Defendant appeals from convictions for carrying a concealed weapon, ORS 166.240, and for possession of a controlled substance. ORS 475.992. He claims that the trial court erred in failing to suppress evidence because of an unauthorized stop and frisk. We affirm.

At approximately 3 p.m. two undercover police officers received a tip from an informant that Lamar Smith was selling cocaine from a car. The informant said that he had seen Smith in possession of cocaine and that two other males, not identified, were in the car when the sale was made. The informant then pointed out the car to the officers, who summoned two uniformed officers, one of whom arrested Smith and searched him, finding a controlled substance. The other uniformed officer gave his attention to defendant, who was sitting in the passenger seat of the,, car. After defendant, at the officer’s direction, left the car, the officer frisked him by patting him down. 1 The officer testified at the suppression hearing that he frisked defendant only for his own safety, looking for weapons. During the pat-down search, the officer felt a hard object, which, on removal, was revealed to be a revolver.

A stop without a warrant is authorized under the United States Constitution when an officer has a reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity may be afoot.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 30, 88 S Ct 1868, 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). Oregon statutes, setting a stricter standard, authorize a stop only when an officer “reasonably suspects that a person has committed a crime.” ORS 131.615(1). 2 A frisk for weapons under ORS 131.625(1) 3 is permitted only when the frisked person is already “stopped” within the meaning of ORS *589 131.615(1). State v. Hampton, 59 Or App 512, 651 P2d 744 (1982). Although the statutes appear to require a subjective as well as objective element, the Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he officer’s motives for an otherwise justifiable stop are * * * not relevant to the question of its validity.” State v. Carter/Dawson, 287 Or 479, 485, 600 P2d 873 (1979). Our inquiry therefore is into the circumstances existing at the time and place of the stop to determine whether, viewed objectively, they justified a belief that defendant was involved in criminal activity. 4

The informant said that two other males were present in the car when he witnessed a cocaine deal being made within the preceding four hours. It was reasonable to suspect that defendant was one of those males. Even if it was not, it was clearly reasonable, in light of the fact that Smith was using the car as his place of dealing in drugs, to suspect defendant of being an accomplice of Smith’s, ORS 161.155(2)(b), of frequenting a place where controlled substances are used, ORS 167.222, 5 or of possessing controlled *590 substances himself. OHS 475.992. Although mere presence in a car where a crime is known to have been committed may not in itself constitute probable cause to arrest or to search a person incident to a justifiable search of the car, United States v. Di Re, 332 US 581, 68 S Ct 222, 92 L Ed 210 (1948), it certainly supports a suspicion that the person has committed a crime, a lesser standard. Occupants of a car, unlike customers in a tavern, see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 US 85, 100 S Ct 338, 62 L Ed 2d 238 (1979), may reasonably be assumed to have some personal or business association, and knowledge that one of them is conducting criminal business in the car at least justifies a suspicion that the other occupants are participants in that business.

It was reasonable to suspect defendant of having committed a crime. Therefore, the stop was legal. Once he was stopped, it was reasonable to frisk defendant for arms.

Affirmed.