Plaintiff appeals from a judgment dismissing his complaint with prejudice. He argues that the trial court erred in holding that a Michigan judgment dismissing a similar action by him is res judicata and barred his claim in Oregon. We reverse.

Plaintiff and defendant are Oregon corporations. Plaintiff contracted to supply building components to a third party for a building in Michigan. Defendant supplied engineering services to plaintiff for the components. The building was completed in January, 1976, and the roof partially collapsed in January, 1982. In May, 1983, and April, 1984, the owner of the building and an injured worker filed lawsuits in Michigan against plaintiff and other third parties. Plaintiff filed a third-party complaint in Michigan against defendant for indemnification or contribution. The Michigan Court of Appeals dismissed plaintiffs claim with prejudice under Michigan’s six year statute of limitations and repose, Mich Comp Laws § 600.5839, holding that the

“right to indemnification or contribution can only arise if it is found primarily liable in the principal case. Such a finding of liability can arise only in Michigan; it is in Michigan and not Oregon that the cause of action accrues, as noted above, M.C.L. § 600.5839; M.S.A. § 27A.5839 is a statute of limitation and repose affecting only procedure rights, * * *. It does not impair substantive rights and it therefore applies to the transactions at issue. ” Cliffs Forest Products v. Al Disdero Lumber, 144 Mich App 215, 226, 375 NW2d 397 (1985), app den 424 Mich 895 (1986). (Emphasis supplied.)1

In December, 1985, plaintiff brought this claim in Oregon for indemnity and contribution on the same legal grounds and for the same course of conduct involved in the dismissed Michigan claim. In defendant’s motion for summary judgment, it argued that the Michigan judgment was res judicata in Oregon and barred plaintiffs action. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed plaintiffs case.

*674Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in giving res judicata effect to the Michigan judgment of dismissal based on Mich Comp Laws § 600.5839.2 For a judgment to be res judicata, the cases must be based on the same operative facts and there must have been an adjudication on the merits. Transamerica Ins. Group v. Adams, 62 Or App 419, 425-26, 661 P2d 937 (1983). Defendant argues that the Michigan judgment adjudicated the merits of plaintiffs claim, because the Michigan statute is a statute of ultimate repose, rather than of limitations, contrary to the language quoted above. A statute of repose provides for an overall maximum on the period within which an action must be brought. It starts to run from delivery of a product or completion of work and cannot be extended, regardless of any unfairness to a plaintiff. In contrast, a statute of limitations does not start to run until a claim is actionable, that is, until there is a legal injury. Delay v. Marathon LeTourneau Sale, 291 Or 310, 313-15, 630 P2d 836 (1981); Dortch v. A.H. Robins Co. Inc., 59 Or App 310, 320, 650 P2d 1046 (1982). Defendant may be correct that the Michigan statute is a statute of ultimate repose. However, as noted above, the Michigan Court of Appeals clearly held that its statute is a statute of limitations and only affected defendant’s procedural rights. We are bound by the Michigan court’s interpretation of its own statute.3

Therefore, the key question is whether, in Oregon, a foreign judgment based on the running of a statute of limitations is a decision on the merits that will bar a new action on *675the same cause in this state. The Oregon Supreme court has held that Oregon statutes of limitations cannot be pleaded as a defense to an action in another state, assuming that the other state also follows the common law rule, because the Oregon statutes only affect the remedy and do not extinguish the right. Goodwin v. Morris, 9 Or 322, 324 (1881); see Myers v. Cessna Aircraft, 275 Or 501, 514, 553 P2d 355 (1976) (citing Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Law §§ 142, 143 (1971)). However, we have not directly addressed the issue presented here.

Most jurisdictions follow the common law rule that a foreign judgment based on the running of a statute of limitations, does not bar an action in another state. Bank of United States v. Donnally, 33 US 361, 372-373, 8 L Ed 974 (1834); see also Order of United Commercial Traveler v. Wolfe, 331 US 586, 607, 67 S Ct 1355, 91 L Ed 1687 (1946); 47 Am Jur 2d, “Judgments” § 1231. The Michigan judgment based on the running of its statute does not bar the action in Oregon.4

The second issue is whether former ORS 12.260,5 the Oregon borrowing statute in effect at the time the case was brought, applies to this case. It has since been repealed and replaced by ORS 12.410 to ORS 12.480. However, even assuming that it does apply, it would not affect this case, because it only applies to nonresident parties. Both parties are Oregon corporations and residents of Oregon.

Reversed and remanded.