¶ 2 Two issues are presented: 1) whether Administrative Order CV-95-11 and 43 O.S. Supp.1997 § 107.22 which require divorcing *1222parents with children to attend classes intended to help minors to cope with divorce are constitutional; and 2) whether, under the facts presented, the husband was entitled to have his timely-filed motion to vacate sustained. We find the administrative order and the statute do not violate constitutional standards of equal protection or due process nor do they constitute a prohibited delegation of the legislative authority. However, the cause must be reversed in part, because the father did not have notice that his rights to visitation were in jeopardy. Under the facts presented, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to vacate the default judgment. The cause is remanded and the trial court is ordered to consider the father’s application for visitation.

FACTS

¶3 On July 19, 1996, the plamtifi/appel-lee, Debbie D. Nelson (wife/mother), served the defendant/appellant, Richard E. Nelson (husband/father), with a petition for divorce. In the petition, the wife sought: custody of the couple’s two minor children with the husband to have “reasonable visitation”; an award of child support and child care expenses computed in accordance with .the Oklahoma Child Support Guidelines, 43 O.S. Supp.1995 § 118, et seq.; medical insurance and payment of a portion of any unpaid medical expenses of the children; an equitable division of marital property and debt; and attorney fees and costs. Because the husband believed that he and his wife were in the process of settling the issues presented in the divorce proceeding, he did not hire an attorney or file an answer.

¶ 4 Finding the husband in default, the trial court granted the divorce on November 4, 1996. Under the decree, the wife was given custody of the minor children, and the husband was denied visitation based on his failure to attend the course, “Helping Children Cope with Divorce.”3 The husband was ordered to pay $611.16 monthly for child support and sixty-six percent of any child care expenses. He was also required to provide medical insurance for the children and to pay á portion of any uncovered medical expenses. The decree divided marital property between the parties and awarded the wife $5,000.00 in lieu of alimony as property division. Each party was directed to discharge the debt on vehicles awarded as their separate property. Finally, the husband was ordered to pay the wife’s attorney fee of $550.00. It is undisputed that the only pleading served on the husband was the petition. In that filing, there was nothing to put the husband on notice that he could be denied visitation with his children.

¶ 5 On November 27, 1996, the husband filed a motion to vacate the judgment and decree of divorce.4 He asserted that: he did not file an answer because he believed that the property and child support issues would be settled; the child support awarded exceeded provisions of the Oklahoma Child Support Guidelines, 43 O.S. Supp.1995 § 118, et seq.; the division of property and debt was inequitable; and the decision to deny visitation based on his failure to attend the parenting seminar violated his right of association with his children and was not based on a consideration of the children’s best interests.

¶ 6 A hearing on the motion to vacate was held on December 30,1996, in which the husband requested that the decree be set aside as to all matters except for the portion of the judgment granting the parties’ divorce. At the hearing, the husband acknowledged that he knew that he was required to attend the Children Coping With Divorce Seminar and that, after the decree was entered, he *1223completed the course.5 All attempts of the husband to offer evidence on the actual value of the marital estate were overruled. The trial court did accept evidence of the husband’s income. Nevertheless, this information was not considered in adjusting the child support obligations. Instead, the wife was ordered to prepare an order nunc pro tunc removing child care expenses from the amount of child support originally ordered. On March 4, 1997, an order was entered designating the husband’s child support obligation at $409.86 rather than $611.19 and requiring him to pay sixty-six percent of any employment-related child care expenses.

¶7 The husband appealed and he requested that the cause be retained to address the constitutionality of Administrative Order CV-95-1 and 43 O.S. Supp.1997 § 107.2. The motion was granted on April 25,1997. Family and Children’s Services, Inc. was given leave to file an amicus brief on May 29,1997,6 and the husband’s final response was filed on June 27,1997.

I

¶ 8 ADMINISTRATIVE RULE CV-95-1 AND 43 O.S. SUPP.1997 § 107.2 DO NOT DENY DIVORCING PARENTS WITH MINOR CHILDREN DUE PROCESS OR EQUAL PROTECTION NOR DO THEY CONSTITUTE A PROHIBITED DELEGATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY.

¶ 9 The husband argues that Administrative Order CV-95-1 and 43 O.S. Supp.1997 § 107.2, requiring the divorcing parents of a minor child to attend educational programs relating to the impact of divorce on a couple’s children, are unconstitutional on equal protection and due process grounds. The wife and amicus curiae assert that neither the order nor § 107.2 violate constitutional standards.

"... Q With regard to — were you made aware that you were to attend the Children Copying [sic] With Divorce seminar?

A Yes.

Q And have you now done that?

A Yes....”

¶ 10 The issue of the constitutionality of statutes similar to Administrative Order CV-95-1 and 43 O.S. Supp.1997 § 107.2 is one of first impression in Oklahoma and in the nation.7 In other areas relating to divorce, state-enacted restrictions have been upheld, i.e., a one-year residency condition for maintaining an action for divorce,8 and a waiting period between the time of filing and the entry of the final decree.9 Additionally, there are established standards for the consideration of statutory enactments attacked on constitutional grounds.

A. Equal protection.

¶ 11 The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that no state “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”10 Due process protections encompassed within the Okla. Const. Art. 2, § 711 are coextensive with those of its federal counterpart. The United States Constitution and the Oklahoma Constitution each contain built-in anti-discrimination components which afford protection against unreasonable or unreasoned classifications which serve no important governmental interests.12 The same equal protection component found in the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution is present in the due process clause of art. 2, § 7.13

*1224¶ 12 There is a strong presumption which favors legislative enactments. A statute will be upheld unless it is clearly, palpably, and plainly inconsistent with fundamental law.14 In testing the validity of a state statute which differentiates in treatment of one class paralleled with its treatment of another class, the statute is immune to an equal protection attack if the basis for the differentiation is neither arbitrary nor capricious, and it bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate aim.15 The Fourteenth Amendment does not require that equal protection be measured by exact equality of classification.16 It does require that the classification rest on bona fide, not feigned differences, that the distinction have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made; and that the different treatments are not arbitrary.17 Unless a classification jeopardizes the exercise of a fundamental right or it makes a classification on an inherently suspect characteristic, a classification which rationally furthers a legitimate state interest will withstand an equal protection challenge.18

¶ 13 Administrative Order CV-95-1 and § 107.2 make a single distinction — parents, or persons standing in the parental role, who invoke the jurisdiction of the court in an action which will alter the character of the parental unit may be required to take an educational course intended to lessen the impact of the change on minor children — if minor children are not involved, the requirement does not apply. Recognizing the harmful impact of divorce on children and in attempt to minimize the involvement of minors in parental conflict,19 statutes similar to the order and to § 107.2 have been enacted in a number of jurisdictions.20

¶ 14 States may seek to protect and facilitate the parental bond through parental participation,21 and they have a strong, traditional interest in setting the terms of and procedures for marriage and divorce.22 The courses mandated by the order and by § 107.2 are educational and cover topics specifically related to children who are members of families experiencing divorce or other disruption of the family unit. Neither the statute nor the administrative order provide that failure to attend the course will result in visitation or custody being denied.23 Rather, to the extent that the requirement places a duty on divorcing parents with minor chil*1225dren which is not carried by persons without minor children, the distinction is justified by today’s alarming divorce rates and the concurrent impact on our children. It reasonably relates to the government’s legitimate concern that the best interests of minor children of divorcing families be served. We find that Administrative Order CV-95-1 and 43 O.S. Supp.1997 § 107.2 are not unconstitutional on equal protections grounds.24

B. Due process.

¶ 15 The husband’s due process attack on CV-95-1 and on § 107.2 is procedural 25 — relating to his lack of notice — and substantive,26 concerning the burden attending an educational course relating to the impact of divorce on minors bears on his parental rights. We agree that the husband did not receive notice sufficient to appraise him that his visitation rights might be in peril.27 We also agree that a parent may not be penalized for failure to attend courses mandated either by the administrative order or by the statute absent notice that completion of the course is required. However, this Court will not assume that simply because here the husband did not receive adequate notice that parties generally will not be advised of the obligation to complete the educational courses.

¶ 16 The husband’s constitutional attack on CV-95-1 and § 107.2 on substantive grounds centers on an argument that, absent some jeopardy to the health or safety of children, the government may not intrude in the familial relationship and require parents to attend the mandated educational courses. However, in. determining whether the order or the statute constitute a substantive due process violation, a balance must be struck between the right protected and the demands of society.28 We recognize that the relationship of parents to their children is a fundamental, constitutionally protected right.29 However, the liberty interest of the *1226parent must be balanced against the best interests of the child. In this arena, the child’s interest are paramount30 and the parents rights are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed.31 Unquestionably, the state has a constitutional right to declare and maintain a policy regarding marriage and divorce concerning persons domiciled within its borders.32 The Legislature’s enactment of § 107.2 and the district court’s adoption of CV-95-1 is a recognition that children are impacted socially, emotionally and economically by divorce.33 The extent to which a parent may be inconvenienced by attendance at the educational seminars is subordinate to the need to protect the child’s welfare. In addition, the requirement to attend the class or seminar creates no burden on the parent’s right of association with the child. We find that neither Administrative Order CV-95-1 nor 43 O.S. Supp.1997 § 107.2 are unconstitutional on procedural or substantive due process grounds.

C. Delegation of legislative authority.

¶ 17 The husband’s final attack on 43 O.S. Supp.1997 § 107.2 and on Administrative Order CV-95-1 centers on an argument that the statute and the rule provide for an unauthorized delegation of the legislative authority in violation of the Oklahoma Constitution art. IV, § 134 and art. V, § 135, because the courts are allowed to make rules to carry out the policy announced by the provision. However, this argument is unpersuasive. The language of § 107.2(a) provides standards for the kind of educational course which is mandated. Subsection (b) merely authorizes the courts to implement local rules governing the program the Legislature has required.36

¶ 18 Additionally, neither the statute nor the administrative order are result determinative. Unquestionably, the relationship of a parent to a child is a constitutionally protected right.37 We agree that an administrative order may not take away or infringe on rights guaranteed by the constitution.38 However, neither § 107.239 nor CV-95-140 require that visitation be denied for failure to attend the mandated seminar. Rather, it is clear that the standard for determining visitation rights remains the “best interest of the child.”41 Administrative Rule CV-95-1 specifically provides only that a party’s failure to attend the parenting seminar may be considered as “a factor in determining the best interest of the child.” The rule was not *1227followed here in making a decision on the husband’s rights to visitation. In drafting-local rules, judicial districts must keep in mind: 1) the purpose of the seminar—to educate the parties on the impact on children; 42 and 2) a visitation schedule that will serve the best interest of the minor child.43 Trial courts remain vested with the discretionary authority to determine the child’s best interest.44

II.

¶ 19 UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED, THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT.

¶ 20 The father asserts that although he was served with the petition, he was not aware that he could be denied visitation with his children or that a money judgment could be entered against him.45 The wife argues that because the husband was properly served with the petition, he had notice of the proceedings and that he may not assert a lack of procedural due process. Although we disagree that the husband lacked notice his wife was seeking a property division,46 we agree that he was not advised that his visitation rights were in jeopardy.

¶21 It is elementary and fundamental that “due process of law” encompasses more than a party’s right to be heard. It begins with a party’s right to notice of the pendency of an action and of the nature of any relief sought47 Here, it is undisputed that the husband was served with the petition and that it provided that he was to have “reasonable visitation” with his children.48 Nevertheless, the default decree denied visitation.

¶22 The mother argues that the husband had constructive notice that his visitation rights were at issue by virtue of the existence of Administrative Order CV-95-1 requiring him to attend the seminar, “Children Coping with Divorce.” Although it appears that the husband was, aware of the order and of the requirement that he attend the class,49 nothing in the order advised him that failure to attend the course could result in a complete denial of visitation with his children. Rather, the clear language of the order indicates that failure to successfully complete the seminar may be considered as “a factor” in determining the best interest of the child.50 There is nothing in the record *1228indicating that based on the “best interest of the child” standard, the husband should have expected that his right to visitation would be barred. The husband’s fitness as a parent was never questioned. Indeed, the mother admits that it was not a determinative factor in the decision to deny visitation.51

¶ 23 Because litigants are entitled to a fair day in court, policy encourages actions being tried on the merits. Default judgments are not favored.52 , Nevertheless, a decision to vacate rests in the sound legal discretion of the trial court and it will not be disturbed on appeal absent an'abuse of discretion.53 Decisions to vacate depend on the facts and circumstances of each individual case.54 In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, we have held that to the extent a default judgment exceeds the relief requested in the petition, the judgment is void.55 Here, nothing in the petition, in Administrative Order CV-95-1, or in the settlement negotiations with the wife,56 put the husband on notice that his visitation rights were in jeopardy. We find that, under these facts, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to vacate the default judgment.

CONCLUSION

¶ 24 Only in exceptional cases should a parent be denied the right to visit his or her minor child.57 The standard used by the Legislature and by this Court as a test for granting or withholding visitation is the “best interest of the child.”58 However, neither Administrative Order CV-1-95 nor 43 O.S. Supp.1997 § 107.2 alter that standard or provide that failure to attend the mandated educational courses will result in visitation being denied. The classification established by the order and by the statute rest on a real and vital difference — parties seeking divorce who have minor children and those who do not. The different treatment is not arbitrary and it relates to the state’s legitimate interest in protecting children of divorce. The difference in treatment does not violate due process or equal protection standards. Nevertheless, under the facts presented, the husband was denied due process of law when his visitation rights were abrogated without notice that access to his minor children was in jeopardy. Under these facts, the trial court abused its discretion by denying the husband’s motion for relief.

*1229¶25 The cause is remanded and the divorce decree is reversed and remanded for further proceedings insofar as it denies the husband visitation.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.

with whom SIMMS, J., joins, dissenting in part.

¶ 1 Today the court gives its imprimatur to a local court rule (Administrative Order CV-95-1 [CV-95-1]),1 which requires all parties in every domestic case (divorce, separate maintenance, guardianship, paternity, custody or visitation actions) to complete a seminar entitled “Helping Children Cope with Divorce.” The rule authorizes the trial court to visit sanctions on noncomplying suitors. By its pronouncement the court informs the public that the underpinnings for the rule’s legitimacy are to be found in an after-enacted statute, 43 O.S.Supp.1997 § 107.2,2 which authorizes each judicial district to adopt its .own rules for managing a similar program. Because the rule is based on a reasonable classification — applying as it does to divorcing couples with children as distinguished from those who have none — the court declares that the rule does not fall within the prohibition of Art. 5, § 46, Okl. Const.,3 which absolutely forbids regulation of procedure by special law.

¶2 This ease is not about special law tainted by flawed classification. It is about local law that facially offends the § 46 prohibition against procedural rules which do not operate statewide. Unlike the court, I would condemn the judicial district’s rule as (a) local adjective law impermissible under Art. 5, § 46, Okl. Const.,4 (b) an encroachment upon the powers expressly reserved in the Supreme Court by Art. 7, § 6, Okl. Const.,5 and (c) an invasion of an individual judge’s decisionmaking independence. I would pro*1230nounce all local rules, promulgated under the authority of § 107.2, to be ineffective. This is so because their content would offend against the § 46 uniformity-of-procedure mandate and usurp the constitutional power of this court to implement the command of § 46 — on a statewide basis — by an exercise of its § 6 authority. Because today’s pronouncement so gravely contravenes Oklahoma’s fundamental law, I recede from the court’s opinion. My sentence of nullity for the local rule in contest would not limit any judge’s power to do, in individual litigation, what proof and discretion may require.

I

THE TRILOGY OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS THAT AFFECT LEGISLATIVE POWER TO ENACT “SPECIAL” OR “LOCAL” LAW

¶ 3 Pertinent to an understanding of the rule’s infirmity are three constitutional sections that deal with the taint of “special” or “local” law — Art. 5, §§ 32,6 467 and 59.8

Art. 5, § 59, Okl. Const.9

¶ 4 Art. 5, § 59 mandates the law’s uniform application by enactment of general laws.10 By § 59 a special law is permissible' where a general law could not be made applicable. In assessing whether a statute is constitutionally permissible under § 59, a three-prong inquiry is to be made: (1) Is the statute a special or general law? (2) If the act is a special law, could a general law be made applicable? and (3) If a general law may not be made applicable, does the statute pass muster as a permissible special law?11

Art. 5, § 46, Okl. Const.12

¶ 5 Art. 5, § 46 mandates in absolute terms statewide procedural uniformity for an entire class of similarly situated persons or things.13 Its relevant terms expressly prohibit the legislature from regulating judicial procedure or inquiry before the courts by special or local law.14 A countywide (or •districtwide) rule of civil procedure is per se offensive to the notion of territorial (statewide) uniformity so absolutely imposed by § 46.

¶ 6 Although directed to the legislature, the terms of §§ 46 and 59 are equally binding on the courts.15 Our own jurispru*1231dence, no less than the legislature’s enactments, must faithfully conform to the fundamental law’s prohibition against disuniform (or non-uniform) laws on prohibited subjects.16

Art. 5, § 32, Okl. Const.17

¶ 7 The terms of Art. 5, § 32 provide a procedure to be followed in considering and passing local or special acts upon matters falling outside the prohibitory scope of the absolutely excluded § 46 subjects.18 The enactment of special or local acts on subjects expressly prohibited by § 46 is not to be deemed validated by compliance with the publication requirements of § 32.19

II

CLASSIFICATION THAT MAY BE TERMED PERMISSIBLE UNDER ART. 5, §§ 59 AND 46, OKL. CONST.

¶ 8 Classification was developed to test for fundamental-law conformity legislative acts challenged as violative of § 59.20 In Reynolds v. Porter21 classification was introduced to measure the constitutional orthodoxy of statutory limitations — a subject protected from disuniformity by § 46. Limitations do not constitute a monolithic subject; they operate on multiple classes ofliti-gation. To test limitations by the gauge of § 46’s absolute prohibition of disuniformity, Porter analyzed the enactment there under attack by the classification used in the common law for dividing different types of litigation into separate time-bar categories.22

¶ 9 Classification is still the test for legislative compliance with § 59 rather than for an act’s orthodoxy when it is measured by the § 46 uniformity-of-procedure mandate. Outside of limitations, the test for § 46 conformity of a challenged act is the presence or absence of uniformity. That is the sole standard this dissent applies to conclude that changing a rule of procedure for an entire class of litigation (recognized by our statutory law) and confining the operation of that change to less than the entire state makes the rule an impermissible “local law” within the meaning of § 46’s absolute bar against territorial disuniformity of Oklahoma’s adjective law.

Ill

THE LOCAL-AND-SPECIAL-LAW DISTINCTION IN OKLAHOMA’S FUNDAMENTAL LAW

¶ 10 An impermissible “special act” is one that deals with a subject already covered *1232by general law and gives that subject a treatment different from that accorded by general law.23 In contrast, an impermissible “local law” is one which has restrictive territorial application.24 The inevitable consequence of territorial restraint is that the litigants within the operational range of the rule will be given treatment different from that which, under like circumstances, suitors will receive elsewhere.25

¶ 11 None of the subjects prohibited by Art. 5, § ⅛6 may be dealt with by local law. Local law dealing with civil procedure (a subject included in the § 46 litany and protected against disuniformity) is invalid per se. The taint of locality does not stem from the vice of an impermissible classification.26 It consists of addressing a subject set aside in § 46 for uniform statewide operation by a law (or rule) that is not to be the same in the entire state.

IV

TODAY’S ANOINTMENT OF LOCAL RULE CV-95-1 CREATES A CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE TERRITORIAL DISUNIFORMITY IN CIVIL PROCEDURE, WHICH OFFENDS THE FUNDAMENTAL-LAW MANDATE FOR LIKE STATEWIDE PROCEDURE IN THE COURTS

¶ 12 We are not dealing here with an impermissible special law but with localization of adjective law by making it operative in but a single two-eounty district.27 Territorial disuniformity facially condemns the rule as a violation of the § 46 proscription against locally different procedure.28

¶ 18 No classification is implicated in today’s testing of the rule in contest. This is so because procedure must have uniform impact (a) in all judicial institutions of the same cognizance when they are processing like classes of litigation and (b) when they *1233are impacting similarly-situated suitors. The rule I would condemn today singles out litigants in the two-county district for a procedural treatment different from that accorded in like situations within the remainder of the state.29

¶ 14 In the final analysis, the 43 O.S.Supp.1997 § 107.2 grant of rulemaking power amounts in this case to an unconstitutional delegation to local courts (or to judicial districts) of a power whose exercise would offend the procedural-uniformity mandate of § 46.30 The legislature may not delegate to another body the powers that are expressly reserved by Art. 7, § 6, Okl. Const., in the Supreme Court.31 Today’s approbation of the rule here on review and of the legislature’s effort to invite adoption of local rules upon a subject that must have statewide uniformity, offends the constitutionally mandated single regime of proee-dure. It destroys the very fabric our fundamental law inexorably commands.

V

THE RULE ENCROACHES UPON THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

¶ 15 The rule under scrutiny here also is offensive to the norm pronounced in Yellow-eyes By and Through Gold v. Blevins.32, Blevins holds that an individual judge’s deci-sionmaking independence is protected from invasion effected by a court rule. There the court invalidated a local court rule that bound all Oklahoma County district court judges by a ruling (upon a novel point of law) earlier made by one of them. The mandatory character of the rule was condemned as an impermissible restriction on the independence of judicial decisionmaking process.

¶ 16 Because each trial court must decide independently whether the parties who stand before it should undergo the kind of training mandated by CV-95-1,33 the rule plainly Con*1234tradicts the teachings of Yelloweyes.

VI

THE COURT’S RESPONSE TO THIS DISSENT’S ANALYSIS RESTS ON A FACIAL LEGAL FALLACY

¶ 17 The court points to Wagnon v. State Farm Fire & Cas Co.34 for authority to create discrete subclasses. Wagnon is inappo-site. Under consideration there was a “special law,” while here we deal solely with an impermissible “local law”.35

¶ 18 The court relies on State ex rel. Wise v. Whistler36 for the notion that the legislature is not forbidden from inviting district courts to adopt local rules that would govern procedure in judicial districts. Whistler is clearly distinguishable. There, the legislature authorized district judges to prescribe rules for the regulation of county jails within the judicial districts in which they sit. Management of county jails is not a subject absolutely protected from territorial disuni-formity by Art. 5, § ⅛6. Statute-based or judge-prescribed nonuniform civil procedure in the district courts is plainly, absolutely and unequivocally interdicted by the command of our fundamental law. In the face of § 46’s uniformity-of-procedure mandate, the legislature is powerless to delegate to the district courts this court’s rulemaking authority in matters of procedure.37

¶ 19 In response to the court’s notion that the rule’s mandatory character is harmless because it does not determine the outcome of the cause (or the custody of the child), suffice it to say that adverse legal consequences do attach to a party’s failure to knuckle under the rule’s ukase.38

¶20 Lastly, in answer to the opinion’s comment that this court has not adopted uniform rules for the district courts, I would refer to the Rules for the District Courts of Oklahoma,39 which in various versions have been in force for several decades.

SUMMARY

¶21 I would condemn the rule under scrutiny here because it is “local” and affects a subject protected against territorial disuni-formity. The rule is hence violative of Art. 5, § 46, Old. Const. There can be no local tampering with a subject listed in § 46. No subject enumerated in § ⅛6 may be regulated by a law or rule that does not extend to the whole state. Flawed classification is hence not the essence of infirmity to be found in the rule under review today.

¶ 22 Today’s approval of the rule, as well as the pronouncement’s support for the authority conferred on local courts by the provisions of 43 O.S.Supp.1997 § 107.2, will doubtless serve as a license for spawning a different procedural regime in each judicial district. Both the legislature and this court are powerless to authorize local judicial institutions to adopt disuniform rules on subjects which, by the § 46 mandate, are required to have statewide application. The rulemaking powers expressly reserved to the Supreme Court by Art. 7 § 6, Okl. Const., may not be delegated to any other judicial body.40

¶ 23 My condemnation of the rule would not preclude any nisi prius court from ordering a party’s attendance of educational courses when its ruling is based on need shown and found to be present in a case sub judice.