Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2026

State v. Stevens

State v. Stevens
Court of Appeals of Oregon · Decided May 13, 2026 · Kamins
349 Or. App. 602
State v. Stevens

Opinion

602 May 13, 2026 No. 413 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CHEYENNE D. STEVENS, Defendant-Appellant.

Douglas County Circuit Court 23CR57174; A185103 Kathleen E. Johnson, Judge.

Submitted April 23, 2026.

Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Daniel C. Bennett, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant.

Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Interim Deputy Attorney General, and Julia A. Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge.

KAMINS, J.

Affirmed.

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 349 Or App 602 (2026) 603 KAMINS, J.

Defendant appeals from a conviction of a single count of second-degree assault. In her single assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied her motion for judgment of acquittal. She argues that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that she was at least criminally negligent with respect to the resultant injury. We affirm.

Defendant’s argument is not preserved, as she asserts a different theory as to the legal insufficiency of evi- dence on appeal than she argued below. See State v. Cassidy, 331 Or App 69, 73, 545 P3d 203, rev den, 372 Or 763 (2024) (“In the context of a motion for a judgment of acquittal, an objection as to the legal insufficiency of evidence to prove a claim on one theory does not have the effect of preserving all other possible theories of insufficiency * * *.” (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.)).

Regardless, defendant’s argument fails on the mer- its. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, a rational trier of fact could reasonably infer that defendant had used a weapon based on the injuries inflicted, photographs and video admitted, and testimony presented.

See Delgado v. Souders, 334 Or 122, 135, 46 P3d 729 (2002) (“[A] party may establish an element of a criminal offense * * * by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from such evidence.”). Based on that inference, a rational trier of fact could determine that the circumstances indicated a substantial risk of serious injury, and defen- dant’s failure to be aware of it constituted “a gross devi- ation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” ORS 161.085(10); see State v. Scatamacchia, 323 Or App 31, 35-36, 522 P3d 26 (2022), rev den, 370 Or 827 (2023) (several punches to the face at close range gave rise to substantial risk of serious injury such that there was little likelihood a jury would not find defendant at least criminally negligent).

Affirmed.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.