. Title 47 O.S.1991 § 12-420, of the Oklahoma Mandatory Seat Belt Use Act, provides:

"Nothing in this act shall be used in any civil proceeding in this state and the use or nonuse of seat belts shall not be submitted into evidence in any civil suit in Oklahoma.”

. Title 47 O.S.1991 § 12-416 et seq.

. Title 47 O.S.1991 § 12-420, see note 1, supra.

. The parents also named the Church’s insurance company and the driver of the other vehicle as defendants in its lawsuit. Consequently, this cause involved multiple claims for relief and multiple parties. The trial court, pursuant to 12 O.S. Supp.1995 § 994, entered a final judgment expressly resolving all of the claims and issues which existed between the parents and the Church and determining that there was no just reason for delay in filing the final judgment.

. Title 47 O.S.1991 § 12-420, see note 1, supra.

. Title 12 O.S.1991 § 2012(B).

. Title 47 O.S.1991 § 12-420, see note 1, supra.

. Title 47 O.S.1991 § 12-417 provides:

"A. Every operator and front seat passenger of a passenger car operated in this state shall wear a properly adjusted and fastened safety belt system, required to be installed in the motor vehicle when manufactured pursuant to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208. For the purposes of this section, ‘passenger car’ shall mean ‘vehicle’ as defined in Section 1102 of this title, except that ‘passenger car’ shall not include trucks, truck-tractors, recreational vehicles, motorcycles, motorized bicycles or vehicles used primarily for farm use and licensed pursuant to the provisions of Section 1134 of this title.

B.This section shall not apply to an operator . or passenger of a passenger car in which the operator or passenger possesses a written verification from a physician licensed in this state that he is unable to wear a safety belt for medical reasons. Provided, the issuance of such verification by a physician, in good faith, shall not give rise to, nor shall such physician thereby incur, any liability whatsoever in damages or otherwise, to any person injured by reason of such failure to wear a safety seat belt system.

C. This section shall not apply to an operator of a motor vehicle who is a route carrier of the U.S. Postal Service.

D. No law enforcement officer shall make routine stops of motorists for the purpose of enforcing this act.”

This statute was amended in 1997, the current version, 47 O.S. Supp.1997 §12-417 replaces subsection D and adds a subsection E. It provides in pertinent part:

“D. The Department of Public Safety shall not record or assess points for violations of this section on any license holder’s traffic record maintained by the Department.

E. Fine and court costs for violating the provisions of this section shall not exceed Twenty Dollars ($20.00).”

. The parents’ claim relates to the Church’s allowing the six girls to ride in the back of the van when there were only seat belts for five girls — one of which was stuffed down in the seat and out of view. The parents' allegations toward the Church relate to its failure to provide each girl with an opportunity to wear a seat belt by placing them in the van or failing to require them to use available seat belts. It appears that there was adequate room in the van for each girl to at least occupy a seat. Accordingly, this is not a case in which the vehicle was so overcrowded that there wasn’t room for all of the girls to fit in it or that they were forced to sit in some unusual position. See generally, Annot., Overcrowding Motor Vehicle or Riding in Unusual Position Thereon as Affecting Liability for Injury or Damage. 44 A.L.R.2d 238.

. Title 47 O.S.1991 § 12-420, see note 1, supra.

. Phelps v. Hotel Management, Inc., 1996 OK 114, ¶ 9, 925 P.2d 891; Grover v. Superior Welding, Inc., 1995 OK 14, ¶ 5, 893 P.2d 500; Wofford v. Eastern State Hosp., 1990 OK 77, ¶ 8, 795 P.2d 516.

. Title 47 O.S. 1971 § 12-413. The current version of this statute, 47 O.S.1991 § 12-413, remains unchanged and provides:

“It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or offer for sale at retail or trade or transfer from or to Oklahoma residents any passenger vehicle which is manufactured or assembled com*1011mencing with the 1966 models, unless such vehicle is equipped with safety belts or safety shoulder harness combinations which are installed for the use of persons in the left front and right front seats thereof.”

. Title 47 O.S. Supp.1983 § 11-1112, as originally enacted, is essentially the same as the current version, see 47 O.S. Supp.1995 § 11-1112, note 14 infra, with three exceptions: 1) it did not make any requirements regarding weight of a child; 2) it allowed the use of a child passenger restraint system or a properly secured seat belt in the rear seat of the vehicle; and 3) no fines were imposed for a violation of the statute.

. Title 47 O.S. Supp.1995 § 11-1112 provides:

"A. Every driver when transporting a child under four (4) years of age weighing sixty (60) pounds or less in a motor vehicle operated on the roadways, streets, or highways of this state shall provide for the protection of said child by properly using a child passenger restraint system. For purposes of this section and Section 11-1113 of this title, ‘child passenger restraint system’ means an infant or child passenger restraint system that meets the federal standards for crash-tested restraint systems set by the United States Department of Transportation.

B. Children four (4) or five (5) years of age shall be protected by use of a child passenger restraint system or seat belt.

C. The provisions of this section shall not apply to:

1. A nonresident driver transporting a child in this state; and

2. The driver of a school bus, taxicab, moped, motorcycle, or other motor vehicle not required to be equipped with safely belts pursuant to state or federal laws; and

3. The driver of an ambulance or emergency vehicle; and

4. A driver of a vehicle if all of the seat belts in the vehicle are in use; and

5. The transportation of children who for medical reasons are unable to be placed in such devices.

D. A law enforcement officer is hereby authorized to stop a vehicle if it appears that the driver of the vehicle has violated the provisions of this section and to give an oral warning to said driver. The warning shall advise the driver of the possible danger to children resulting from the failure to install or use a child passenger restraint system or seat belts in the motor vehicle.

E. A violation of the provisions of this section shall not be admissible as evidence in any civil action or proceeding for damages.

F. In any action brought by or on behalf of an infant for personal injuries or wrongful death sustained in a motor vehicle collision, the failure of any person to have the infant properly restrained in accordance with the provisions of this section shall not be used in aggravation or mitigation of damages.

G. Any person convicted of violating subsection A or B of this section shall be punished by a fine of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and shall pay a maximum of Fifteen Dollars ($15.00) court costs thereof. This fine shall be suspended in the case of the first offense upon proof of purchase or acquisition by loan of a child passenger restraint system. Provided, the Department of Public Safety shall not assess points to the driving record of any licensed or unlicensed person convicted of a violation of this section.”

. Title 47 O.S. Supp.1995 § 11-1112(G), see note 14, supra.

. Title 47 O.S. Supp.1995 § 11-1112(C)(4), see note 14, supra.

. Title 47 O.S.1991 § 12-417, see note 8, supra.

. Title 47 O.S. Supp.1997 § 12-417(E), see note 8, supra. Although not relevant to our decision, we note that 47 O.S.1991 § 12-418 provides:

"Any person convicted of violating Section 2 of this act shall be punished by a fine of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and shall pay court costs of Fifteen Dollars ($15.00). Provided, the Department of Public Safety shall not assess points to the driving record of any licensed or unlicensed person convicted of a violation of this act.”

In 1997, the Legislature amended § 12-417, incorporating the language of § 12-418, but limiting fines and court costs to $20.00. However, § 12-418 has not been repealed.

. Title 47 O.S.1991 § 12-413, see note 12, supra.

. Title 47 O.S.1991 § 12-417, see note 8, supra.

. Most states have some form of statute limiting or prohibiting seat belt evidence. The parents rely on several cases from other jurisdictions in support of their argument that we should determine that the Church owed a common law duly toward their daughter. These cases are either distinguishable on their facts, are contrary to our holding in Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 1976 OK 106, 555 P.2d 48, 84 A.L.R.3d 1199, or were determined prior to the enactment of seat belt evidence statutes.

We note that some courts in other jurisdictions, relying on particular state laws or particular factual circumstances, have found either a duty to ensure that a minor wear a seat belt or that a fact question of negligence exists when a minor passenger fails to use, or is not provided with a seat belt. See, e.g., Barnes v. Robison, 712 F.Supp. 873, 877 (D.Kan. 1989) [Under Kansas law, evidence of father’s failure to secure 2 year-old child in child safety restraint was admissible. Common law duty to protect a child from injury preceded and coexists with statutory duty.]; Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153, 1159 (Wyo. 1992) [Seat belt statute inapplicable where injury occurred prior to enactment. Parents have a duty to buckle the seat belts of their minor passengers.]; Califato v. Gerke, 258 Mont. 68, 852 P.2d 121, 124 (1993) [Evidence that minor did not have seat belt on at time of accident because seat belt had been rendered inoperable and was unavailable for use was admissible in negligence action against owner of vehicle. Legislature created statutory duty for drivers and all occupants of vehicles to use seat belts. However, if a driver or occupant chooses not to use a seat belt, that choice is not admissible as evidence of negligence.]; Rider v. Speaker, 180 Misc.2d 999, 692 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922-23 (N.Y.Sup. 1999) [Babysitter, as custodial passenger who failed to buckle infant in seat belt or child safety seat, could be held liable for damages resulting from injuries suffered by infant entrusted to her care on the basis of negligent supervision.]; Costello by Hines v. Marchese, 137 A.D.2d 482, 524 N.Y.S.2d 232, 233 (N.Y.App.Div. 2 1988) [Grandfather's failure to fasten grandchild's seat belt before operating vehicle could be found to be a negligent act.]; Twohig v. Briner, 168 Cal.App.3d 1102, 1107, 214 Cal.Rptr. 729, 732 (1985) [Triable issue of fact regarding whether owner/operator breached duty to exercise due care in the safe operation and maintenance of vehicle owed to passenger by removing the seat belts.].

Other courts have refused liability. Gaertner v. Holcka, 219 Wis.2d 436, 580 N.W.2d 271, 279 (1998) [Claim for contribution may not be sustained in cases involving a motor vehicle operator's negligence in failing to restrain passengers between 4 and 15 years of age with a seat belt.]; State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Holland, 324 N.C. 466, 380 S.E.2d 100, 106 (1989) [Failure of mother to restrain infant daughter in child restraint system in violation of statute was not actionable negligence and was not proximate cause of wrongful death of daughter.]; Patterson v. Horton, 84 Wash.App. 531, 929 P.2d 1125, 1129 (1997) [Automobile driver’s failure to secure children was not actionable for damages. Statutes which require passengers under the age of 16 to be properly restrained also contain provisions excluding evidence of seat belt law violations to prove civil negligence.]; Baker v. Keller, 241 A.D.2d 947, 661 N.Y.S.2d 330, 331 (N.Y.App. Div. 4 1997) [Statute barred parents from alleging driver had been negligent in allowing child to ride in back seat without safety belt.]; Chaney v. Young, 122 N.C.App. 260, 468 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1996) [Mother’s improper use/misuse of seat belt in securing minor child was tantamount to non-use and inadmissible.]; Goldberg v. Nelson, 202 *1013A.D.2d, 390, 608 N.Y.S.2d 684, 685 (N.Y.App. Div. 2 1994) [No liability attributable toward father for injuries sustained by infant son while riding in the back of a cargo van which, although properly equipped with required front seat belts, lacked seat belts or seats in the rear.]; Stewart v. Taylor, 193 A.D.2d 1078, 598 N.Y.S.2d 627 (N.Y.App.Div. 4 1993) [Statute requiring front seat passenger to use safety belt did not impose a duty on vehicle operator to ensure that 16 year-old passenger was wearing a safety belt.]; Swelbar v. Lahti, 473 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Minn.App. 1991) [Statute which clearly and unambiguously barred evidence of use or nonuse of seat belts or child restraints in any litigation applied to preclude evidence that child passenger restraint had not been used in wrongful death claim.]; Hammer v. City of Lafayette, 502 So.2d 301, 303 (La.Ct.App. 1987) [Mother’s duty to take reasonable steps to protect minor child did not encompass the duty to restrain minor child with a seat belt device. Further, the injuries were the effect of the accident, not the cause of it.]; Hamilton v. Purser, 162 A.D.2d 91, 563 N.Y.S.2d 163, 164 (N.Y.App. Div. 3 1990) [Expansive language of statute is clear and unambiguous. Statute prohibits proof in support of cause of action predicated, directly or indirectly, upon noncompliance with statute requiring seat belt restraint of back seat passengers under the age of 10.].

. Title 47 O.S.1991 § 12-420, see note 1, supra.

. Id.

. The parents insist that if the statute were intended to apply to anything but the use of a "seat belt defense” it would limit evidence of the use or nonuse of seat belts in product liability actions as well. The question of the statute's application to a products liability action is not before us and we need not address it. We note, however, that whether this type of statute applies to product liability claims as well as to breach of contract actions has been litigated in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Gardner By and Through Gardner v. Chrysler Corp., 89 F.3d 729, 736 (10th Cir. 1996) [Under Kansas statute, evidence that seat was equipped with seat belt which passenger did not use was admissible for determining whether overall design of seat assembly was defective.]; Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-Jones, 878 S.W.2d 132, 135, 48 A.L.R. 5th 787 (Tex. 1994) [Statute prohibiting evidence of use or nonuse of seat belt in civil trial was not intended to and does not apply to protect seat belt manufacturer from liability for defective restraint systems.]; Marsden v. Crawford, 589 N.W.2d 804, 807 (Minn.App. 1999) [Seat belt gag rule precluded presentation of evidence in support of mother's breach of contract action against daycare provider for failing to use child restraint.].

. Rout v. Crescent Public Works Authority, 1994 OK 85, ¶ 10, 878 P.2d 1045; Smicklas v. Spitz, 1992 OK 145, ¶ 8, 846 P.2d 362; Clifton v. Clifton, 1990 OK 88, ¶ 7, 801 P.2d 693.

. Rout v. Crescent Public Works Authority, see note 25, supra; Oglesby v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1992 OK 61, ¶ 8, 832 P.2d 834; Smicklas v. Spitz, see note 25, supra.

. Copeland v. Stone, 1992 OK 154, V 5, 842 P.2d 754; State ex rel. Macy v. Freeman, 1991 OK 59, ¶ 8, 814 P.2d 147.

. Minie v. Hudson, 1997 OK 26, ¶ 7, 934 P.2d 1082; Fuller v. Odom, 1987 OK 64, ¶ 5, 741 P.2d 449; Darnell v. Chrysler Corp., 1984 OK 57, ¶ 5, 687 P.2d 132.

. Bryant v. Com’r of Dept. of Public Safety, 1996 OK 134, ¶ 11, 937 P.2d 496; Rodgers v. Higgins, 1993 OK 45, ¶ 19, 871 P.2d 398; Cooper v. Dix, 1989 OK 55, ¶ 4, 771 P.2d 614.

. Title 47 O.S.1991 § 12-420, see note 1, supra.

. Title 47 O.S.1991 § 12-420, see note 1, supra. The parents reference to the Journal of the Senate, First Regular Session of the Fortieth Legislature of Oklahoma 1985, in which it appears that two proposed amendments to the statute were considered are not helpful here. One of the amendments proposed that the failure to wear seat belts could not be used "as grounds for or in defense of any civil liability action," while the other stated that the Act could not be used "to determine negligence or contributory negligence in any civil or criminal suit." Ultimately, the version that was adopted used much broader language. 47 O.S.1991 § 12-420, see note 1, supra.

. For instance, other states have made general requirements, with some exceptions, that the driver of a passenger vehicle must ensure that persons between 4 and 8, 4 and 16, 4 and 18, or under the age of 13 wear seat belts. See, e.g, Miss.Code Ann. § 63-2-1 (Supp. 1998) [Persons between 4 and 8 required to wear seat belt]; La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 32:295 (Supp. 1997) [Persons under the age of 13 required to wear seat belt or age/size appropriate child safety restraint.]; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 257.710e (Supp. 1991) [Persons between 4 and 16 required to wear seat belt.]; Va.Code Ann. § 46.2-1095 (Supp. 1997) [Persons between 4 and 16 required to wear seat belt.]; Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 29-A § 2081 (Supp. 1997) [Persons between 4 and 18 required to wear seat belt.]; Montana requires, unless all of the seat belts are being used by other occupants, that each occupant of a designated seating position wear a seat belt. Mont.Code Ann. § 61— 13-103 (1987).

. Title 47 O.S.1991 § 12-420, see note 1, supra.

. The language in 47 O.S.1991 § 12-420, see note 1, supra, is very broad. Likewise, Oklahoma's statute regarding child safety restraints, 47 O.S. Supp.1995 § 11-1112(E) provides that "[a] violation of the provisions of this section shall not be admissible as evidence in any civil action or proceeding for damages.” Other states have enacted similar statutes, but the majority provide explicit limitations or circumstances in which seat belt evidence may or may not be admitted.

. Title 47 O.S.1991 § 12-420, see note 1, supra. Statutes must be read to render every part operative and to avoid rendering it superfluous or useless. Bryant v. Com'r of Dept. of Public Safety, see note 29, supra; Medina v. State, 1993 OK 121 ¶ 10, n. 10, 871 P.2d 1379; Moore v. Hayes, 1987 OK 82, ¶ 7, 744 P.2d 934.

. Nicola v. Nicola, 449 Pa.Super. 293, 673 A.2d 950, 951 (1996) [Doctrine of ejusdem generis inapplicable. Statute prohibiting evidence of nonuse of seat belt also applies to rear seat passenger.]; But see, Purvis v. Virgil Barber Contractor, Inc., 205 Ga.App. 13, 421 S.E.2d 303 (1992) [Summarily affirming trial court's determination that seat belt statute, by its terms, applied only to front seat passengers.].

. Title 47 O.S.1991 § 12-420, see note 1, supra.

. Id. See, Lind v. Slowinski, 450 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn.Ct.App. 1990) [Evidence that seating position contributed to and caused injuries properly excluded from jury consideration pursuant to statute prohibiting admissibility of use or failure to use seat belt.].

. City of Hugo v. State ex rel Public Employee Relations Bd., 1994 OK 134, ¶ 23, 886 P.2d 485; Toxic Waste Impact Group, Inc., v. Leavitt, 1988 OK 20, ¶ 10, 755 P.2d 626.

. In re Initiative Petition No. 360, 1994 OK 97, ¶ 2, 879 P.2d 810 [Courts do not generally concern themselves with wisdom or expediency of the law, but only with its legality.]; Blackwell Zinc Co., Inc. v. Parker, 1965 OK 100, ¶ 11, 406 P.2d 965 [Courts do not concern themselves with the merits, wisdom or advisability of legislative enactment but only with their meaning and validity.].