INT HEUN ITESDT ATDEISS TRCIOCUTR T

FORT HED ISTRIOCFTO REGON PORTLADNIDV ISION

LEANNJE.H ENSL,E Y CasNeo3 .: 20-cv-00791- Plaintiff, OPINIAONNDO RDER V. NIKE,I NCa.nO, r egCoonr poration, Defendant. MOSMAN,J., OnS epte17m 2,b0 e2rM1 a,g isJturdaJgtoeelA i.Re us sios shueeFrdi ndainndg s Recommen(d"&aFRt "i[)oE nC8 F1] r ,e commetnhtdahitcin osgug rrtanD te fendNanitkI en,sc .' MotitooDn i sm[iEsC7sF1 an ]d d imsisPsl aiLnetaninHffee s nleSye'csoA nmde nded Complbauittnh tta,htd e i smbiesw siatlhp oruetj uNdopi acrtyoe b.j etcott heFed& RU.p on reviIae gwr,we ietJ hu dRgues sroe'cso mmetnodd iastmitiohcsneos m plHaoiwnetvI.fie nrd,

thtahtce o mplsahionbuteld di smediw sisptrhe juIGd RiAcNetT.h m eo tianodDn I SIMSS PlainSteicfoAfnm'des n dCeodm pl[aEiC5nF8tw ] i ptrhe judice. DISCUSSION Thmea gisjturdmagateke oe nslr ye commentdota hcteoi uotrtnow,s h iacnhpya rmtya y filwer itotbejne cTthiceoo nuisrtns. o bto ubnydt hree commenodfta hmteai goinssjt urdagtee burte traeisnpso nfosrim bakiilntighfit eny ad le termiTnhcaeot uiirogstne .n erreaqlultiyor ed make a de novo determination regarding those portions of the report or specified findings or recommendation as to which an objection is made.

(b)(1)(C). However, the court is not required to review, de novo or under any other standard, the factual or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge as to those portions of the F&R to which no objections are addressed. See Thomas v. Arn,

(1985); United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

(9th Cir. 2003). While the level of scrutiny under which I am required to review the F&R depends on whether or not objections have been filed, in either case, I am free to accept, reject, or modify any part of the FER.

(b)(1)(C). Over the course of this case, Plaintiff has filed three different complaints.! Compl. [ECF 1]; Am. Compl. [ECF 27]; Second Am. Compl. [ECF 58]. Each time, Judge Russo has carefully analyzed Plaintiff's complaint and found that it failed to meet the requirements under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Order [ECF 13]; F&R [ECF 28]; F&R [ECF 81]. However, in the F&R before me, Judge Russo recommends I grant dismissal without prejudice. F&R [ECF 81] at 9 n.2. I disagree. Though “[d]ismissal with prejudice...is a harsh remedy,” that harshness “is directly proportionate to the likelihood that plaintiff would prevail if permitted to go forward to trial.” McHenry v. Renne,

(9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Von Poppenheim v. Portland Boxing & Wrestling Comm’n,

, 1053 n.4 (9th Cir. 1971)). Here, Plaintiff has failed to articulate a claim with any likelihood of success at trial. Instead, she alleges a Title VII action against a company she never worked for and an invasion of privacy claim that lacks even a shadow of the elements of such a claim. See F&R [ECF 81] at 7~9. As such, I find that Plaintiff’s complaint cannot “be saved by amendment,” and therefore must be dismissed with prejudice.

! The Court construes Plaintiff's original complaint [ECF 1], which was filed in three parts, see

Ex. 1;

Ex. 2, as one complaint.

OPINION & ORDER °

Ewbank v. Emrick,

, 149 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2003)). CONCLUSION Upon review, I agree with Judge Russo’s recommendation in part, and I ADOPT the F&R [ECF 81] with the exception of its recommendation that the dismissal of the complaint be without prejudice. [GRANT Defendant Nike, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF 71] and DISMISS Plaintiff Leanne Hensley’s Second Amended Complaint [ECF 58] with prejudice. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED this Dex October, 2021. _

CHAEL W. MOSMAN United States District Judge

OPINION & ORNER