Defendant, a corporation, was charged on three different occasions with violating - provisions of the air quality control code of the city -of Portland. It was found guilty in municipal court on all three *3 charges. The defendant appealed to the circuit court for Multnomah County and in separate trials was again found guilty on all three charges.

After the entry of the judgments, the defendant appealed to the - Supreme Court. These cases were there consolidated.

After the cases were consolidated on appeal, the plaintiff moved for an order dismissing the .appeal on the ground that there was no question for the court to decide. The city claimed that OBS 221.360 granted to the Supreme Court jurisdiction to decide only constitutional questions on appeals from cases, involving violations of municipal ordinances. The Supreme Court denied the motion but gave the city leave to renew the motion' oh oral argument.'

This court came into existence , on July 1, 1969, and this consolidated case was. assigned to. this court as contemplated by law. At the time of oral argument in this court, the plaintiff raised the. question of the jurisdiction- of this court to.-.consider these appeals. The jurisdictional question requires our first attention. We have .only such appellate jurisdiction as is given by the legislature. In Portland v. Duntley, 185 Or 365, 371, 203. P2d 640 (1949), the Supreme Court said:

“Except for that limited,class, of cases in which the Supreme Court exercises, original jurisdiction, this is an appellate court deriving its- jurisdiction from the statutes. They are the sole ' source of appellate jurisdiction * * *."

OBS 221.360 is the only statute permitting an appeal beyond the” circuit .court "from a conviction in municipal court for violation of a municipal ordinance. That *4 statute, as amended in 1969 to apply to this court, is set forth in the margin. ①

In City of Salem v. Polanski, 202 Or 504, 510, 276 P2d 407 (1954) in granting a motion to dismiss an appeal based on OES 221.360, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled:

“We hold, therefore, that there can be no appeal from the circuit court to the Supreme Court in cases involving ordinance violations, arising in the municipal court and appealed to the circuit court, excepting only where constitutional questions are involved. * * *”

To the same effect, see City of Portland v. Welch, 229 Or 308, 364 P2d 1009, 367 P2d 403 (1961).

The first assignment of error is the only one which states a constitutional question. It alleges that the ordinance violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and Article I, § 20 of the Constitution of the State of Oregon, in that it lacks standards for enforcement. The city of Portland denies that the constitutional *5 question was raised in the courts below. The defendant does not contend that it was raised below, but insists that we must decide it anyway when a conviction has been obtained, arguing that the constitutionality of the act determines whether a crime has been committed.

The rule against considering a constitutional question for the first time on appeal is not inflexible, but there must be some compelling reason to justify this court in ruling upon a question not presented to the trial court. Highway Com. v. Helliwell, 225 Or 588, 358 P2d 719 (1961); State v. Zusman, 1 Or App 268, 460 P2d 872, cert den 398 US 905, 26 LEd2d 65 (1970). We find no compelling reason in this case.

A constitutional objection to a city ordinance should be raised first in the trial court, just as has already been required when a defendant has been convicted of violating a state statute. See State v. Varney, 244 Or 583, 419 P2d 431 (1966) and State v. Layne, 244 Or 510, 419 P2d 35 (1966).

Affirmed.