This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a judgment. Because the order appealed from is on a form titled “Court Minute”, and we have not been furnished with an order of the trial court meeting the form for appealable orders required by the recent statutory changes, we dismiss the appeal as premature.

The trial was for back-due child support, modification of child support, and contempt. The court modified child support, and determined the amount owed by Defendant Williams to the State of Oklahoma for A.F.D.C. support expended by the State. It determined that the Defendant owed Plaintiff $5,145.70 for child support arrearage. The order was filed on September 9, 1993.

On October 8, 1993 Plaintiff filed a combined motion for new trial and motion to vacate the order of September 9, 1993. Plaintiff argued that because her motion was filed within thirty days of the order the court could vacate, modify, or amend the order. On November 16,1993 the trial court filed an order that denied the motion to vacate. The petition in error was filed in this Court on December 15, 1993.

Our consideration of this appeal must be limited to the trial court’s order in denying the motion to vacate. A motion for new trial authorized by 12 O.S.1991 § 653 will not extend the time to appeal from the judgment if the motion is filed after the ten-day statutory period for such motions. Estate of *1131Heimbach, 827 P.2d 170 (Okla. 1992).1 Plaintiffs counsel on appeal (different from that at trial) is correct in stating that the post-judgment motion did not extend the time to appeal the judgment of September 9, 1993. This appeal is limited to challenging the trial court’s order of November 16, 1993 on Plaintiffs motion to vacate the judgment. Schepp v. Hess, 770 P.2d 34, 36 n. 2 (Okla. 1989).

The order denying the motion to vacate is on a printed form titled “Court Minute”. We have explained that recent statutory changes effective October 1, 1993 made minute entries an unappealable form for a filed judgment. Mansell v. City of Lawton, 877 P.2d 1120 (Okla. 1994); Aven v. Reeh, 878 P.2d 1069 (Okla. 1994). We requested a response from Plaintiff on the applicability of Mansell.

Plaintiff, in asserting that this particular minute order was appealable, argues that this Court looks to the substance of an instrument and not its form. Generally speaking, she is correct. “[Fjorm does not rule over substance in evaluating documents filed in this Court.” Markwell v. Whinery’s Real Estate, Inc., 869 P.2d 840, 847 (Okla. 1994). We followed this principle in Manning v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 876 P.2d 667, 669-671 (Okla. 1994) and explained that a “court minute” could be a filed judgment, in a decision where the minute predated the statutory changes effective October 1, 1993.

However, the Legislature has taken considerable trouble to declare that it is the form that shall determine whether a judge-signed instrument starts appeal time. The recently enacted 12 O.S.Supp.1993 § 696.3 states that a filed judgment must be in a certain form to be appealable. The court minute in this case contains a caption setting forth the name of the court, the names and designations of the parties, the file number of the case, a title, a disposition of the action and the relief awarded, and the signature and title of the court. This minute facially meets the requirements of § 696.3.

But since October 1, 1993 certain types of instruments are deemed to not be a “judgment, decree or appealable order” for the purpose of commencing the time to appeal. 12 O.S.Supp.1993 § 696.2(C). One of these is a “minute entry.”2 Pursuant to § 696.2(C) a minute entry, even though it might meet the other requirements of § 696.3, is not an ap-pealable order or judgment.

Plaintiffs interpretation of § 696.2 is that some court minutes are appealable while others are not. She would have us examine the content of each instrument bearing a “minute” label to determine its appealability. It is clear to us that the legislature wants a brighter line to distinguish appealable orders from non-appealable ones than we have recognized in the past. We believe this is a useful reform, with one of its aims to reduce the amount of judicial energy expended on determining when time to appeal starts to run. We therefore decline this invitation to create a body of caselaw delineating the type of minutes that are appealable. We conclude that an order of the District Court titled “Court Minute” is not a judgment, decree or appealable order for the purpose of commencing the time to appeal. Mansell v. City of Lawton, 877 P.2d 1120 (Okla. 1994); Aven v. Reeh, 878 P.2d 1069 (Okla. 1994).

The only disposition of Plaintiffs post-judgment motion appearing in the appellate record is the court minute. No filed judgment complying with the form of § 696.3 appears in the appellate record. A judgment or appealable order conforming to § 696.3 is *1132“a jurisdictional prerequisite to the commencement of an appeal.” 12 O.S.Supp.1993 § 696.2(C). We dismiss the appeal as premature. 12 O.S.Supp.1993 § 990A(F).

with whom SIMMS, Justice, joins, dissenting.

The court dismisses Pamela J. Corbit’s [Corbit] appeal from a nisi prius denial of her motion for new trial because the denial order — although captioned, signed and subscribed by the judge and completely resolving all the dispositive issues in the case — is memorialized on a form bearing “court minute” as its title. Today’s opinion concludes that this filed order of denial cannot trigger appeal time. I dissent from this disposition that allows Corbit to secure and file another order, proper inform, which would presumably trigger an appealable event for review of all errors she attempts to tender. The solution I counsel would (a) bar our review of two trial court rulings for which this appeal clearly is untimely and (b) confine the breadth of corrective relief to errors, if any, in the trial court’s response to Corbit’s term-time motion to vacate. I must also recede from today’s unwarranted extension of extant jurisprudence, first pronounced in Mansell v. City of Lawton,1 and from the court’s strained interpretation of pertinent statutory language.

I

THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION

On July 1, 1992 Garry Williams [Williams] requested the district court reduce his child support obligation. Corbit, Williams’ divorced wife, then pressed, on July 31, 1992, for a contempt citation to enforce payment of an accumulated child support arrearage owed her (and the Department of Human Services). At a July 13, 1993 hearing the court orally lowered Williams’ current support obligation and made a quantitative finding of his child support delinquency to date. By its July 21, 1993 entry the trial court corrected sua sponte this last determination by another reduction of the adjudicated arrearage. By the terms of the latter order the lowered arrearage was commuted to judgment. The July 21 ruling was memorialized on a court form bearing the title “court minute”. On July 22, 1993 Corbit timely sought a new trial. By judge-generated order filed September 9, 1993 the trial court (1) sustained Williams’ quest for reduction of future child support, (2) found him guilty of indirect contempt, (3) deferred his sentencing and (4) denied Corbit’s new-trial motion addressing the amount of adjudicated arrearage. This critical order does not bear the title “court minute”.2 By her October 8, 1993 paperwork, filed more than 10 days after the September 9, 1993 entry, Corbit once again sought a new trial, this time requesting the September 9 order’s vacation. By another judge-generated order3 (dated November 16, 1993) the court (1) overruled Corbit’s second new-trial motion and (2) sentenced Williams on the contempt charge. The November 16 order is correctly captioned, identifies the court, and is both signed and subscribed by the judge. It bears the preprinted title “court minute”.

In this appeal, brought here on December 15, 1993, Corbit seeks corrective relief from the trial court’s judgment for commuted ar-rearage, effective of record below from July 21, which became appealable on September 9 when her timely new trial motion (targeting that issue) was denied. She also seeks our review of the trial court’s reduction of her former husband’s future child support obligation, effective of record below from September 9, which decision, for lack of a timely new trial motion (addressing that issue), became immediately appealable on that date. 4

On this record, the dispositive queries now before us are: (1) whether the post-decree *1133order filed September 9 became at once ap-pealable for review of tivo decisions: (a) the judgment for commuted arrearage and (b) the order for future child support reduction (the latter’s appeal time ran from September 9 because the October 8 new-trial motion came too late); and (2) whether filed documents that meet all the statutory requirements for entry upon the judgment roll — but bear the preprinted title “court minute”— constitute appealable orders within the meaning of 12 O.S.Supp.1993 § 696.3(A).5 I would give an affirmative answer to both of these questions.

II

THE COURT IGNORES TWO APPEAL-ABLE POST-DECREE RULINGS FOR THE REVIEW OF WHICH THIS APPEAL IS UNTIMELY

A captioned document (a) bearing the signature and title of the court, (b) including a statement of the relief aivarded and the liabilities and obligations imposed on the parties and (c) filed in the district court clerk’s office operates to trigger the appeal time.6 The July 21 and September 9 post-decree orders both bear these attributes; the latter meets even the suprastatutory requirement imposed by Mansell.

A.The July 21, 1993 Order

A new trial motion, filed in the court clerk’s office within ten (10) days of an ap-pealable order’s filing, extends appeal time until that motion’s disposition is memorialized and filed.7 The July 21 judgment for commuted arrearage became reviewable when the September 9 order denying Corbit’s timely new trial motion was placed on file. That order meets the standards of Mansell. Corbit is hence too late for our review of the judgment commuting arrearage.

B. The September 9, 1993 Order

Appeal time is not extended by a motion to vacate filed more than 10 days after the final order is placed on file in the office of the court clerk.8 The correctness of the trial judge’s order for reduced future support became appealable when the memorial of the September 9 ruling on that issue, which meets the Mansell test, was filed below but not followed, within 10 days, by a new trial motion. Corbit is hence tardy with her quest for our review of the order reducing future support.

C. The Limited Scope of the November 16, 1993 Order’s Reviewability

Corbit’s belated second new trial motion (of October 8, 1993) should be considered nothing more than a motion to vacate brought under the provisions of 12 O.S.1991 § 1031.1.9 It came too late for a new-trial quest but still timely for term-time relief affordable by the cited statute. Even if the court is correct in today’s condemnation of the November 16 order as defective under *1134§ 696.2(C)10 (when measured by the Mansell test), Corbit’s appeal, if refiled after its dismissal, would have to be confined to the single issue of whether there was error in the trial court’s November 16 response to the belated “second new trial motion”.11 The refiled appeal would be too late to confer on this court reviewing cognizance over the correctness of two nisi prius decisions, each of which was separately appealable as a final post-decree determination: (1) the judgment for the commuted arrearage and (2) the order reducing future child support.12

Ill

THE COURT IMPERMISSIBLY EXTENDS THE MANSELL13 DOCTRINE TO CONDEMN COURT-FILED DOCUMENTS WHICH, THOUGH MEETING ALL STATUTORY STANDARDS, BEAR THE PRE-PRINTED TITLE “COURT MINUTE”

Mansell v. City of Lawton14 teaches that a filed memorial of a ruling does not bring about an appealable event unless its text is in strict compliance with the requirements of 12 O.S.Supp.1993 § 696.3(A).15 The obverse of this rule is that any filing in accord with the provisions of that section must be deemed to constitute a satisfactory jurisdictional prerequisite for an appeal’s commencement. The meaning and effect of an instrument depend on its substantive content.16 The court-filed paper Corbit offers as the foundational document for this appeal (the November 16, 1993 order) clearly meets the attributes of a recordable memorial. It contains a caption identifying the court; it is signed and subscribed by the judge; its content denies certain relief that is described in certain terms.

While both judgments and minutes17 are posted on the appearance docket,18 each has a separate function and a distinct identity19 which facially distinguish each from the other by content and substance. A “minute” of *1135a judge’s courtroom decision internalizes the event by a short abstract to be posted solely on the court’s appearance docket. It does not serve as the court’s official record and external proof of the proceeding’s result; it is rather a mnemonic in-house aid. The proof of an adjudication is afforded solely by a recordable20 memorial that must be filed in the case and entered on the court’s journal.21

The November 16 memorial’s content and substance qualify it for consideration as a final order rather than for a mere minute. A signed order that meets the § 696.3(A) criteria must be recorded and then treated as an appealable order.22 By expanding Mansell’s teaching to rob of efficacy all court-filed documents that use for their title the word “minute”, the court invites lawyers to offer for entry on the nisi prius journal, as memorials of the same ruling, ttvo potentially discordant paper trails, both signed by the judge' — one bearing the title “minute”, and another, later-filed document that would be free of this single offending word. The second of these two papers (memorializing the same ruling) would be a nullity, leaving as the sole official record of the court’s action the earlier “court minute” — a document of the type Corbit tenders today. This unfortunate result is dictated by our “ruling case law” whose viability Mansell left intact.23

IV

THE COURT’S PRONOUNCEMENT CREATES AN INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN TWO STATUTORY SECTIONS

A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that relevant provisions must be considered together, giving force and effect to each of them.24 Legislative commands that are seemingly discordant should be reconciled in a manner that renders them consistent, harmonious and capable of intelligent application.25 Words, phrases and sentences in a legislative enactment must be interpreted not in an abstract sense, but with due regard for their context.26 The court relies on certain terms in 12 O.S.Supp.1993 § 696.2(C) — which section disapproves of “minute entries”27 — to condemn the November 16 order as “unap-pealable”. By invoking those provisions out of context, rather than in conjunction with in *1136pari materia legislative text, the court introduces into our law discord between § 696.2(C) and § 696.3(A),28 which is not ascribable to statutory language. Under today’s rationale, title alone — -rather than the law-conforming content — will absolutely control an instrument’s efficacy. I would treat the § 696.2(C) litany of negatives as not an across-the-board condemnation of court entries entitled “minutes”. A paper bearing in its title this offending word may nonetheless be efficacious to trigger appeal time if it complies with the requirements of § 696.3(A). My interpretation of the pertinent language would restore harmony between the two sections by giving effect to both.

y

SUMMARY

Today’s rationale allows Corbit to bring a new appeal as soon as she secures an approvable written order (sans the offending word) and files it in the court clerk’s office. / recede from this disposition. It ignores the tardiness of the instant appeal for review of tivo appealable post-decree decisions: (1) the judgment for commuted arrearage of July 21 (followed by the “Mansell-proof’ September 9, 1993 entry denying new trial) and (2) the order reducing future child suppori of September 9 (not followed by a timely new-trial motion).29

The main vice in today’s disposition lies in its expansion of Mansell. The court extends the teachings of that opinion to invalidate all orders which, though conformable to the terms of § 696.3(A), bear a single offending ivord. This result plainly demonstrates an unwarranted knee-jerk reaction of hostility to judge-prepared memorials. Aside from injecting into the nisi prius record-keeping system an inconsistency between two in pari materia sections, today’s pronouncement intrudes into the trial court’s control over the contents of its memorials. I would require substance and content always to prevail over form. Reading the provisions of §§ 696.2(C) and 696.3(A) together, as I strongly counsel the court to do, would reconcile their quite consistent texts to make both sections stand in harmony.

I would hence dismiss this appeal as untimely to bring for review the two post-decree decisions memorialized by the Man-sell-proof September 9, 1993 order; I would let the appeal stand but confine our review to errors in the trial court’s response (of November 16, 1993) to the belated “second new-trial motion” of October 8, 1993. That plea should be treated as a § 1031.1 vacation quest.

APPENDIX A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR OKLAHOMA COUNTY STATE OF OKLAHOMA

No. FD-92-4666.

Sept. 9, 1993.

Pamela J. Corbit, aka Pamela Kearney, now Pamela Harris, Plaintiff,

v.

Garry Williams, Defendant. State of Oklahoma, Ex Rel Department of Human Services, Third Party Defendant.

ORDER

On February 25, 1993, July 13, 1993 and August 26, 1993, the above entitled action came on for trial on Plaintiffs Application For Citation For Contempt of Court filed July 31, 1992 and Defendant’s Motion To Modify Child Support filed July 1, 1992 and Plaintiffs Motion For New Trial filed July 22, 1993. The parties appeared in person and by counsel. The Court heard the statements and arguments of counsel and took the matter under advisement.

*1137The Court, on July 13, 1993 entered certain Orders at the bench and are incorporated and set forth as follows:

(1) AFDC owed to the State of Oklahoma by the Defendant as per stipulation of the parties and judgment was entered accordingly against the Defendant.

(2) The Defendant was found guilty of Indirect Contempt of Court and sentencing was deferred to August 26,1993 at 1:30 P.M. with the Defendant being released on his current O/R bond. Child support arrearage was set at $8,237.31 thru July 31, 1993.

(3) Defendant’s Motion To Modify Child Support was sustained as per the Guide Lines prepared by the Court, effective August 1, 1992, as per Exhibit “A” attached hereto.

(4) Attorney’s fee and costs were reserved.

Thereafter, on July 21, 1993 the Court entered a Court Minute amending the Court Order of July 13,1993 to reflect an arrearage of $5,996.11 in lieu of $8,237.31.

On August 26, 1993 this matter came on for Sentencing and for an Evidentiary Hearing to ascertain certain child support payments made to the Plaintiff and to ascertain the judgment amount owed to the State of Oklahoma, ex rel Department of Human Services for A.F.D.C. expended by the State by the State of Oklahoma and to ascertain payments of child support to the Plaintiff from March 1, 1993 to July 31, 1993. The evidence presented indicated the following payments had been made to the Plaintiff by the Department of Human Services from funds paid by the Defendant to the Department of Human Services for child support from March 1, 1993 thru July 31, 1993, to wit:

March, 1993 $420.41

April, 1993 $430.00

May 1993 $430.00

June, 1993 $430.00

July, 1993 $430.00

$2140.41

The parties stipulated the judgment amount owed by the Defendant to the D.H.S. on February 28, 1993 was $886.45 and that judgment was so entered on July 13, 1993.

The Court Finds and Orders the Plaintiffs Motion For New Trial filed July 22, 1993 should be sustained in part and denied in part as herein Ordered.

The Court’s further Findings and Orders are as follows:

(1) The child support arrearage owing to the Plaintiff by the Defendant thru July 31, 1993 is $5,145.70, as detailed on Exhibit “B” attached hereto and made a part hereof and which this Court finds to be in accordance with the evidence presented in the aforesaid hearings. The modification of child support will be effective March 1, 1993.

(2) Child support payments, as set forth in Exhibit “A” attached hereto, has been prepared accordingly.

(3) Interest on unpaid child support installments will bear interest in accordance with the statutes and case law of the State of Oklahoma.

(4) Sentencing of the Defendant is set for hearing on October 26, 1993 at 1:30 P.M. The Defendant is released on his current O/R Bond.

(5) The issue of attorney’s fees and cost is reserved.

(6) The Court considers the foregoing to be a final Order as to the issues addressed herein.

Dated September 9, 1993.

/s/ Thornton Wright, Jr. Thornton Wright, Jr. Special Judge

cc: Patricia L. Carroll

M. Joe Crosthwait, Jr.

Randy Henning

*1138APPENDIX B

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The Court’s Orders are as follows:

(1) The Plaintiffs Motion For New Trial as Amended and Supplemented is overruled; exceptions allowed.

(2) The Defendant is sentenced to six months in the County Jail, with no good time; said sentence of confinement is suspended pending the Defendant’s payments as follows:

(a) Current support of $280.15 per month to Plaintiff commencing December 1, 1993; and

(b) Monthly payment of $214.41 to Plaintiff to apply on child support arrearage of $5145.70, commencing December 31, 1993 and

(c) Payment to the Department of Human Services the sum of $36.94 per month on the arrearage of $886.45, commencing December 1, 1993.

(3) The aforesaid sentence subject to acceleration upon default of Defendant.

(4) The issue of attorney’s fees and costs is reserved. ...

(5) The Defendant is released on his current O/R Bond.

/s/ Thornton Wright, Jr. Thornton Wright, Jr. Special Judge