FORD v. THE OKLAHOMA STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

¶1 We conclude plaintiffs' action challenging the Social Studies Standards of 2025 and requesting injunctive and declaratory relief is moot because the 2025 Social Studies Standards no longer exist. The appeal must be dismissed as moot. The two exceptions to mootness do not apply. We conclude the judgment against plaintiffs must be reversed, and a new judgment entered that dismisses plaintiffs' petition without prejudice due to mootness.

¶2 The Oklahoma State Board of Education (OSBE) approved the Social Studies Standards of 2025 on February 27, 2025. Plaintiffs filed a petition in the District Court and sought a declaratory judgment that the 2025 Social Studies Standards (2025 Standards) were "invalid, null, and void as a matter of law, and for any such other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper."

¶3 A motion to dismiss was filed by Ryan Walters and the Oklahoma State Department of Education (OSDE). 12 O.S. §2012Randall v. Fields, 2025 OK 91581 P.3d 109

¶4 Plaintiffs appealed and their petition in error challenged the orders denying an injunction and dismissing their petition. 75 O.S. §§ 250.470 O.S. §§11-103.6a

¶5 This Court addressed the validity of the Social Studies Standards of 2025 in Randall v. Fields, supra, where the Court concluded: "The 2025 Oklahoma Academic Standards for Social Studies shall not be enforced." Id. 2025 OK 91Randall raised various constitutional and statutory claims challenging the 2025 Standards that the Court did not adjudicate. Randall, at ¶22, 581 P.3d at 118. The Court's holding in Randall was based solely upon application of the Oklahoma Open Meeting Act, 25 O.S.2021 §§301Id. 2025 OK 91Randall v. Fields, supra, upon the present appeal.

¶6 Plaintiffs argue: (1) The challenged 2025 Standards present a legal issue capable of repetition in future litigation related to (a) 75 O.S. §§ 250.470 O.S. §11-103.6aRandall shows the trial court's order was incorrect requiring a reversal of the trial court; and (4) Alternatively, and to the extent Randall renders moot plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction and declaratory relief, plaintiffs' action remains viable due to exceptions to mootness. Plaintiffs argue the Court should retain the appellate cause and address the issues raised regarding the trial court's order sustaining the defendants' motions to dismiss.

¶7 Defendants state the decision in Randall moots plaintiffs' action and no exception to the mootness doctrine applies. The appeal is dismissed for mootness based upon the Court's analysis.

II. Analysis

¶8 Plaintiffs' argument is essentially twofold: (1) The controversy is not moot and the Court should apply Randall as stare decisis, reverse the District Court's dismissal of their petition, and remand for additional proceedings in the District Court; or (2) The controversy is an exception to the mootness doctrine. Plaintiffs' first argument for reversing the District Court's dismissal of their petition requests a form of appellate relief based upon either (a) viewing the decision in Randall as not establishing a new rule of law and merely announcing law as it has always been and should be applied to their controversy by reason of stare decisis, or (b) viewing the decision in Randall as announcing new law but requiring application of the pipeline doctrine to different parties in a different appeal.

¶9 Stare decisis, by itself, does not create mootness. State ex rel. Okla. Firefighters Pension and Retirement System v. City of Spencer, 2009 OK 73237 P.3d 125Id. ¶4, 237 P.3d at 129. A state or condition which prevents an appellate court from rendering relief for the purpose of mootness may include when the controversy is no longer justiciable because the cause of action no longer exists, e.g., a cause of action consists of an antagonistic demand and when this demand is no longer present the appeal is moot.

¶10 In Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 133 S.Ct. 721, 184 L.Ed.2d 553 (2013), the Court explained a federal court case becomes moot when the case is "no longer a 'Case' or 'Controversy' for the purposes of Article III" of the U.S. Constitution. Id. 568 U.S. at 91. In Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fikre, 601 U.S. 234, 240-41, 144 S.Ct. 771, 218 L.Ed.2d 162 (2024), the Court explained mootness and an exception to its application.

A court with jurisdiction has a "virtually unflagging obligation" to hear and resolve questions properly before it. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). But the converse also holds true. Sometimes, events in the world overtake those in the courtroom, and a complaining party manages to secure outside of litigation all the relief he might have won in it. When that happens, a federal court must dismiss the case as moot. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91, 133 S.Ct. 721, 184 L.Ed.2d 553 (2013). . . .

None of this implies that a defendant may "automatically moot a case" by the simple expedient of suspending its challenged conduct after it is sued. Already, 568 U.S., at 91, 133 S.Ct. 721. Instead, our precedents hold, a defendant's "'voluntary cessation of a challenged practice' " will moot a case only if the defendant can show that the practice cannot " 'reasonably be expected to recur.' " Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000); see United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632--633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953).

Federal courts often see motions to dismiss where Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 12 (b)(1) (lack of subject matter jurisdiction) and Rule12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted) are raised simultaneously and each invokes a mootness argument. An adjudication of a 12(b)(1) jurisdictional defense may moot a 12(b)(6) defense and a dismissal for 12(b)(1) mootness, that is, dismissal due to absence of an Art. III case or controversy is often a result with the Rule 12(b)(6) argument mooted.

¶11 Our Court has noted a similarity between (1) the "Case" or "Controversy" requirement in U. S. Const. Art. III and (2) the power vested in District Courts by Okla. Const. Art. VII, § 7,

¶12 Our Court recognized an appellate court may decline to dismiss an appeal as moot when a controversy presents one of two exceptions. In Oklahoma Electric Cooperative v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 2025 OK 60578 P.3d 1201Id. at ¶20. State ex rel. Okla. Firefighters Pension and Retirement System, supra, and Oklahoma Electric Cooperative, supra, indicate mootness during an appeal may be based upon a lack of justiciability and an appellate dismissal is not always required.

¶13 The effect of this Court's exceptions to mootness is similar to the well-known concept that when jurisdiction attaches over a person by a court of general original jurisdiction exercising equity, then the equity jurisdiction will continue apart from the parties' rights on a legal cause of action in a law court. Federal Bureau of Investigation, supra, and its single exception to mootness and dismissal based upon repetition of the controversy while evading judicial review due to the conduct of the parties.

¶14 Plaintiffs challenged the 2025 Standards and sought an injunction to prevent their enforcement. These 2025 Standards no longer exist. Randall v. Fields, supra. A request for an injunction to prevent an act will become moot if the act is no longer threatened. Truttman v. City of McAlester, 1952 OK 149243 P.2d 355

¶15 Relief in the nature of an injunction is authorized by statutes such as 12 O.S. §138112 O.S. §1451remedy for the cause of action adjudicated. Wells v. Childers, 1945 OK 365165 P.2d 371Id. at ¶10, 165 P.2d at 371. Id.

¶16 Generally, different theories of liability may be pressed in support of each cause of action, but a single cause of action is ordinarily predicated upon one occurrence, one transaction, or a single wrong.

¶17 Plaintiffs' petition alleged 75 O.S. §306

¶18 Plaintiffs' petition in error assigns seven errors. The first two relate to the jurisdiction of a District Court based upon the Administrative Procedure Act and review of the 2025 Standards. The third relates to the process used by the Oklahoma Department of Education and the State Board of Education and whether the process violated plaintiffs' rights. The fourth relates to the 2025 Standards and plaintiffs' alleged rights to be free from certain types of speech. The fifth relates to plaintiffs' desire to amend their trial court petition. The sixth relates to whether the implementation of the 2025 Standards was a "non-justiciable political question." The seventh relates to the trial court's denial of an injunction.

¶19 Plaintiffs' cause of action is based upon the alleged wrongfulness of the 2025 Standards allegedly harming plaintiffs' rights. Those standards no longer exist. Plaintiffs' request for an injunction to prevent enforcement of the 2025 Standards is moot. Truttman, supra. Plaintiffs alleged that declaratory relief pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act should be available for the purpose of reviewing the 2025 Standards. This allegation is moot because the 2025 Standards to be reviewed by this method no longer exist, i.e., the alleged wrong does not exist, and the alleged and requested remedy by declaratory relief would not be proper to address a hypothetical issue.

¶20 Plaintiffs allege as procedural error the trial court's dismissal without opportunity to amend their petition concerning the 2025 Standards. In Oklahoma, a 12 O.S. §2012

¶21 A part of a mootness inquiry examines whether any legally cognizable collateral consequences to plaintiffs remain after the Randall decision. Randall.

¶22 An order of this Court in Randall stayed implementation of the 2025 Standards. This stay was not dissolved until simultaneous holding that the Standards were not enforceable. Randall, 2025 OK 91tare decisis, or a court adhering to its former precedent, stare decisis is not an "inexorable command" for a court to apply the precedent of its own decisions, a court usually does not reject its own decisions unless a change has occurred in the circumstances, applicable law, public policy, or the nature of the controversy requires additional analysis. Randall's stare decisis to plaintiffs in the future.

¶23 Plaintiffs' cause of action in District Court challenged the same 2025 Standards as those in Randall, but plaintiffs raised issues of law not addressed by Randall; and these additional issues were adjudicated as a failure in plaintiffs' pleading by the District Court judgment adjudicating motions to dismiss relying upon 12 O.S. §201212 O.S. §2012stare decisis from an intervening opinion of this Court moots a legal issue, but not the cause of action; then the Court may reverse the trial court's judgment of dismissal and remand for plaintiff to seek judicial relief on the alleged cause of action not mooted.

¶24 Federal courts have addressed mootness on appeal and whether an appellate remand should include direction to vacate a trial court's judgment. In Mitchell v. Wall, 808 F.3d 1174 (7th Cir. 2015) the court explained the following.

When a case becomes moot on appeal (supposing the present case, so far as it concerns the probation-officer defendants, hadn't become moot already in the district court), the court of appeals generally vacates the judgment of the district court and remands with instructions to dismiss the case. It does this in order to prevent the district court's unreviewed decision from having a preclusive effect in subsequent litigation between the parties.

Id. 808 F.3d at 1176. Mitchell discussed the concept of an estoppel created by a judgment with a subsequent dismissed moot appeal, and relied upon Gjertsen v. Board of Election Commissioners, 751 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1984), which in turn relied upon procedure for federal courts described in United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 71 S.Ct. 104, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950). Munsingwear explained an appellate court may dismiss a moot appeal and vacate a judgment with directions to dismiss the trial court action without prejudice upon remand because it "clears the path for future litigation of issues between the parties and eliminates a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance." Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40. Gjertsen also explained that the "Supreme Court held that since the requirement of vacating the lower-court order when it becomes moot on appeal is for the benefit of the loser in the lower court, he can waive it, and does so by failing to invoke it." Gjertsen, 751 F.2d at 203 (citing United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40-41).

¶25 We are not required to follow holdings in these federal opinions; 12 O.S. §95212 O.S. §952

¶26 A potential for future litigation authorizing vacation of a judgment upon dismissal of an appeal is not identical with the mootness exception based upon a potential for future litigation while evading review. One court concluding mootness did not apply observed that the issue "in this case does not have an inherent problem of limited duration that will cause it to evade review in future litigation."

¶27 Plaintiffs argue they possess a right to District Court judicial review of administrative proceedings and whether such a right exists presents a public interest exception to mootness. Plaintiffs argue a new issue is whether specific education statutes in Title 70, Oklahoma Statutes, alter 75 O.S. §306publici juris for the purpose of assuming original jurisdiction, 75 O.S. §306

¶28 One court has held that the substantial public interest exception to mootness of an issue is present "particularly where final determination of the issue is essential in guiding the conduct of public officials." Randall, that is, the scope of a District Court procedure, would not result in a judicial determination that would directly alter conduct of education officials when they create academic standards.

¶29 In addition to analyzing whether the conduct of public officials will be guided by a judicial decision, a court may review whether a "question of great public importance" is present by determining "if the controversy concerns 'mature seeds' of an actual, present and existing dispute, 'as distinguished from a possible dormant, hypothetical, speculative, or moot disagreement.'"75 O.S. §30670 O.S.2011 §11-103.6a75 O.S. §306

III. Conclusion

¶30 We conclude plaintiffs' action challenging the Social Studies Standards of 2025 and requesting injunctive and declaratory relief is moot because the Social Studies Standards no longer exist. Randall v. Fields, supra. The appeal must be dismissed. Truttman v. City of McAlester, supra, Saxon v. Macy, supra. Two exceptions to mootness to the controversy and the appeal do not apply. Oklahoma Electric Cooperative v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Corporation Commission, supra.

¶31 We conclude the judgment against plaintiffs must be reversed, and a new judgment entered that dismisses plaintiffs' petition without prejudice due to the mootness of the controversy. 12 O.S. §952Morrison v. Board of Education of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 6, supra; Saxon v. Macy, supra; and Randall v. Fields, supra. The District Court is directed to enter a judgment dismissing plaintiffs' petition as moot without prejudice.

¶32 The appeal is dismissed as moot. The judgment of the District Court is reversed with a direction to enter a new judgment consistent with this opinion.