No. 91 February 12, 2025 759 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. HAWREE AKRAM ABDULHAMEED ALJAF, Defendant-Appellant.

Washington County Circuit Court 21CR08732; A180112 Beth L. Roberts, Judge.

Argued and submitted January 14, 2025.

Peter G. Klym, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public Defense Services.

Peenesh Shah, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.

Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge.

TOOKEY, P. J.

Affirmed.

760 State v. Aljaf TOOKEY, P. J.

Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for one count of third-degree sexual abuse, ORS 163.415, one count of harassment, ORS 166.065, and one count of public indecency, ORS 163.465, raising four assignments of error concerning various evidentiary rulings. Defendant’s convic- tions stem from his conduct while he was experiencing a mental health crisis and in a locked psychiatric ward of the emergency department at St. Vincent’s Hospital.

For the reasons below, we affirm.

First Assignment of Error. The trial court ruled that defendant could not “give a diagnosis” regarding his own mental health, viz., that defendant could not testify that he has bipolar I disorder. In his first assignment of error, defen- dant assigns error to that ruling. The state responds that the trial court did not err in excluding that testimony and that, in any event, any error is harmless.

Even assuming that the trial court erred, we agree with the state that any error is harmless, because there is little likelihood that the challenged ruling affected the ver- dict in this case. State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 32, 77 P3d 1111 (2003) (“Oregon’s constitutional test for affirmance despite error consists of a single inquiry: Is there little likelihood that the particular error affected the verdict?”). In reach- ing that conclusion, we note that a witness who worked as a “qualified mental health associate” at the emergency department where defendant’s conduct occurred and who provided care to defendant on the night of defendant’s con- duct testified that it appeared defendant was “experiencing the symptoms of bipolar one” and that defendant was “show- ing classic signs of mania”; that, although defendant was not able to testify as to his diagnosis of bipolar I disorder, he was permitted to (and did) testify to the mental health symptoms he was experiencing on the night of the conduct that led to his convictions, e.g., he testified “feeling like I am powerful and I am God”; and that another witness, who worked as a registered nurse at the emergency department, testified that defendant was being treated “for psychosis” with “antipsychotic” medication. See State v. Strasser, 303 Or Nonprecedential Memo Op: 337 Or App 759 (2025) 761 App 566, 572, 464 P3d 497 (2020) (“The erroneous exclusion of evidence is harmless if a factfinder would have regarded the evidence as duplicative or unhelpful to its deliberations.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

Second Assignment of Error. In his second assign- ment of error, defendant contends that the trial court “erred when it excluded testimony pertaining to defendant’s men- tal health history as irrelevant.” Based on the record and the preservation section of defendant’s briefing, we under- stand defendant’s second assignment of error to be directed at two specific rulings: (1) the trial court’s exclusion of defen- dant’s testimony that he had “observed his long-term part- ner going through cancer treatment in 2018” which is what “ultimately led to his mental health deterioration over the next two years”; and (2) the trial court’s exclusion of tes- timony from defendant that two “psychiatric holds” were placed on him in the months leading up to the “psychiatric hold” during which his criminal conduct occurred, and that another “psychiatric hold” was placed on him a month after the “psychiatric hold” during which his criminal conduct occurred.1 The state argues, among other points, that defen- dant failed to preserve his challenge to those rulings.

We conclude the trial court did not err. As to the first ruling—concerning defendant’s observation of his part- ner’s cancer treatment—defendant told the trial court that he sought to admit the challenged testimony in order to “just lay[ ] the timeline for what occurred,” because it was the “starting point for this psychotic break that he had just two years later.” The trial court determined that that evi- dence was not relevant. Assuming defendant’s challenge to this ruling is preserved, we conclude that the trial court did not err in excluding the testimony as irrelevant, because the excluded testimony did not have “any tendency to make the We also note that, at oral argument, with respect to this second assign- ment of error, defendant stated that he “should have been able to testify regard- ing when he first developed bipolar 1 disorder and how that has progressed over the * * * two and a half years between when he developed it and the incident.”

Defendant has not identified when the trial court made the ruling excluding that evidence or that, if it did, he has preserved his challenge to that ruling. We address the pertinent rulings that we understand the trial court to have made.

762 State v. Aljaf existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determina- tion of the action more probable or less probable.” OEC 401 (“ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less proba- ble than it would be without the evidence.”).

As for the second ruling—concerning the psychiat- ric holds—we understand the trial court to have excluded the evidence both because it determined the evidence was irrelevant under OEC 401 and because, even if it was rel- evant, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under OEC 403. Because defendant did not articulate a theory of relevance in the trial court for the three psychiatric holds, we agree with the state that he did not preserve that issue for appeal. State v. Johnson, 288 Or App 528, 534-35, 406 P3d 1091 (2017), rev den, 362 Or 389 (2018) (“To preserve an issue, a party must provide the trial court with an explanation of his or her objection that is specific enough to ensure that the court can identify its alleged error with enough clarity to permit it to consider and correct the error immediately, if correc- tion is warranted.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

Further, and in any event, even if the trial court did err, we conclude that any error was harmless, given the evidence that was admitted at trial—that is, evidence that defendant was being held in the psychiatric ward at the time of his conduct and evidence of the mental health symptoms he was experiencing at the time of his conduct.

Third Assignment of Error. In his third assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred when it “excluded testimony pertaining to defendant’s mental health symptoms at the time of the incident as irrelevant.”

The state argues, among other points, that defendant did not preserve the arguments that he raises in this assign- ment of error.

As we see it, the difficulty with this assignment of error is that it starts from a false premise—namely, that the trial court “excluded testimony pertaining to defendant’s mental health symptoms at the time of the incident as irrel- evant.” Instead, we understand the trial court to have (1) Nonprecedential Memo Op: 337 Or App 759 (2025) 763 sustained an objection as to a purported cause of defendant’s mental health symptoms—that is, that he experienced “psy- chosis” because he had been “prescribed [with a] medication called Vyvanse”; and (2) sustained an objection to defen- dant’s testimony when defendant did not answer the ques- tion that was asked of him while he was testifying. Indeed, contrary to defendant’s contention in his third assignment of error, and as noted by the state, the trial court allowed defendant to testify at trial about the mental health symp- toms he was experiencing at the time of his conduct. It also allowed a witness to testify that she had given defendant an antipsychotic medication.

Because, in his third assignment of error, defen- dant has not developed any argument as to the rulings that the trial court actually made, we reject it. Beall Transport Equipment Co. v. Southern Pacific, 186 Or App 696, 700 n 2, 64 P3d 1193, adh’d to as clarified on recons, 187 Or App 472, 68 P3d 259 (2003) (“[I]t is not this court’s function to specu- late as to what a party’s argument might be” or “to make or develop a party’s argument when that party has not endeav- ored to do so itself.”).

Fourth Assignment of Error. In his fourth assign- ment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding testimony “from [two witnesses] that defendant was being treated for Bipolar I disorder and suffered from the symptoms of that disorder.” The state responds that the trial court “did not exclude testimony that defendant was being treated for Bipolar I disorder and suffered from the symptoms of that disorder,” and that, to the extent that its ruling could be construed that way, any error was harmless.

In view of the evidence that was admitted at trial, we agree with the state that any error was harmless. In reaching that conclusion regarding this assignment of error, we note that that one of the witnesses whom defendant identifies in this assignment of error—the qualified men- tal health associate—testified that it appeared that defen- dant was “experiencing the symptoms of bipolar one,” that “his thought process appeared to be disorganized,” that it appeared that “he was having delusions,” that it appeared “he was in some state of psychosis,” and that he was 764 State v. Aljaf “showing classic signs of mania.” The other witness whom defendant identifies in this assignment of error—the reg- istered nurse—for her part, testified that she was treating defendant for psychosis, and that treatment included giving defendant an antipsychotic medication.

Affirmed.