Plaintiff, in response to being terminated from her employment, brought this action for breach of contract. The trial court granted defendant hospital district’s 1 motion to dismiss for failure to allege facts sufficient to state a claim. ORCP 21(8). We affirm.

Plaintiff worked for defendant from September 14, 1981, until her discharge on August 7, 1987. Her complaint alleged that she

“was employed pursuant to the terms and conditions of a certain ‘personnel policies and procedures’ manual (hereafter ‘manual’), issued by Defendant * * *. Plaintiff reviewed the manual when it was issued to her upon the commencement of her employment with Defendant * * *. Each employee of Defendant * * * was required to read and sign a form acknowledging that they understood the terms of the manual. * * *

“6. The manual constituted an employment contract between Plaintiff and Defendant * * *.”

In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, we assume the truth of all well pleaded allegations and of any facts that might be adduced as proof of those allegations. See Brennan v. City of Eugene, 285 Or 401, 405, 591 P2d 719 (1979); Stout v. Citicorp Industrial Credit, Inc., 102 Or App 637, 639, 796 P2d 373 (1990), rev den 311 Or 151 (1991).

Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her breach of contract claim, because the complaint alleged facts sufficient to state a claim that the manual constituted a contract. Personnel policy manuals can create contractual obligations between an employee and a defendant. Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co., 281 Or 651, 656, 576 P2d 356 (1978); Fox v. Bear Creek Corp., 99 Or App 90, 92, 781 P2d 378 (1989). The facts alleged in plaintiff’s complaint are sufficient to indicate that the manual was intended to communicate express terms of the employment relationship, to which new employees had to agree, and was not merely a policy guide for managers. See Lakeside v. Freightliner Corp., 612 F Supp 10, 12 (D Or *145 1984). We hold that plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the manual created an employment contract between the parties.

However, we also conclude that the complaint did not sufficiently state a claim for a breach of the employment contract. According to plaintiff, the manual is ambiguous as to whether it restricts defendant’s right to terminate her at will, and therefore its meaning is a question for the juxy. See Fox v. Bear Creek Corp., supra, 99 Or App at 92. Her complaint attached the manual and alleged:

“7. Section221 ofthe manual provides that ‘involuntary termination may result as the final stage of the corrective discipline policy or because of gross misconduct.’ Section 221(4)(7) of the manual defines gross misconduct as a ‘breach of professional conduct including the confidentiality of patient and employee information.’

“8. On August 7,1987, Plaintiff was fired by Defendant * * *, ostensibly for a breach of confidentiality regarding employee information.

“9. Plaintiff never participated in the corrective discipline policy while employed by Defendant * * * nor did she breach any confidentiality requirement.

“10. Defendant * * * terminated Plaintiff’s employment in violation of section 221 ofthe manual.” (Emphasis supplied.)

In the absence of a contract or statute to the contrary, an employer may discharge an employee at any time, for any reason or for no reason. See, e.g., Patton v. J. C. Penney Co., 301 Or 117, 120, 719 P2d 854 (1986); Elliot v. Tektronix, Inc., 102 Or App 388, 395, 796 P2d 361, rev den 311 Or 13 (1990). The question is whether plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to show an express or implied agreement modifying the employment-at-will relationship. See Simpson v. Western Graphics, 293 Or 96, 101, 643 P2d 1276 (1982).

The language from the manual quoted by plaintiff specifically provides that involuntary termination may result as the final stage of the disciplinary process or because of gross misconduct, not that those are the only avenues for termination. In fact, it also allows defendant to skip the initial stages of *146 the disciplinary process altogether and simply terminate an employee. 2

Most persuasive, however, is the provision that “[sjince employment * * * is based upon mutual consent, either the employee or the employer is privileged to terminate employ ment.” (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, regardless of any optional termination procedures, the manual did not modify the employment-at-will relationship. See Carlson v. Crater Lake Lumber Co., 103 Or App 190, 198, 796 P2d 1216 (1990), modified 105 Or App 314, 804 P2d 511 (1991). Because plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to show a restriction on defendant’s right to terminate her employment, the trial court did not err in dismissing her claim for breach of contract. 3

We turn to plaintiffs argument that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim for denial of “due process” because her status as a non-probationary public employee confers a constitutionally_protected property interest in her continued employment. Plaintiff does not identify the basis for such a claim, and we are not aware of any independent tort action designated simply as “denial of due process.” Because we do not intend to create such a tort, we do not address plaintiffs assignment of error.

Affirmed.