Defendants appeal from a partial summary judgment entered against them. The appeal presents an abstract, academic question, the determination of which would avail defendants nothing. Therefore, we affirm.

Plaintiffs complaint joins nine causes of action against defendants, eight of which seek payment of the unpaid balance alleged to be due under eight separate promissory notes, in which defendant George S. Fenn is the maker, together with attorney’s fees as provided for in each of said notes, and the ninth cause of action is against defendant Frances Fenn, as a guarantor on each of the notes. Each of the defendants filed substantially similar counterclaims for damages in tort arising out of the plaintiff’s having allegedly unlawfully disclosed confidential information concerning defendants’ financial condition; each prays for both compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants asserted nothing by way of set-off or recoupment which could reduce the amounts plaintiff claimed under the notes. See Rogue River Management Co. v. Shaw, 243 Or 54, 411 P2d 440 (1966).

Plaintiff moved for summary judgment. The trial court concluded that there was no genuine issue of a material fact with respect to liability on the notes or the guaranty, or to the principal balances owing under each of the promissory notes, but that there was a genuine issue with respect to attorney’s fees to be allowed plaintiff under each of said notes. Defendants do not dispute those conclusions. The court entered a partial summary judgment (ORS 18.125)1 for the ba*70lance due under each of the eight promissory notes, together with accrued interest, but reserved the issue with respect to attorney’s fees for trial. The judgment, as permitted by the statute, directed that no execution issue on the judgment pending resolution of the defendants’ counterclaims. It further stated, as required by the statute, "No just reason exists for delay”2 and directed the entry of the judgment.

In this court defendants do not deny their liability under the notes or the guaranty, or the amounts owing thereunder, but assign error to the trial court’s entering a partial summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) the claim for attorney’s fees under each of the notes is indivisible from the causes of action based upon the notes, and (2) the trial court made no specific findings to support its determination that there was no just reason for delaying the entry of judgment. However, defendants paid the full amount thereof, and a satisfaction has been entered of record. Given this posture of the case, we do not understand how our deciding those questions can be of benefit to defendants.

*71Assuming, arguendo, that we were to hold that the lartial summary judgment ought not to have been ntered for either or both of the reasons given, defend-nts would not be entitled to restitution from plaintiff ecause they admit both liability on the notes and the mounts owing thereunder. This is not a case where an ppellant pays a judgment pending appeal where lia-ility or the amount of damages is contested, the eversal of which would entitle defendants to restitu-Lon.3 Defendants’ contention that all of the claims, oth plaintiff’s and defendants’, should be resolved efore any judgment is entered4 is beside the point ecause they have paid what they admittedly owe, lthough claiming that they have other unrelated auses of action against the plaintiff which could re-ult in a judgment in excess of the amount they owe laintiff. If they prevail on their counterclaims, they dll be entitled to a judgment against plaintiff and lay proceed to execute on that judgment, if necessary.

As things stand, any decision we might make with aspect to either of defendants’ contentions would be bstract or academic because any judgment we could ander would be of no efficacy to defendants. Appellate ourts do not sit to decide such questions.

Affirmed.