Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Trower
Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Trower
Opinion of the Court
Opinion of the court by
As will be seen by the foregoing statement of facts, there is hut one question submitted for the determination of this court, viz: Does the record and judgment in case No. 641, Garfield county, show a final adjudication of such liabilities and obligations as that when so adjudicated the subject-matter of this action was therein determined ?
This is an action for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage given to secure the payment of two certain promissory notes, of the aggregate face value of $625. Case No. 641 above referred to was an action of replevin, brought by the plaintiff in this action against the defendants to recover the possession of certain personal pro]3erty covered by a chattel mortgage given to secure the same notes which are here made the basis of this action to foreclose the real estate mortgage. In said case No. 641 upon final hearing therein the defendants, who are defendants in error in this case, recovered judgment for a return of the property taken in replevin, and further that in case a return could not be had judgment for the value thereof (as stated in the verdict) in the sum of $906.00.
It is clear upon this brief statement of the issues, and *469 the determination reached in case No. 641, that the rights of the parties to recover in this action, would not necessarily be concluded by that judgment when considered solely with reference to the verdict rendered.
It is urged by the plaintiff in error that we may look bejond the issues as framed in said case No. 641, and the verdict and judgment therein, to determine what was really decided in that case. We cannot agree with counsel in this contention.
Case No. 641 was an action in replevin, and from the issues presented it will be seen that the promissory notes involved in this case, and which are secured by the mortgage here sought to be foreclosed, are the same notes which were the evidence of indebtedness in that case, to secure the payment of which the chattel mortgage was given, which was 'the ■basis of the special ownership in personal property sought to be recovered in that action ; but in replevin the limited pleadings necessary to join the issues do -not always give a complete understanding of what is actually involved, further than that it is understood by them.that there is specially presented the right of possession of the personal property set forth and described, and such issue is raised by a general denial, which authorizes a very wide range of evidence the scope of which could not be discovered from the pleadings, verdict and judgment.
In such cases it is necessary to look beyond the issues joined and the verdict and judgment, to determine what controverted questions had been tried and settled in such ease.
In the consi deraton of this case to determine the ques *470 tion as to whether or not the judgment in said case No. 641 is res judicata of the question here presented, it be-somes necessary to look beyond the pleadings, verdict and judgement in that case.
Upon the trial of this case the entire record of the proceedings and evidence in case No. 641 was offered and received in evidence, and is a part of the record now before this court, from which it appears that the plaintiff in error at the time of instituting case No. 641 recovered, through the writ of replevin therein issued, possession of the chattel property mortgaged to secure the payment of the notes, and that cause went to judgment without a return of the property to .the owner, defendant in error herein.
At the time case No. 641 was commenced, the debt to secure which the chattel mortgage was given had not become due, and the plaintiff founded its right to recover under such circumstances, upon the conditions contained in the mortgage, and its right to recover by force of those conditions was made the principal contention, and touching this contention the court instructed the jury that if they found the debt was not due, and the security had not depreciated in value and that the action was inspired by malice or unjustifiable motives, they should return their verdict for the defendant.
In answer to special interrogatories submitted, the jury found that at the time of bringing the action the plaintiff had no reasonable ground for believing its demand was unsafe or insecure, and that the plaintiff acted maliciously in taking, seizing and disposing of the mortgaged property.
It further appears from the record that upon the final *471 trial of the case, the debt to secure which the mortgage was given had become due, and in consideration of this fact the court instructed the jury that if they found the plaintiff wrongfully took possession of the property at the time of bringing the suit, and if a return thereof could not be had, the defendant in such case was entitled to recover such sum as from the evidence they found was the actual value of the property so seized, less such sum as the jury found from the evidence was owing by defendant to the plaintiff. Under this instruction the jury found for the defendant and found the value of the property to be $906.00.
Considering the instructions of the court and the verdict together, it is manifest, beyond question, that the jury deducted from the total value of defendant’s property seized by plaintiff, the amount of defendant’s debt to plaintiff, and that the value of $906 was the balance due the defendant from plaintiff after satisfying the indebtedness of defendant to plaintiff, and this amount so found was afterwards fully paid and satisfied by the defendants. Upon such findings the defendant’s obligation to plaintiff was fully discharged' and paid. No action could be maintained to again enforce the payment of such debt, out of real property mortgaged to secure it, and from this conclusion it is impossible to escape, unless we assume that the jury totally disregarded the instructions of the court, which is unwarranted.
It is urged that the verdict and judgment thereon entered in ease No. 641 do. not show that defendant’s indebtedness to plaintiff was deducted from the value of the property taken by the plaintiff. The answer to that is that the verdict must be held to be in accord with the instructions of the *472 court; and being in accord with sncli instructions, is a complete bar to any further action to collect that indebtedness.
The judgment of the district court must therefore be affirmed with costs.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Nichols & Shepard Company v. John W. Trower, Alice Trower, Jane Healy and the Enid and Tonkawa Railway Company
- Cited By
- 1 case
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- MORTGAGES — Replevin—Foreclosure—Res Judicata. Certain notes given for the purchase price of machinery were secured by a chattel mortgage, and also by a real estate mortgage. Before the notes became due plaintiff elected and declared that he deemed himself insecure, and demanded possession of the chattel security, which being refused, he brought replevin -action to recover the same, and by force of the writ of replevin received the property, which was never returned to the defendant. Upon trial of the-replevin action, the debt of defendant to plaintiff, pendente lite, became due, and the court instructed the jury that if they found for the defendant and a return of the property could not be had, a verdict should -be returned finding the value of the property, less the amount of defendant’s debt to plaintiff. A general verdict was returned in favor of defendant for possession of the property, and in case a return could not be had fixing the value of the property at $906.00. The -property having been disposed of, the plaintiff paid the value as fixed by the jury, upon the judgment therefor, and brought this action to foreclose the real estate mortgage. Held, That this verdict and judgment in replevin, considered in connection with the instructions of the court, is res judicata as to any further attempt to enforce payment of the notes. (Syllabus by the Court.)