personal service, he could have obtained service by publication. In this case, as disclosed by the record, the defendants returned *543 to the Territory in 1899; at least it is alleged that they were .absent from the Territory only from some time in 1895 nntil some time in the year 1899, so that we may presume that they were residents of the Territory in 1900, at the time that the judgment in this case became dormant, and that personal service could have been obtained. However, that fact is not material.

Plaintiff in error further contends that the “letter written by the defendant in error, Henry LeBrOton, to the plaintiff in error concerning said indebtedness in itself-'revives the judgment,” the letter being the letter hereinbe-fore quoted. Conceding for the purposes of this case that the letter referred particularly to the judgment in question, a judgment cannot be revived in that manner. It can only be revived by an order, of the court, and in the manner provided by the’statutes before referred to. This is not an action to recover judgment, but to revive a judgment that had been recovered, and permitted to become dormant.

As provided by the statutes of this Territory, the ’revivor must be applied for within the time limited, unless by consent of the defendant, and the pleadings filed by the defendants in this case clearly show that they were not consenting to the order of revivor.

As our views upon the question discussed necessarily dispose of this case, it will not be necessary to notice the •other questions raised.

The judgment of the probate court of Canadian county as affirmed, with costs against plaintiff in error.