UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF OREGON

JAMIE RALSTON, Civil No. 2:24-cv-01354-CL Plaintiff, V. JUDGMENT COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this case is reversed and remanded pursuant to sentence four of

(g) to the Commissioner of Social Security for further administrative proceedings pursuant to this Court’s ORDER of remand. JUDGMENT is entered for Plaintiff, and this case is closed. □

Dated: [21/25

MARK D. CLARKE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Submitted by: WILLIAM M. NARUS, CAB #243633 Acting United States Attorney KEVIN DANIELSON, OSB #065860 Executive Assistant United States Attorney JAMES POTTER, ILSB #6293571 Special Assistant United States Attorney Telephone: (816) 936-5061 [email protected] Attorneys for Defendant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF OREGON MEDFORD DIVISION ERIC SIROTKIN, Plaintiff, Case No.: 1:24-cv-02023-CL ORDER OF DISMISSAL y WITHOUT PREJUDICE

SHADY SOFIA ROSE, Defendant.

THIS MATTER having come upon the joint submittal of the parties indicating that they have reached a settlement agreement that includes the dismissal of this action without prejudice while some settlement terms are effectuated, and the Court finds that good cause exists for granting this motion.

THEREFORE, the above matter is dismissed without prejudice and4ll parties shall pay their own costs of said litigation. patep: “2/241 2S ark D. Cl Submitted and Approved: United States Magistrate Judge

ERIC SIROTKIN, Plaintiff pro se 121 Sandoval St. Santa Fe, NM 87506 505.930.7223 [email protected]

Telephonic approval 4/14/25

/s/_Andrew Narus Attorney for Defendant Andrew Narus Davis, Hearn, Anderson & Selvig, P.C. 515 East Main St. Ashland, Oregon 97520 Phone: (541) 482-3111 Fax: (541) 488-4455 [email protected]

. IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

BRIAN S.!

Plaintiff, Civ. No. 6:24-cv-00188-CL □ v. □ OPINION AND ORDER □□□□□ COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, — Defendant. □

MARK D. CLARKE, Magistrate Judge. .

. Plaintiff Brian S. (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying her claims for supplemental. security income benefits. This court has jurisdiction under

(g) and 1383(c)(3), > and all parties have consented to jurisdiction by magistrate judge under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73 and

(c) For the reasons provided below, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND □ On May 14, 2019, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for disability insurance . benefits (“DIB”), alleging disability beginning on March 11, 2018. Tr. 212-15, The claim was -

' Tn the interest of privacy, this Opinion and Order uses only the first name and the initial of the last name of the non-governmental party or parties in this case. 1 - Opinion and Order

denied initially and on reconsideration. Tr. 68, 79. Plaintiff requested ahearing beforean administrative law judge (“ALJ”) and appeared before ALJ Mark Triplett, on March 15, 2023. Tr. 33-67. Plaintiff, along with his attorney and a vocational expert, testified at the hearing. The

found Plaintiff not disabled in a written decision issued April 5, 2023. Tr. 14-32. The □ Appeals Council denied review on November 28, 2023, making the ALJ’s decision the final

agency decision. Tr. 1-6. Plaintiff's timely appeal followed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff was 47 years of age on his alleged onset date and has at least a high school education. Tr. 26. He has past relevant work as an arc welder. Tr. 26. In his application, he alleged disability due to C6 vertebrae corpectomy and left shoulder torn rotator cuff. Tr. 69. DISABILITY ANALYSIS □

A claimant is disabled if he or she is unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity □ by reason of any medienlly determinable physical or mental impairment which.. has lasted or be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C. □ § 423(d)(1)(A). “Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential process for determining whether an applicant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Keyser v. Comm’r. Soc. Sec. Admin. 648 F 3d 721, 724 (9th Cir, 2011). Each step is potentially dispositive.

(a)(4). The five-step peauentinigorocess asks the following series of questions: .

1, Is the claimant performing “substantial gainful activity”? 20 CF “R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i).. This activity is work involving significant mental or physical duties done or intended to be done for pay or profit.

. If the claimant is performing such work, she is not disabled - within the meaning of the Act.

(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, the analysis proceeds to step two.

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2. Ts the claimant’s impairment “severe” under the Commissioner’s regulations?

(a)(4)(ii). Unless expected to result in death, an impairment is “severe” if it significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.

(a). This impairment must have lasted or must be expected to last □ for a continuous period of at least 12 months.

. If the claimant does not have a severe impairment, the analysis ends.

(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant has a severe impairment, the analysis proceeds to step three. 3, Does the claimant’s severe impairment “meet or equal” one or more of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? If so, then □ the claimant is disabled.

(a)(4)(ii). If the impairment does not meet or equal one or more of the listed impairments, the analysis proceeds to the “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”) assessment. □ a. The ALJ must evaluate medical and other relevant evidence to assess _ and determine the claimant’s RFC. This is an assessment of work- related activities that the claimant may still perform on a regular and continuing basis, despite any limitations imposed by his or her impairments.

(e); 404.1545(b)-(c). After the ALJ determines the claimant’s RFC, the analysis proceeds to step four.

4, Can the claimant perform his or her “past relevant work” with this RFC assessment? If-so, then the claimant is not disabled.

(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant cannot perform his or her past relevant □ work, the analysis proceeds to step five. . 5. Considering the claimant’s RFC and age, education, and work experience, is the claimant able to make an adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy? If so, then the claimant is not . disabled.

(a)(4)(v); 404.1560(c). If the claimant cannot perform such work, he or she is disabled. See also Bustamante v. Massanari,

(9th Cir. 2001). The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. /d. at 954. The Commissioner bears the burden of proof at step five. Jd. at 953-54. At step five, the Commissioner must show that the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant □

numbers in the national economy, “taking into consideration the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.” Tackett v. Apfel,

(9th Cir.

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1999) (internal citations omitted); see also

(describing “work which exists in the national economy”). If the Commissioner fails to meet this burden, the claimant is disabled.

(@)(4)(v). If, however, the Commissioner proves that the claimant is able to perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy, the claimant is not disabled. Bustamante,

; Tackett,

. THE ALJ’S FINDINGS At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 11, 2018, his alleged onset date, Tr. 19. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe cnpacnentes degenerative disc disease; osteoarthritis; and left shoulder degenerative joint disease/rotator cuff. Tr. 19. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination thereof that met or medically equaled the severity of a □□□□□□ impairment. Tr. 20. The ALI found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work with the following additional limitations: [he] can occasionally push/pull with the bilateral, upper extremities. [He] can frequently climb ramps and stairs, but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. [He] can frequently balance, ‘stoop, kneel, and crouch, but occasionally crawl. [He] can - occasionally reach overhead bilaterally. [He] can frequently, but □ not constantly, reach in other directions bilaterally. [He] can frequently but not constantly, handle, finger, and feel bilaterally. Tr. 20. At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff cannot perform his past relevant work as an arc welder. Tr. 26. At step five, the ALJ found that, in light of Plaintiff's age, education, work □ eeerenes and RFC, a significant number of jobs existed in the national economy such that Plaintiff could sustain employment despite his impairments, including such representative occupations as: marker for merchandise; small products assembler: and inspector/hand packager. Tr. 27. The ALJ thus found Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Tr. 27.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW The reviewing court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on the proper legal standards and the legal findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record.

(g); Batson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin.,

(9th Cir. 2004); see also Hammock v. Bowen,

(9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence is “more than a

mere scintilla,” and means only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill,

(2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing the Commissioner’s alleged errors, this Court must weigh “both the evidence that supports and detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusions.”

‘Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F 2a 711, 772:(9th Cir. 1986). Variable interpretations of the evidence are insignificant if the Commissioner’s interpretation is rational. Burch v. Barnhart, 400F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir, 2005). if the decision of the Appeals Council is the final decision of the Commissioner, this Court must review the decision of the Appeals Council to determine whether that decision is

_ supported by substantial evidence. Howard v. Heckler,

(9th Cir. 1986). Where the evidence before the ALJ or Appeals Council is subject to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner’s conclusion must be upheld. Batson,

198 (citing Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041). “However, a reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hammock,

). Additionally, a reviewing court “cannot affirm the [Commissioner’s] decision on a ground that the [Administration] did not invoke in making its decision.” Stout v. Comm ’r Soc. Sec. Admin.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). Finally, a court may not reverse the

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Commissioner’s decision on account of an error that is harmless. Jd. at 1055-56, burden showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” Shinseki v. Sanders,

(2009). . "Even where findings are supported by substantial evidence, “the decision should be set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the □ decision.” Flake v. Gardner,

(9th Cir. 1968). Under sentence four of 42 USS.C. § 405(g), the reviewing court has the power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing. . . DISCUSSION Plaintiff argues that remand is warrarited because the ALJ erred in his evaluation of

Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony and in his evaluation of the medical opinion of Dr. □□ Samir Ale. The Court addresses each argument below. - I. Subjective Symptom Testimony □ Plaintiff argues that he is unable to work, in part, due to a neck injury he sustained while working. Tr. 4-43, In a written statement, Plaintiff described his neck injury as causing □ “constant pain,” noting that he cannot look up or bend his neck to the right or left. Tr. 269. At his hearing, Plaintiff stated that he had surgery for his neck injury, but he still experiences pain, = despite having completed multiple rounds of physical — Tr. 44-45. He testified that his. pain prevents him from looking up, and that medications prescribed to help with his pain □ cause upset stomach and sexual dysfunction. Tr. 44-47. He stated he is unable to lie flat, due to

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his neck pain, and that, because of his pain, it takes him longer to complete his daily household

. chores. Tr. 47-48. When a claimant has medically documented impairments that could reasonably be □ expected to produce some degree of the symptoms complained of, and the record contains no affirmative evidence of malingering, “the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the □ severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Smolen vy, Chater,

, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). A general assertion that the claimant is not credible is insufficient: instead, the ALJ “must state which... testimony is not ciedible and - . what evidence suggests the complaints are not credible.” Dodrill v. Shalala,

(9th Cir. 1993). The reasons proffered must be “sufficiently specific to permit the reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant’s testimony.” Orteza v. Shalala,

(9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). If the ALJ’s finding regarding the claimant’s subjective symptom testimony is “supported by substantial evidence in the record, [the court] may not engage in second-guessing.” Thomas v. Barnhart,

(th Cir. 2002). Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p provides that “subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an individual’s character,” and requires that the ALJ consider all the evidence in an individual’s record when evaluating the intensity and persistence of symptoms. SSR 16-3p,

, at *2 (S.S.A. Oct. 25, 2017). The ALJ must examine “the entire case record, including the objective medical evidence: an individual’s peiemens about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms; statements and other information provided by medical sources and other persons; and any other relevant evidence in the ©

individual’s case record.” Id, at *4.

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A. Medical Records . □ The ALJ rej eed Plaintiff's symptom testimony, in part, because the medical evidence was his symptom allegations. In some circumstances, an ALJ may reject subjective complaints where the claimant’s “statements at her hearing do not eomeor with

objective medical evidence in her medical roar Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. See. Admin.,

(9th Cir. 2009). However, a lack of objective evidence may not be the sole basis -

for rejecting a claimant’s subjective complaints. See Rollins v. Massanari,

(9th Cir. 2001). .

Th ALJ properly considered the objective medical record in discounting Plaintiff's subjective symptoms testimony. Although Plaintiff had some pain and reduced range of motion in his cervical spine, objective physical examinations showed largely normal results, including negative Spurling’s test and normal strength in his cervical spine. See, e.g., Tr. 431, 535, 542, □ 549, 573. Plaintiff was able to successfully complete a series of repetitive movements including overhead reaching, forward bending, forward reaching, and repeated full squat motions. Tr. 689- □ 90. The ALJ properly found these normal objective observations were inconsistent with

Plaintiff's claims of constant, debilitating pain and severely reduced functionality. The ALJ further considered records showing that Plaintiff? s symptoms improved with

treatment. A claimant’s improvement with treatment is “an important indicator of the intensity and persistence of... symptoms.” 20 C.FR. § 404.1529(c)(3). For example, “{i]mpairments that

can be controlled effectively with medication are not disabling for the purpose of determining eligibility for SSI benefits.” Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

(9th Cir. □ 2006). Symptom improvement, however, must be weighed ann the Corer of an “overall diagnostic picture.” Holohan v. Massanari,

(9th Cit. 2001); see also Lester

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v. Chater,.

(9th Cir. 1995) (“Occasional Symone periods .. . are not □ inconsistent with disability.”). ae . □ The ALJ properly found that Plaintiff's symptoms improved with treatment. Plaintiff's

records show that he completed two rounds of physical therapy, and he reported eeiencne improvements in both his pain level as well as his level of functioning. Tr. 363, 372, 595, 634. Plaintiff's records show that, despite having some lingering pain after his surgery, his symptoms were controlled enough to where he could complete his daily activities. For example, Plaintiff □

reported to his physical therapist that he could complete his personal care, lift heavy objects, and engage in most of his usual Pecresicrel activities. Tr. 363-64. □

' Plaintiff was prescribed oxy.codone, which provided good pain control, until October 2019. Tr. 550. His provider then declined to continue prescribing opioid medication because Plaintiff was repeatedly noncompliant with hospital opioid prescription policies. Tr. 550-51. Thereafter, Plaintiff was not prescribed any pain medication until October 2020, when he was □

trialed on venlafaxine. Tr. 755. At that visit, Plaintiff told providers that his symptoms had improved since his surgery. Tr. 755, Plaintiff subsequently told providers he was happy with the control venlafaxine provided, despite reporting that it did not help with his neck pain. Tr. 964. As to his neck pain, Plaintiff told his provider that he “can live with it.” Tr. 964. See

(c)(3) (In evaluating symptoms such as pain, “[W]e will consider all of the evidence presented, including ... your statements about your symptoms”); see also Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F Ath 489, 500 (oth Cir. 2022) (noting that the ALJ did not err in concluding objective and self-reported evidence of improvement was inconsistent with Plaintiff's subjective testimony that she was in constant 10/10 pain). It was thus reasonable for the ALJ to rely on these reports of improved symptoms and conclude that Plaintiff's symptom testimony ee less

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than credible. B. Daily Activities — □ The ALJ found that Plaintiff's testimony was inconsistent with his reported daily activities. When assessing a claimant’s symptom testimony, the ALJ “may consider, among other _ - factors, ... ‘the claimant's daily activities.”” Rounds v, Comm 'r Soc. Sec. Admin.,

(9th Cir. 2015) (internal citation omitted). The ALJ may reject symptom allegations that are inconsistent with a claimant’s ability to perform normal activities of daily living. See 20 CFR. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i). There are two ways that daily activities may support such rej ection: (1) the activities contravene the claimant’s allegations of functional limitations; or (2) the activities

“meet the threshold for transferrable work skills[.]” Orn v. Astrue,

(9th Cir. 2007). “Even where those activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s ection to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally

disabling impairment.” Molina y. Astrue,

(9th Cir. 2012). The ALJ noted Plaintiff’s claims of constant pain and extreme physical limitations were inconsistent with his reportedly active lifestyle. For example, Plaintiff testified that he regularly goes pmen fishing, he drives and shops for household items, and he reported to providers that he leads an active lifestyle. Tr. 48, 49, 52, 54, 363, 974, 979. The ALJ did not err in finding Plaintiff’s activities were inconsistent with his claims of debilitating symptoms. For instance, ~

although Plaintiff testified that he is “pretty tore up” the day after he goes fishing, the fact that he can regularly go salmon fishing at all indicates that he is more capable than his symptom allegations suggest. Tr. 55. Fishing, in general, requires repeated activities such as casting, reeling, and pulling heavy items out of the water; activities that are not consistent with claimsof extreme pain and limitations. Furthermore, Plaintiff testified that he is responsible for household .

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shopping, as well as completing all household chores. Tr. 56. Plaintiff attested to having some pain and difficulty in completing some daily activities, but this alone is not sufficient to upend ‘the ALJ’s disability determination. See

(c)(3)(). The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly found that eee where a claimant experiences some difficulty or pain, his daily’ activities may be grounds for discrediting symptom testimony if those activities “contradict □ claims of totally debilitating impairment.” Molina,

. See also Smartt, 53 F.4th‘at □ 499 (ALJ did not err in finding claimant’s symptom allegations inconsistent with her ability to perform normal daily activities, despite her limitations). .

C. Symptom Magnification

_ The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s symptom allegations because two examining doctors ined Plaintiff was engaging in symptom magnification. Tr. 22-23. Evidence of symptom

magnification may constitute a clear and convincing reason to reject a claimant’s symptom testimony. See Austin v. Saul, 818 F.App’x 725, 727 (9th Cir. 2020) (evidence that the claimant exaggerated his need for a crutch was a clear and convincing reason to reject his symptom testimony); see also 20 CER. 404.1529(c)(4) (“We will consider whether there are any Meoneictencics in the evidence and the extent to which there are any conflicts between your statements and the rest of the evidence). . In June 2019, Plaintiff presented for a work capacity evaluation and an independent medical examination at the request of his worker’s compensation meer Tr. 684-696; 697-711. both instances, the examining physicians concluded that Plaintiff's eeamnaion results were not valid, noting variability in his results as an indication of symptom magnification. Tr. 691- 693, 709-10. The ALJ considered the doctors’ conclusions =n symptom magnification, and further noted that, despite Plaintiff's symptom allegations, he was able to successfully perform a

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series of movements that were inconsistent with his self-described limitations, Tr. 2, citing Tr. “689-90, 706, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly relied on the evidence of symptom magnification, because the ALJ ultimately found these medical opinions unpersuasive. But the ALJ only rejected the doctors’ ultimate conclusions that Plaintiff was capable of performing his prior work as a welder, not the results from the objective testing which supported their - conclusions as to symptom magnification. Thus, the ALJ did not err in finding that evidence of symptom magnification called into question the credibility of Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony. □ an In sum, the ALJ proviiedtclert and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence for rejecting Plaintiff *s subjective symptom testimony. II. Medical Opinion Evidence of Dr. Samir Ale In the context of social meee claims, a medical opinion isa “statement from a medical source about what you can still do despite your impairment(s) and whether ron have one or more impairment-related limitations or restrictionis[.]”

. 1513(a)(2); see also Rodin □□ Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,

, at *12 (E.D. Cal. May 5, 2023) (“the revised

regulations now more narrowly define as [medical opinion] a statement from a medical source about what a claimant:-can’still do despite impairments”). ALJs must consider the persuasiveness

of all medical opinion evidence. The most important considerations in evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinions are supportability and consistency.

.1520c(a). The supportability of a medical opinion is evaluated by examining the how well the relevant

_ objective medical evidence and the medical source’s explanation support the opinion, whereas consistency is evaluated by examining how consistent a medical opinion is with other medical

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opinions (and prior administrative findings) of record. 20 C.F R §§ 404.1520e(c)(1); 404.1520e(c)(2).

Dr. Samir Ale submitted a medical opinion in support of Plaintiffs disability benefits application. Tr. 984-88. Dr. Ale opined that Plaintiff would-need to lie down and rest “every few hours” throughout the day to “relieve neck pain, stiffness and tension.” Tr 985. He stated that

Plaintiff can sit, stand, and walk for no more than one hour in an eight-hour workday. Tr. 986. According to Dr. Ale, Plaintiff would require four-to-five unscheduled breaks per day, with each break lasting 15 to 20 minutes. Tr. 987. Dr. Ale further. opined that Plaintiff would miss more than four days of work per month, due to his impairments. Tr. 988. The ALJ found Dr. Ale’s opined limitations “extreme” and concluded that such

limitations were not persuasive. Tr. 25. To start, the ALJ noted that Dr. Ale’s treating relationship with Plaintiff was fairly limited, and none of his treating notes supported the limitations set forth □ in his opinion. Tr. 25, citing Tr. 764, 768-69. Additionally, the ALJ noted that there were - inconsistencies between the obj ective evidence in the record and Dr. Ale’s opinion. Tr. 25, citing Tr. 970, 972, 974, 975, 976, 979, 981. The ALJ’s conclusions are a reasonable reading of the record and are supported by substantial evidence. me

Plaintiff does not articulate any meaningful challenge to the ALJ’s supportability and consistency findings regarding Dr. Ale’s opinion, but instead argues that the ALJ engaged in “cherry-picking” evidence. Pl. Br. at 10. The Court, however, finds no fault in the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Ale’s opinion. An independent review of the record finds that the extreme limitations opined by Dr. Ale are not supported anywhere within the record. Indeed, Dr. Ale’s opinion itself contains no discernible explanation for the limitations assessed. See, e.g., Tr. 987 (stating without explanation that Plaintiff is limited to using his right and left hands 40% of the workday, fingers.

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80% of the workday, and arms 10-15% of the day). The record contains only limited instances of physical examinations conducted by Dr. Ale, none of which mention the restrictions in his medical opinion. See, e.g., Tr. 970, 974, 976, 981. Moreover, as the ALJ pointed out, Dr. Ale’s opinion is inconsistent with examination results from other medical providers. in the record. Tr. —-972. 20 C.E.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2). The Court thus concludes that the ALJ adequately articulated his findings regarding the Rereunsivences of Dr. Ale’s medical opinion. ORDER In sum, the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony and the medical opinion of Dr. Ale. For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. .

‘Tt is so ORDERED and DATED GLE. MARK D. CLARKE □ . United States Magistrate Judge □

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