The Children’s Services Division (CSD) appeals from a decision of the trial court that respondents Cecil and Eva Graham are entitled to a contested case hearing before CSD can refuse to consent to respondents’ adoption of Mrs. Graham’s grandchildren. The consent of CSD is required because CSD was awarded permanent custody of the children 1 when the parental rights of the children’s father, Mrs. Graham’s son, were terminated under ORS 419.523 and 419.525. The trial court found that respondents have a constitutionally recognized liberty interest in their grandchildren requiring the protection afforded by such a hearing. See, ORS 183.310(2)(a). 2

*30 Hence, the issue before us is whether grandparents of children in whom parental rights of the grandparents’ child have terminated, and who at one time had custody of those children, have a constitutionally protected interest in such grandchildren which requires the procedural protection of an adversary hearing before an agency empowered to withhold its required consent to adoption of the grandchildren by the parents. 3

The father of the children was convicted of the murder of their mother. The act was committed in the presence of one of them. The children were placed in temporary foster care for five months, and then legal custody of them was awarded to the Grahams. Fourteen months later a trial court terminated the father’s parental rights and awarded permanent custody of them to CSD, which was to find a suitable adoptive home for the children. It also denied the Grahams’ petition for adoption. Five months later we affirmed the termination and denial of the petition for adoption. State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Kenneth M., 27 Or App 185, 555 P2d 933, rev den (1976). The respondents applied again to CSD for adoption of the children, but CSD withheld its consent. The respondents then petitioned for review in title circuit court, alleging that they were entitled to a contested case hearing before CSD could withhold its consent. The circuit court agreed. We disagree, and reverse.

*31 The court below found that the Grahams have a protected liberty interest, arising either out of their status as grandparents of the children or from their association with the grandchildren as legal custodians for 14 months, of which the state may not deprive them without due process of law.

In finding that the Grahams had a protected interest as grandparents, the trial court relied heavily on Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 US 494, 97 S Ct 1932, 52 L Ed 2d 531 (1977). In Moore the court struck down an ordinance which prohibited heads of households from sharing their homes with the offspring of more than one of their children. A plurality opinion held that there was a substantive due process right of members of an extended family to live together, arising from American tradition, which could not lightly be denied by a local government. 4

CSD argues that here the family has already been destroyed by the termination of the children’s father’s parental rights, and thus Moore does not apply. Respondents claim that the instant case concerns a greater infringement on the family than did Moore, since it involves not minor criminal sanctions but the deprivation of respondents’ continued contact with their grandchildren.

Moore is inapposite here. It concerned the right of a family to live together and not the right to adopt. It does not create in grandparents a liberty or property interest in their grandchildren as prospective adoptive children.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that where there are no parents to assert their vested legal claims to their children, the inchoate right of the next of kin ripens. Hence, when a mother surrendered her rights *32 to her child when faced with a termination proceeding, the court required the agency with whom the child had been placed to allow the grandmother of the child a hearing before denying her petition for custody or adoption of the child. Wilson v. Family Services Div., Region Two, 554 P2d 227 (Utah 1976).

We do not agree with the rationale of Wilson that a grandparent, by virtue of his status as a grandparent, has a right of adoption superior to that of a nonrelative. See, Mahoney v. Linder, 14 Or App 656, 514 P2d 901 (1973); State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Hayes, 16 Or App 438, 519 P2d 104 (1974). Additionally, the decision in Wilson rested, at least in part, on a finding that the agency could act arbitrarily and unreviewably. Such is not the case in Oregon, where our Administrative Procedures Act provides for review of noncontested cases. ORS 183.484. Also, the juvenile court may retain jurisdiction over the children involved, even though it cannot modify any orders while an adoption proceeding is pending. Children’s Services Division v. Weaver, 19 Or App 574, 528 P2d 556 (1974); ORS 419.527(1)(a). Furthermore, we cannot agree that an inchoate right to grandchildren always arises in the absence of parents.

The court below also found a liberty interest arising from the Grahams’ custody of the children for the 14 months immediately preceding the termination of Mrs. Graham’s son’s parental rights. Several recent cases from various jurisdictions have explored the possibility that foster parents and prospective adoptive parents have rights entitled to due process protection.

In C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal App 3d 909, 106 Cal Rptr 123 (1973), a California Court of Appeals found that prospective adoptive parents had an interest in the child entitled to protection, and thus "[i]n the absence of imminent danger to the child, the grievous loss threatening the prospective parents outweighs the state’s interest in summary termination” of their *33 custody of the children. 29 Cal App 3d at 917. A federal district court has ruled that an informal foster mother, who had taken care of a child for most of its two and one-half years of life, was entitled to the same due process protection as a natural or legal parent when the state sought to establish that the child was neglected. James v. McLinden, 341 F Supp 1233 (D Conn 1969).

The Supreme Court has assumed, without deciding, that foster parents have some liberty interest, and held that the state statutes in question provided them with any procedural protections to which they were entitled when the state sought removal of children from foster homes. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 US 816, 97 S Ct 2094, 53 L Ed 2d 14 (1977). However, it noted that such an interest was, of necessity, quite limited, as it was based upon state statutes and contracts. 431 US at 846.

The Fifth Circuit refused to find protected liberty interests for a foster family which sought to adopt the child placed with it. Drummond v. Fulton Cty. Dept. of Family, etc., 563 F2d 1200 (5th Cir 1977), cert den 437 US 910 (1978). 5 It found that the state in question considered foster homes to be temporary, and that the development of a relationship giving rise to a liberty claim would be inimical to the goals set for foster homes as transitions between two permanent homes. 563 F2d at 1206-07. It also held that an attempt to remove a child was not defamatory to the foster family, and thus did not infringe on a liberty interest in the family’s reputation. 563 F2d at 1207-08.

Although these cases would be quite relevant were the question before us the existence of, and scope of protection to be afforded to, any liberty interest the *34 Grahams had in continued custody of their grandchildren, that is not the issue we must address. Rather, it is claimed that the Grahams have a liberty interest arising out of their prior custody of their grandchildren. That custody was ended by court order at the same time Mrs. Graham’s son’s parental rights were terminated. We find no support for the thesis that custody long extinguished by court order after a judicial inquiry into the sort of custody which would best serve the interests of the children gives rise to any continued liberty interest, assuming that such an interest theretofore existed.

In summary, we conclude that grandparents have no liberty interest herein and no rights superior to a nonrelative applying for permission to adopt. Hence, we find no liberty interest of the respondents requiring the protection of a contested case hearing.

When respondents sought review of CSD’s denial of consent in the circuit court, as required by ORS 183.484(1), 6 they apparently sought not only a determination of whether they were entitled to a contested case hearing, but also, if the court found they were not so entitled, review of the matter as a noncontested case, pursuant to ORS 183.484(3). Since their petition was adequate for review, they are now entitled to review in the circuit court. ORS 183.484(3). 7

*35 Reversed and remanded.