Aspinwall v. Dunlavy
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the court.
For the purposes of this opinion we shall assume that the respondent is correct when he says that the issues of fact are “narrowed down to the one question whether or not by mutual mistake the land in controversy was omitted from the deed to respondent.” A careful reading of the record convinces us that there was no mistake, but that, on the contrary, Jones and wife conveyed exactly what they intended to sell and Aspinwall received what he agreed to purchase. We can best understand the situation if attention is first directed to the descriptions found in all the deeds. Not a single monument is referred to in any of the
The result is different, however, if the boundaries of the four tracts are to be determined by lines run between the iron pipes which Gesner placed at the different comers of tracts 1, 2 and 3. Without exception, the course of every line is different from the course given in the deeds and each line is longer than the corresponding- line found in the deed. Commencing at the iron pipe which marks the northwest corner or place of beginning for tract 1 and running easterly along the center of the county road, it is 10.992 chains to the iron pipe which Gesner evidently drove in the
It is plain that Gesner intended that the iron pipes should mark the corners called for in the deeds rather than that the courses and distances given in the deeds should be governed by the sites of the iron pipes. This conclusion is corroborated by the testimony of Matthes who says that after the survey he received “a plat of it from Mr. Gesner” and that the description of his tract, or tract 2, was the same as the plat. Undoubtedly Gesner intended to survey-off three twenty-acre tracts because Jones and wife were to sell two twenty-acre tracts to Aspinwall and one to Matthes. The parties understood that the purchasers were to have the tracts surveyed at their own expense; and after the survey was made deeds were presented to Jones and wife who signed them without any knowledge of the location of any of the iron pipes. M. L. Jones testified thus:
“I intended to convey them twenty acres apiece; * * I intended to convey those parties, all of them, exactly what I had agreed to convey, and they made their own survey and put in the description, I think; they furnished the description of the land; * * I intended to convey to them just exactly what they paid me for; * **602 I didn’t make out the deeds. They were made out and brought to me. They conformed to the agreement that I had made with them to convey them twenty acres of land apiece.”
According to the descriptions of tracts 1, 2 and 3 as found in the deeds the area of each tract is 20.05 acres. Aspinwall purchased tracts 1 and 3 aggregating 40.10 acres and according to the recital in the deed he paid $2,005 or at the rate of $50 per acre. Matthes paid $1,002.50 for tract 2 or at the rate of $50 per acre. The recitals in the deeds about the amount of the consideration demonstrate that all persons concerned believed that Jones and wife were transferring and the purchasers were paying for the land described in the deeds. The conveyances give to Aspinwall and Matthes the exact acreage called for and the grantee paid for that acreage at a fixed rate per acre. If, however, the deeds are to be controlled by the iron pipes then tracts 1, 2 and 3 will each contain more than 20.05 acres.
Jones intended to sell three twenty-acre tracts: One to Matthes and two to Aspinwall. G-esner intended to survey off three tracts, each to contain twenty acres. In making the survey he indicated the corners with iron pipes and undoubtedly believed that those pipes were placed in exact conformity with the calls in the deeds, for the record discloses that subsequent to the survey he prepared a plat and the plat was the same as the descriptions in the deeds. It is more than probable that Gesner wrote out the descriptions for tracts 1, 2 and 3 although that conclusion can only be supported by circumstantial evidence. Furthermore, the purchasers paid for the exact acreage which the deeds conveyed to them. In view of this situation it cannot be said that any land was omitted from either of the deeds by reason of the mutual mistake of the grantors
It is true that on February 11, 1915, Jones and wife gave a quitclaim deed to Aspinwall to all the land now claimed by the latter. Jones and wife had, however, previously given a deed to Dunlavy covering the disputed territory and consequently a subsequent quitclaim deed would not operate to convey any title to Aspinwall for the reason that on February 11, 1915, Jones and wife had none to convey. M. L. Jones explains the quitclaim deed by saying that it was brought to him by Pierre Aspinwall who said:
“He desired a quitclaim deed to some land that I had conveyed to Britt Aspinwall formerly. I looked over the deed and made some interlineations to make it simply a quitclaim deed, conveying only the right that I held there. I understood that I had conveyed all my owner ship in the land formerly, but I had no objections to making him a quitclaim deed, conveying him simply what interest, — that is, no more interest than I had, and I didn’t consider that I had any interest, but he said that it corrected some description in the land which I had given him formerly; * * I didn’t make any comparisons, or didn’t know what mistake they claimed was in it; didn’t look that up; didn’t make any comparison with the former deed; * * I simply in*604 tended to correct any mistake that might have been made in the description of the land which I had formerly conveyed to Mr. Aspinwall. I had no intention of conveying any land to him which I had deeded to Mr. Dunlavy. ’ ’
The description of tract 3 appearing in the deed of November 17, 1906, to Aspinwall includes all the property at that time intended to be conveyed and Aspinwall is not entitled to have the deed changed so as to include more or different land. When this cause was argued it was stated and not denied that the narrow strip in dispute was not worth to exceed $31. Under all the circumstances we think that the decree should be without costs to either party in either court. The decree is reversed and the suit is dismissed without costs to either party in any court. Reversed and Dismissed.
070rehearing
Denied April 3, 1917.
On Petition for Rehearing.
(163 Pac. 1169.)
On petition for rehearing. Rehearing denied.
Mr. Samuel T. Richardson, for the petition.
Messrs. Pogue, Page & Roberts, contra.
Department 1.
delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiff insists in a petition for a rehearing that the difference between the courses and distances in the
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.