Opinion of the court by

It is contended by the plaintiff in error that the territory of Oklahoma is not the proper party to institute this action, and that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action. There is no merit to these contentions. The latter part of section 14 of chapter 8 of the Statutes of Oklahoma of 1893 (section 352) in force at that time, contains the following provision :

“The district court shall, upon the complaint of any member of the territorial board of health or the county board of health where he resides have power to cancel any license that may be issued to any person to practice medicine where such license was fraudulently obtained, or where the person to whom such license was issued has been guilty of violating any provisions of this act.”

It will thus be seen that the statute clearly confers upon the district court the power to cancel a license issued to any person to practice medicine, where such license was fraudulently obtained. Hence the court clearly had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action.

But it is contended that the action should be instituted by the territorial board of health, or some member thereof. We do not think the statute is susceptible of such a construction. It provides that upon complaint of a member of the territorial board of health, the action may be instituted in the district court for the *193 cancellation of the license. This does not mean that the action shall be instituted in the name of the territorial board of health, or any member thereof. The record discloses that the action was instituted upon the complaint of the territorial board of health, and upon the direction of the governor of the territory, and we think that this fully satisfies the requirements of the statute. Manifestly, the territory of Oklahoma is not .only a necessary partjq but it is the proper party to institute such an action.

It is also contended that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the finding and judgment of the court below. In our opinion the evidence fully sustains the allegations of fraud and deception in the procurement of the license, and we think that no other reasonable or just conclusion could have been reached by the trial court. The record discloses a flagrant case of fraud, deception, and misrepresentation in the procurement of the license. And this is not all. The applicant knew, at the time he made his application and verified, the same, under oath, that he was not a graduate of a reputable medical college, within the meaning óf this statute. He knew that the pretended diploma which he held from the college was a mere sham and fraud, well calculated to mislead and deceive the territorial board of health. He knew that the obtaining of the diploma was a mere pretence and fraud, and he knew that the supreme court of the state of Illinois had, long prior to his application for license to practice in this territory,, forfeited the charter of this pretended medical college, and declared “that the corporation is a mere diploma mill, designed wholly for issuing diplomas to practice medicine, for a consideration, to persons wholly unqualified for such practice.”

In the case of Independent Medical College v. People ex rel. Aikin, Attorney General, 182 Ill. 274, 55 N. E. 345, the right of this medical college to transact business in the state of Illinois-was directly involved. And this is the college from whence the plaintiff in error represented that he was a graduate. The action was proceeding by information in the nature of a qua warranto, brought in the circuit court of Cook county, February *194 term, 1898, by the people, on the relation of the attorney general, against the Independent Medical College, a corporation, of Chicago, to forfeit its franchise or charter. The corporation was chartered in 1896, having as its object the establishment of ‘an institution of learning/ and ‘for the purpose of promoting mental and physical culture/ and for teaching branches taught in medical colleges generally, with power to grant diplomas and confer degrees. The information charged that the corporation was conducted for pecuniary profit; that it conferred degrees and issued diplomas for a price, without regard to the qualifications or fitness of the applicant to practice medicine, that in some cases no examination whatever was required, and degrees were conferred upon persons wholly unfit and incompetent; that in one case, specifically alleged, a diploma or license to practice medicine and surgery was granted for the price of $25, the applicant never having been a student of medicine or surgery. It was further charged that the corporation was a diploma mill, designed wholly for issuing diplomas to practice medicine, for a consideration, to persons wholly unqualified for such practice. The respondent filed a plea to the information, denying its general allegations, and averring that it had not resorted to wrongful or unlawful methods in conferring degrees as a means of profit to its incorporators, and that it has not issued diplomas to persons wholly incompetent to practice, medicine. To this plea the attorney general filed a replication, averring that the defendant ‘has usurped and misused, and does now usurp and misuse, its liberties, privileges, and franchises/ and tendering issue. Issue being joined, the cause was heard by the court, without a jury, upon the pleadings and evidence taken. The court found the defendant guilty as charged, and rendered judgment that the Independent Medical College be ousted and excluded from the exercise of all its corporate privileges and franchises under its articles of incorporation/’ From the judgment an appeal was prosecuted to the supreme court of the state of Illinois, and in affirming the judgment, the court said:

“Without an extended analysis or weighing of the testimony *195 introduced upon the trial as it appears in this record, we have no hesitancy in saying that it fully justified the finding and judgment of the court below. In fact, it is sufficient to establish the guilt of the defendant, as charged in the information, beyond a reasonable doubt, and would have justified, not only the forfeiture ■of the charter, but the infliction of a fine upon the parties guilty of the abuses.”

In Illinois Health University v. People, 166 Ill. 171, 46 N. E. 740, the supreme court of Illinois, in discussing this question, said:

“It is not consistent with the public policy of a state which enacts stringent laws for the preservation of the public health, and for the protection of its people from quacks and ignorant pretenders to a knowledge of the science of medicine and surgery, to authorize or permit a pretended health university to turn any one whether known or unknown, qualified or unqualified, into a doctor of medicine, armed with a diploma and degree as one qualified to heal the sick, who may answer its prescribed list of questions and pay its prescribed fee. The charter of a corporation is the full measure of its power, and, if any doubt arises out of the language employed in such charter, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the state. Mills v. St. Clair Co., 2 Gilman (Ill.) 197; St. Louis J. & C. R. Co. v. Trustees, etc., of the Institution for the Blind, 43 Ill. 303; Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Village of Hyde Park, 70 Ill. 634; St. Clair Co. Turnpike Co. v. People, 82 Ill. 174; Minturn v. Larue, 23 How. (U. S.) 435. It stands admitted by the demurrer that there was a willful misuser and abuse of the power conferred on this corporation, and a prostitution and perversion of its corporate powers to objects and purposes for which no certificate of incorporation could be properly issued, and which would be against the policy of our laws. It was a clear abuse of the liberal privileges conferred by our incorporation laws for appellant to make use of them for the purposes set forth in the information. And for such abuse and misuser its charter may and should be revoked. Edgar Collegiate Institute v. People, 142 Ill. 363, 32 N. E. 494.”

In Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 122, the supreme court of the United States, in passing upon the right and power of a state to ezact from parties, before they can practice medicine, a degree of skill and learning in that profession upon which the *196 community employing their services may confidently rely, and, to ascertain whether they have such qualifications, to require them to obtain a certificate or license from a board or other authority competent to judge in that respect, said:

“Few professions. require more careful preparation by one who seeks to enter it than that of medicine. It has to deal with all those subtle and mysterious influences upon which health and life depend, and requires not only a knowledge of the properties of vegetable and mineral substances, but of the human body in all its complicated parts, and their relation to each other, as well as their influence upon the mind. The physician must be able to detect readily the presence of disease, and prescribe appropriate remedies for its removal. Every one may have occasion to consult him, but comparatively few can judge of the qualifications of learning and skill which he possesses. Eeliance must be placed upon the assurance given by his license, issued by an authority competent to judge in that respect, that he possesses the requisite qualifications. Due consideration, therefore, for the protection of society may well induce the state to exclude from practice those who have not such a license, or who are found upon examination not to be fully qualified.”

It is argued by plaintiff in error that the court erred in admitting in evidence the records of the Illinois courts showing the actions brought by the state of Illinois to revoke and cancel the charters of the Illinois Health Institute, and the Independent Medical College, its successor, and the record of the conviction of Armstrong, the head of these institutions, for the fraudulent use of the mails in operating the same. Clearly, this evidence was competent and material, for the purpose of showing that these pretended colleges were fraudulent institutions, and that the pretended diploma was procured from a fraudulent institution. .

But one question remains: Did the court err in refusing the defendant a jury trial? This question must be answered in the negative. This is not one of the actions in which the party is entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right. Trial by jury is guaranteed only in those classes of cases where that right existed at common law. The case at bar falls under the well-recognized *197 rules of equity jurisprudence to cancel a license on the ground of fraud, and hence the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right. McCardell v. McNay, 17 Kan. 433; Kimball v. Connor, 3 Kan. 414.

. After a careful examination and consideration of the entire record, and of each of the errors assigned and which have been argued, we are clearly of the opinion that no error was committed by the trial court which would justify a reversal of this cause. It follows that the territory was a proper party to institute this action, upon the complaint of the territorial board of health, and by direction of the governor; that the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action; and that the evidence fully establishes the allegations of the petition that the license was- procured by fraud and deception.

Believing the judgment of the trial court to , be right and just, and in consonance with reason and sound morals, the judgment is affirmed.