820 March 12, 2025 No. 223 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON George MORARU and Sandica Moraru, aka Sandra Moraru, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and Dan MORARU, Intervenor-Appellant, v. PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC and Online Northwest, Defendants-Respondents, and ASPLUNDH TREE EXPERT, LLC, Defendant.

Yamhill County Circuit Court 21CV04886; A181536 (Control), A180613 Jennifer K. Chapman, Judge.

Argued and submitted February 3, 2025.

Dan Moraru argued and filed the brief for appellants, pro se. Also on the briefs were George Moraru, pro se, and Sandica Moraru, pro se.

Dallas DeLuca argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent Portland General Electric. Also on the brief were Markowitz Herbold PC and April M. Stone.

Melanie A. Gillette argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent Online Northwest. Also on the brief were Jasmine C. Eberhard and Smith Freed Eberhard, P.C.

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 338 Or App 820 (2025) 821 Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Hellman, Judge, and Mooney, Senior Judge.

MOONEY, S. J.

Affirmed.

822 Moraru v. PGE MOONEY, S. J.

This is a civil case concerning a utility pole, several utility lines, and approximately forty Douglas fir trees on plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs George Moraru and Sandica Moraru, and intervenor-plaintiff Dan Moraru (collectively, plaintiffs) sought (1) damages against Portland General Electric (PGE) and Asplundh Tree Expert, LLC, for exces- sively pruning their Douglas fir trees, (2) damages against PGE and Online Northwest for unjust enrichment related to a fiber optic cable, and (3) a declaration that neither PGE nor Online Northwest have easement or other rights to use or cross plaintiffs’ property for their utility pole, lines, and equipment. These consolidated appeals concern the claims related to the utility pole and lines. The claims related to the Douglas fir trees are the subject of a separate appeal and this opinion does not concern those issues.

Plaintiffs appeal four limited judgments that dis- missed their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against PGE, dismissed all their claims against Online Northwest, and granted relief to PGE on its first counter- claim by declaring that PGE had acquired a prescriptive easement for the utility pole and utility lines that are located on or over plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs raise five assign- ments of error. We reject the third, fourth, and fifth assign- ments without discussion. We reject the second assignment because the record supports the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that PGE had acquired a prescrip- tive easement on and over plaintiffs’ property for its utility pole and lines.

We turn to the first assignment, where plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when it allowed their attor- ney and his “entire law firm”1 to “withdraw from represen- tation for health reasons” while PGE’s motion for summary judgment was pending. We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to allow counsel to withdraw for abuse of dis- cretion. Field v. Myrick, 299 Or App 634, 638, 449 P3d 895 (2019), rev den, 366 Or 259 (2020) (applying that standard in The record does not support plaintiffs’ argument that their counsel’s “entire law firm” had agreed to represent them in this matter, and we reject their conten- tion to the contrary.

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 338 Or App 820 (2025) 823 a post-conviction relief case). The abuse of discretion stan- dard tests whether the trial court made a decision within the permissible “range of legally correct choices.” Porter v. Veenhuisen, 302 Or App 480, 483, 461 P3d 276 (2020) (inter- nal quotation marks omitted). ORS 9.380(1) provides, as rel- evant here, that “The attorney in an action or proceeding may be changed, or the relationship of attorney and client termi- nated, as follows: “* * * * * “(b) At any time, upon the order of the court, based on the application of the client or the attorney, for good and sufficient cause.”

Plaintiffs’ counsel, William Sherlock, filed a motion for an order allowing withdrawal of counsel supported by Sherlock’s declaration: “I must withdraw for professional considerations under ORPC 1.16(A)(2) due to physical health issues. For that rea- son, I respectfully request that I be allowed to withdraw as attorney of record for Plaintiffs in this matter.”

Rule 1.16(a)(2) of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct, relied upon by Sherlock, requires a licensed attorney to withdraw from representing a client when the attorney’s “physical or mental condition materially impairs” his ability to represent the client.

Plaintiffs responded to the motion by filing their own pro se motion advising the court that they did not “rec- ognize Mr. Sherlock’s rights” to withdraw as their attorney “based on his physical health issues,” but they did not ask the court to deny the motion. They instead requested that the court “set the decision for [Sherlock’s motion to withdraw] on hold until the completion of transfer to our lawful rep- resentative Dan Moraru of [the] entire case file[.]” The trial court permitted Sherlock to withdraw and also granted the companion motions Sherlock had filed (1) to postpone trial and (2) to extend plaintiffs’ time to respond to PGE’s partial summary judgment motion by 30 days. Sherlock’s declara- tion supplied “good and sufficient cause” for his withdrawal.

824 Moraru v. PGE The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Sherlock’s motion to withdraw.

Affirmed.