dissenting.

I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Eastman, 51 Or App 723, 626 P2d 956 (1981). In this case, as in that case, a defendant who patently was the cause of all the expenses which were incurred because of "the facts or events constituting” his crimes is given the benefit of the results of an extraordinarily rigorous analysis,1 which substantially ignores the policy of the statute, as well as its words.

PRO TEMPORE.

On December 16, 1979, a Springfield city police officer attempted to stop defendant’s vehicle for a traffic infraction. Defendant, a habitual traffic offender with a revoked operator’s license, refused to stop. A chase ensued which encompassed a distance of nearly 60 miles at speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour. The defendant’s vehicle was eventually boxed in by two Springfield city police cars and one Lane County sheriff’s car. The defendant refused to leave his vehicle, as requested by the police officers. Instead, he put his car in reverse, backed up, and hit the Lane County sheriff’s vehicle. The defendant was again told to remove himself from his vehicle. Defendant again ignored the demand, and drove his car into one of the police officers, striking him lightly on the knee. At this point, the Lane County deputy fired on defendant. Defendant was struck in the face by a bullet. He was taken to a hospital where he received extensive emergency medical treatment. One of the police cars was also damaged by the gunfire.

Defendant was convicted of assault in the fourth degree, recklessly endangering another, criminal mischief in the first degree, attempting to elude a police officer, and driving while revoked. He appeals from the sentence order requiring him to pay the following items of restitution: (1) $5,381.05 to the state Adult and Family Services Division (Division) for payment of defendant’s medical expenses; (2) $426.95 to the Springfield Police Department for damage to the patrol vehicle struck by the gunfire; and (3) $507 to Lane County for damage to the patrol vehicle defendant rammed.

The court’s power to order restitution is limited by statute. The court may order restitution to be made only to a victim of defendant’s criminal activities. ORS 137.106(1). A victim is any person who "has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of defendant’s criminal activities.” ORS 137.103(4). Pecuniary damages are all special damages "which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant’s criminal activities.” ORS 137.103(2). Criminal activities are any offense for which defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct which he admits. ORS 137.103(1).

*732The state contends that, because the medical expenses resulted from the facts and events surrounding defendant’s course of criminal conduct, the Division, having paid those expenses, is a victim of defendant’s criminal activities and is a proper recipient for payment of restitution. The statute, however, does not readily support this contention. Restitution may appropriately be ordered for special damages which the victim could recover against defendant "in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting” the crimes which defendant admits or for which he is convicted. (Emphasis supplied.) ORS 137.103(2). This language seems to contemplate civil liability arising out of the elements of the crime, i.e., the facts or events constituting the crime. The state’s argument and the statute thus present two opposing questions: Is it sufficient that the victim’s loss relate merely to the facts or events surrounding the criminal conduct; or must the defendant’s criminal conviction or admission establish his civil liability for the loss before restitution can be ordered? Our review of the legislative history indicates the legislature intended the latter standard to apply.

Restitution as a sentencing device can be viewed in two conceptually different ways. It can be viewed (1) as a method for summarily awarding a victim civil damages resulting from criminal conduct, or (2) as a sanction imposed to punish criminal conduct. The former view implicates the defendant’s right to a jury trial in civil cases.1 That right would exist even if restitution were limited, as is the case with the current Oregon statutes, to special damages. The latter view does not necessarily implicate a right to a jury determination. We believe that the "sanction” view was, overall, the one taken by the legislature. That is not to say, however, that the legislature could not have intended the equivalent of a jury finding of civil liability as a precondition to imposition of a sanction of restitution.

When it enacted the present statutes, the legislature was primarily responding to the Supreme Court’s suggestion in State v. Stalheim, 275 Or 683, 552 P2d 920 (1976), that the laws relating to restitution in Oregon were in need of comprehensive re-examination. In Stalheim, the *733Supreme Court posed for itself a choice between a broad or a narrow interpretation of Oregon’s then existing restitution statute. Both interpretations viewed restitution as a sanction. The court chose the narrow construction to promote the "rehabilitative purpose served by imposing restitution.” 275 Or at 688. Most of the opinion, however, was devoted to setting out the "legal and practical complexities created by [the] broad interpretation.” 275 Or at 687. It is here that restitution — a sanction — first became entangled with the concept of civil liability. For example, the court found it "highly inappropriate” to assign to a trial judge presiding over a criminal trial the task of calculating unliquidated damages, something which "we customarily rely upon the collective intuition of the civil jury” to do. 275 Or at 687. The court noted the real danger that the defendant might be prejudiced by "the introduction of civil damages issues” into his criminal trial, and further, that he would not have the benefit of civil defenses or a jury determination of damages. The court also required a hearing and a set-off against any civil judgment. 275 Or at 688, n. 8. Finally, the comb alluded to Chief Judge Schwab’s dissent in State v. Sullivan, 24 Or App 99, 544 P2d 616 (1976), expressing concern over the defendant’s right "to have a jury trial on the civil liability question * * 275 Or at 689, n. 11.

The bottom line of the Stalheim decision was to construe the statute narrowly and advance its rehabilitative purpose by limiting the possibility of imposition of a speculative sanction. Along the way, the court implicitly found that the rehabilitative purpose of the statute would be served only if the defendant, in fact, was liable for the victim’s damages. At the time the present statutes were enacted Stalheim was the latest judicial pronouncement on. the propriety of restitution as a criminal sanction. Our review of the legislative history leads us to believe that the legislature viewed the decision as legal authority, not judicial policymaking, and that, by enacting the present restitution statutes, it hoped to resolve the numerous concerns of the court.2

*734The statutes now specifically limit restitution to the victim’s special damages. See ORS 137.103(2),(4).3 They also provide the defendant with a hearing before the court if he requests one. See ORS 137.106(3). Nonetheless, the statutory procedure still does not provide the defendant with all the advantages and protections of a civil trial. The most glaring difference is the omission of a jury. Discussions at the legislative hearings demonstrate both a concern for the defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial in civil cases and a desire to prevent sentencing hearings *735from turning into full scale civil trials. The hearing procedure was viewed as adequate, however, where the criminal conviction would serve to collaterally estop the defendant on the issue of liability. Tape recording, Interim Committee on Judiciary, September 9, 1976, Side I at 872 ff.4 The hearing would primarily serve the purpose of determining the amount of special damages, making the process relatively uncomplicated. From this policy of avoiding an extensive proceeding in the midst of sentencing, we conclude the legislature intended restitution to be ordered only when the criminal conviction establishes the defendant’s liability for the loss, or when the defendant admits liability.

*736In this case, the Adult and Family Services Division has paid more than $5,000 in medical expenses. It has suffered a loss which it probably could recover in a civil suit against defendant. The defendant’s criminal convictions, however, do not establish his liability for the items of special damages the Division asserts. The Division’s loss results from defendant’s possession of a welfare card and from his having been brought to a hospital in need of medical treatment. Its claim against defendant rests on a quasi-contractual footing. The requisite relationship between the numerous crimes for which defendant was convicted and his liability for the medical expenses incurred because of his injury is missing. Defendant would have been convicted had he not been shot. The fact that he was shot does not increase his liability for his criminal conduct. It would be quite possible for defendant to be guilty of these crimes, and yet not be liable for the medical expenses. In a civil trial he could very well have defenses available to him which would have been irrelevant to the criminal charges.

We vacate the order requiring defendant to make restitution to the Adult and Family Services Division. For similar reasons we also vacate the restitution order relating to the Springfield patrol vehicle struck by gunfire.

Defendant was charged with and convicted of criminal mischief in the first degree for intentionally damaging a Lane County Sheriff’s Office patrol vehicle. The order to make restitution to Lane County in the amount of $507 was proper.

Defendant also argues the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. There was no error. State v. Jones, 250 Or 59, 440 P2d 374 (1968).

*737Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded for resentencing.