Cape v. Moore

Supreme Court of Oklahoma
Cape v. Moore, 253 P. 506 (Okla. 1927)
122 Okla. 229; 1927 OK 46; 1927 Okla. LEXIS 171
Harrison, Branson, Mason, Phelps, Hunt, Clark, Lester, Riley, Hefner

Cape v. Moore

Opinion of the Court

HARRISON, J.

This litigation grew out of a controversy between two factions in tbe Missionary Baptist Church of Scullin, Okla., as to which faction should occupy and con trol the church house and other church property, and this appeal is to reverse a judg-intent of the district court of Murray county awarding such property to one faction, defendants in error, and restraining the other faction, plaintiffs in error, from interference therewith.

It appears from the record that said controversy arose and. took its present concrete form out of the following circumstances*, viz.:

Said church from the time of its organization up to the time this controversy arose had, as appears from the evidence, with many other Missionary Baptist churches, been aligned with and had affiliated with .an organization referred to in the record as the Oklahoma State' Convention, the general purposes of which organization, as appears from the record, being to assist its affiliating churches in th'e, direction and management of missionary work, or rather to superintend the missionary work of its affiliating churches in sending out missionaries, home and foreign, the> handling of mission funds, and general direction of missionary work.

There came a tim’e in 1920 when a portion of said Scullin Missionary Baptist Church congregation favored obtaining a loan of $150 from or through said Oklahoma State Convention, but a portion of the congregation opposed such loan.

It also apjiears that a portion of the congregation had become dissatisfied with tbe methods of the Oklahoma State Convention in handling its mission affairs and wanted to I withdraw from further affiliation with said I organization and to align and affiliate with I a similar organization, referred to in the record as the Chickasha Convention.

These propositions were all opposed by a portion of said church congregation, and the controversy grew to such bitterness as to result in two apparently irreconcilable factions, referred to in tbe record and briefs as tbe minority and the majority, the majority consisting of some 20 odd members, and tbe minority consisting of some nine to 'eleven members.

Tbe majority withdrew from the Oklahoma State Convention and began affiliatior with the Chickasha Convention, and callee a pastor who was in sympathy with the Chickasha Convention.

The minority refused to be bound by thes< actions, withdrew from fellowship and too] possession of the church property, including the church house, and locked its door against the majority.

Thereupon the majority began a replevii action in the justice ooiurt for possession o the chattel property, taken over by the mi nority, and about th'e same time began an a< tion in the district court for an injunctio: against locking the church doors. I

*231 The judgment of the justice court in the replevin action was appealed from to the district court, which in the meantime had. issued a temporary restraining order against locking th'e church doors.

Upon final hearing, the two causes were consolidated in the district court and the general imoposition as to which faction was entitled to possession and use of the church property was tried, resulting as aforesaid in th'e judgment decreeing the property to the minority and enjoining the majority from interference therewith, wherefore this appeal is prosecuted by the majority.

The whole affair is much regrtetted, and we earnestly hope that the resultant bitterness may pass away.

However, in assuming to exercise such powers as the civil courts are authorised to exercise in such matters we are forcibly reminded of the words of Hr. Justice Miller, .who wrote the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Watson v. Jones, 20 L. Ed. 666, a church controversy, in which the learned Justice said:

“Conscious as we may be of the excited feeling engendered by this controversy, and .of the extent to which it has agitated the intelligent and pious body of Christians in whose bosom it originated, we enter upm its consideration with the satisfaction of knowing that the principles on which we are to decide so much of it as is prop'ev for our decision are those applicable alike to a'U of its class, and that ouv duty is the simple one of applying those principles to the facts before ns.”

The undisputed facts before us in this case are:

That th'e church in question was at the time these dissensions arose a regular, orthodox, Missionary Baptist church in harmony with the principles, doctrine, teachings, tests, and tenets of faith and membership and manner of worship and rules of Ihurch government of the Missionary Bap;ist church denomination.

That each Missionary Baptist church rongregation is an independent, self-govem-ng, sovereign power or entity within itself, subject to no regulation, prescription, nor nandate of any higher church organization r ecclesiastical tribunal.

That the members in any Missionary Bapist church congregation constitute the sov-reign governing power of such church.

That the law and teachings of Christ, as iterpreted and construed by the Missionary ¡aptist church denomination, is the supreme law governing Missionary Baptist ehurchés in matters of faith, worship, and church government.

That the' Missionary Baptist church denomination believes and teaches that the right .of the majority of the members of the church -to rule its affairs is in accord with the law of Christ, and that in all matters and upon all questions the will of the majority must prevail, except that upon the question of receiving a member into .the church probably a unanimous vote is required, but in all other matters the will of a majority nf the church congregation is recognized as the law of the church.

That the various Missionary Baptist conventions or associations all recognize the sovereign independence of each individual Missionary Baptist church.

That the primary purpose of such conventions or associations as the Oklahoma State Convention and Chickasha Convention is the promotion of missionary work and assistance of their affiliating churches in such work.

That neither the affiliation- or nonaffiliation of an individual church congregation with any of such conventions or associations is regarded or construed as a test of true faith and practice in, or' departure from the cardinal doctrines taught by the Missionary Baptist church denomination, nor is the withdrawal from such affiliation so regarded or construed.

That in the event of contributions or donations from such conventions on- associations to an individual church, such contribu-yo». or donation is construed as a gift -... free offering, which does not carry with it any right or claim. of a donor upon the amount so contributed, nor any liten upon the church propterty into which it goes.

Of course, in case of a loan from such a convention or association to a church the question of a lien upon the church property would depend upon the terms of the loan contract.

It is also an undisputed fact that plaintiffs in error constitute the- majority, and that defendants in error are the minority.

It is also apparent that neither faction specifically charges the other with departure from the fundamental and essential doctrines of the Missionary Baptist church denomination no.r denies that either faction would' b’e entitled to membership in any regular Missionary Baptist church.

It is also an undisputed fact that the mi *232 nority, defendants in error, withdrew from further fellowship with the majority, plaintiffs in error, and assuming to be th'e Missionary Baptist Church of Scullin, called a pastor, took charge of the personal property involved in the aforesaid replevin action, and proceeded to lock the church house doors against the majority, and that the majority likewise had elected a new board of deacons and called a pastor and offered to take the minority back into the church, if they would come in.

Also the d’eed held by the church to the real estate involved was introduced into the record and is as follows:

“Warranty Deed.
“State of Oklahoma, Murray County.
“Know All Men By These Presents, That A. P. Hudson, a widower, party of the first part, in consideration of th'e' sum of two hundred ($200) dollars, in hand paid, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, does hereby grant, bargain, sell, and convey unto the Missionary Baptist Church of Scullin, Okla., and to the deacons of said church, viz.: S. T. Perrin, J. C. Boss, A. P. Hudson, and J. J. Cape, and to their successors, for the sole and only purpose of a place of public worship, parties of the s’econd part, the following described real property and premises, situate in Murray county, state of Oklahoma, to wit:
“All of lot 7 in block 81 in the town of Scullin, Okla., together with all improvements thereon, and the appurtenances thereunto belonging, and warrant the titl’e to the same.
■‘To have and to hold said described premises unto said parties of the second part, their successors and assigns forever, charges, taxes, judgments, mortgages and other liens and encumbrances of whatsoever nature.
“Signed and delivered this 25th day of March, 1919.
“(•Signed) A. P. Hudson.
(50c Revenue Stamp) “State of Oklahoma, Murray County.

Before me, Mate C. Nicholson, a notary Public in and for said county and state, on the 2'5th day of March. 1919, personally appeared A. P. Hudson, a widower, to me known to be the identical person who executed the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed th’e same as his free and voluntary act and deed for the uses and purposes therein set forth.

“Witness my hand and official seal the day and date above written.
“(Signed) Mate C. Nicholson, Notary Public.
“My commission Expires June 12, 1920.”

■ The foregoing undisputed facts, together with the foregoing deed, constitute the determinative points of evidence before us. We are not assuming toi say what the true doctrines of the Missionary Baptist church are. nor whether they accord with the teachings of Christ; we are merely saying what the undisputed facts before us show them to be. In assuming to apply the law to such state of facts, we bear in mind the well-guarded extent to which the civil courts should interfere in such church controversies, lest they invade the precincts of religious conscience, so securely protected by the Constitution of the United States, and likewise by art. 1, s'ee. 2, of the Constitution of this state.

But We bear in mind also that many pages of history bear evidence that religious controversies are often of the bitterest type and that in some instances property rights are violated to an extent which impels the court to protect such rights under the civil law.

We believe it to be the universal rule in our country, certainly a general rule with rare exceptions, that civil courts will intercede to protect property rights where such rights are being violated contrary to plain principles of law. See Watson v. Jones, 20 L. Ed. 666; First Baptist Church of Paris r. Fort et al. (Tex.) 49 L. R. A. 617; also 23 R. C. L. sec. 20, page 449, and cases cited in notes 4 and 5.

We deem it unnecessary to attempt an ex-hausive discussion and review of authorities on the extent to which and the particular character of cases in which the civil courts! will assume jurisdiction in religious con-1 troversies.

It will, suffice to say that upon a state of facts similar to the facts here presented the decisions are practically in harmony, and the distinction between controversies in religious denominations which have appellate judicatories, as do the Presbyterian, Methodist, Episcopalian, and Catholic churches and churches like the Missionary Baptisl churches, where each church is an indepen dent sovereignty, has been clearly drawn and the principles of law applicable to sucl conditions are well settled.

In Watson v. Jones. 20 L. Ed. 666, the Supreme Court of the United States held

“Where a church is of a strictly congr< gational o.r independent organization, and th property held by it has no trust attached t it, its rights to the use of the property mus be determined by the ordinary principle which govern voluntary associations.”

The application of these principles to coi *233 troversies of the character here presented was followed in First Baptist Church of Paris v. Fort et al., supra.

And the same principles have been applied in the determination of similar controversies in many cases. See notes to Mack v. Kime, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.), beginning on page 692.

So, applying thes'e principles to' the matter before us, we have a voluntary association of persons organized for specified purposes under. principles and rules of government and regulation of its affairs known to and agreed upon by the members forming the association.

The- voluntary organization of this association, this church, constitutes a union and meeting of minds upon the conditions made by the foregoing state of facts, and the members are bound by terms of their compact.

Hence, it fallows that th'e majority had a right to withdraw from the Oklahoma State Convention and to affiliate with the Chiek-asha Convention, and to the use of the church property in question as a place of public worship.

The right of a majority to control in such matter was known to and agreed upon and adopted by the members of the church as part of the conditions of the church organization and is binding.

We might have reached a different conclusion had the foregoing grant or deed been made upon conditions that the Seullin Missionary Baptist Church should continue to affiliate with the Oklahoma State Convention, or with any other convention, but the deed -contains no such condition, makes no such reservation; the only condition imposed by the deed is that it is to be us'ed “for the sole and only purpose of a place of public worship.”

It neither imposes the condition that the grantees shall affiliate with any convention or association, nor that they shall continue in any specified principles or tenets of faith; the condition is “for the sole and only purpose- of a place of public worship.”

The fact that the Seullin Missionary Baptist Church is mentioned in the deed signifies no more than the mere name of the ¡grantee. Upon these conclusions, the opinion filed is withdrawn and this opinion is rendered instead, the petition of defendants in ■error for rehearing is denied and the judgment below is reversed, with directions to dissolve the injunction.

Reversed, with directions.

BRANSON, C. J., and MASON, PHELPS. HUNT, CLARK, and LESTER, JX, concur. RILEY and HEFNER, JJ., not participating.

Reference

Full Case Name
CAPE Et Al. v. MOORE Et Al.
Cited By
9 cases
Status
Published