Defendant 1 appeals the denial of his motion to set aside a default judgment, arguing that his failure to appear in the action was due to excusable neglect. ORCP 71B. We affirm.

In June, 1986, plaintiffs attorney wrote to defendant, asserting a claim for damages arising out of an allegedly negligent root canal surgery performed by defendant. Defendant forwarded the letter to his insurance agent, who sent the letter to the insurance carrier. The carrier then contacted plaintiffs attorney. Following further communication, plaintiffs attorney sent a letter to the carrier in August, stating that, if he did not hear from the carrier within ten days, he would recommend filing a lawsuit. The carrier contacted that attorney regarding the claim, but there was no discussion of any potential lawsuit. On October 10,1986, plaintiff filed his complaint, but did not send a copy to the carrier. Defendant was personally served on October 27, 1986. On November 28, plaintiff applied for and obtained a judgment by default. Defendant first became aware that a judgment had been entered when he received a letter from plaintiffs attorney dated January 15, 1987, which informed him that a judgment had been entered and demanded payment of $50,000. On February 5, defendant filed his motion to set aside the judgment, which the trial court denied.

We review a trial court’s refusal to set aside a default judgment for abuse of discretion. 2 The trial court’s determination of whether there was a sufficient showing of excusable neglect will not be disturbed except for a manifest abuse of such discretion. Lowe v. Institutional Investors Trust, 270 Or 814, 529 P2d 920 (1974).

We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Defendant acknowledged that he was served with summons and complaint. As stated in his affidavit in support of *393 the motion to set aside the default, he intended to send the documents to his insurance agent:

“It was my intention at that time to send those documents to my insurance agent and company. It is my practice to forward such documents as soon as I receive them. I thought I had sent the documents to the proper representative of the company.”

However, neither the agent nor the insurance carrier ever received the summons and complaint from defendant. In contrast to Hackett v. Alco Standard Corp., supra n 2, and Reitz v. Coca-Cola, 36 Or App 487, 584 P2d 791 (1978), where the defendants’ officers had delegated total responsibility to take care of the matter, defendant’s only request of his office staff was to send the documents to the insurance carrier. A week after he had been served, he received a letter from the carrier requesting that he cooperate on the claim. 3 Three weeks after service, he discussed the claim by telephone with the carrier’s representative but failed to mention anything about the lawsuit. We hold that the trial court properly found that defendant’s failure to appear was not due to excusable neglect.

Affirmed.