Plaintiff Jeffrey Wohl, as the guardian ad litem of his daughter, Kayla, appeals from a summary judgment dismissing negligence and product liability claims against defendants, who manufactured, distributed, and sold an allegedly defective child restraint seat. The trial court concluded that those claims were preempted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Act (the Safety Act), 15 USC § 1381 et seq, and related standards, 49 CFR § 571.213. We reverse and remand.

Plaintiffs complaint alleged that Kayla, an infant, suffered serious head injuries when the car in which she was riding was involved in an accident, causing her head to strike the hard plastic side of her car seat. The complaint further alleged that the car seat was negligently designed and unsafe for its intended purpose because its sides were inadequately padded.

Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs claims were both expressly and impliedly preempted by the Safety Act. In particular, defendants asserted that plaintiffs claims, if successful, would establish a safety standard applicable to child car seats that is “not identical” to federal standard for car seats described at 49 CFR § 571.213, 1 and, consequently, those claims are expressly preempted by 15 USC § 1392(d). That statute provides:

“Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this subchapter is in effect, no State or *507 political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item or equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard.”

Defendants also argued that the Safety Act impliedly preempts plaintiffs claims because a successful suit based on such claims would impede Congress’ purposes and objectives in enacting the Act. The trial court agreed that plaintiffs claims were preempted and granted summary judgment.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the Safety Act does not preempt state common law tort claims. He invokes, particularly, the Act’s so-called “savings clause,” which provides:

“Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this title does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.” 15 USC § 1397(k).

Although the parties dispute the effect of the savings clause, and marshal massive authority from other jurisdictions supporting their positions, 2 plaintiff argues that McMullen v. Volkswagen of America, 274 Or 83, 545 P2d 117 (1976), is controlling and compels reversal. We agree.

In McMullen, the plaintiffs, who were injured in an auto accident, sued the automobile’s manufacturer and distributor on negligence and product liability theories. They asserted, in particular, that the automobile was defectively and negligently designed in that it contained certain features *508 that enhanced injuries sustained in a collision. The defendants demurred, arguing, inter alia, that the federal government’s extensive involvement in promulgating and enforcing automobile crash protection standards suggested a federal preemption of common law liability in the area of crash-worthiness design. The trial court sustained the demurrers.

Citing the savings clause and its legislative history, 3 the Supreme Court reversed:

“There is nothing in the legislative history or in the text of either the federal or state product safety legislation indicating an intention to pre-empt the fixing of such standards. The federal statutes expressly provide that compliance with the standards fixed by the federal agency does not relieve a person from liability under common law.” 274 Or at 88.

Notwithstanding that unambiguous conclusion, defendants assert that McMullen is not dispositive because the court did not refer to 15 USC § 1392(d), “which indicates that the [c]ourt did not have to evaluate the effect of any existing federal standard” and, consequently, “did not analyze how a state-tort claim might interfere with the purposes and objectives of the Safety Act itself.”

We disagree. Although McMullen does not explicitly address section 1392(d), that provision existed in its present form at the time McMullen was decided and, given the juxtaposition of that provision and the savings clause in the statutory scheme and the breadth of McMullen’s holding, that holding necessarily implicated section 1392(d). Moreover, from our review of the pleadings and briefs in McMullen, it appears that the plaintiffs claims in that case did, in fact, implicate then-existing federal safety standards. Thus, defendants’ purported distinctions are unpersuasive.

*509 McMullen controls and is fully dispositive. Accordingly, plaintiffs claims are not preempted.

Reversed and remanded.