1, 2. The appellant contends that the award is invalid for two reasons: (a) That since, under the terms of the written agreement, the third party to be chosen upon the failure of the two specified arbitrators to agree, was not to be the. sole arbiter; but was to act with the others in breaking the . deadlock, he was not an umpire, but an arbitrator, and that the death of one of the arbitrators terminates the authority of all. In support of this doctrine our attention is directed to the case of Blundell v. Brettargh, 17 Ves. Jr. 231. The case cited is of' no aid to us upon the question here presented, for the reason that in that case, it was not an arbitrator who died, but one of the parties to the contract of submission. It is true, as counsel for ‘appellant contends, that the third person chosen by the arbitrators named in the contract was not, in the strict sense, an umpire, for an umpire is one who succeeds to the duties of those who, after failure to agree, have chosen him to accomplish that wherein they have failed, making the original arbi*147trators functus officio. By the terms of the submission, the third party chosen by the two referees named therein was to operate with the others in order to secure a majority, and was therefore what may be called a special arbitrator. It may be conceded for the purpose of this discussion, that if one of the arbitrators named in the written submission had died, or refused to act, before an award had been agreed upon, there could have been no award and the entire affair would have been thereby ended, since the personal participation of each was one of the express terms of the contract. The death of Mr. Clark, however, who was selected, not by signers of the agreement, but by the arbitrators themselves; presents a different question, since his failure to act did not have any effect upon the express terms of the written instrument, as would have been the case if such writing had named him as the umpire or special arbitrator. It is of no consequence to the present inquiry, whether we call him an umpire or an arbitrator, since under either title, or with the powers belonging to either title, his appointment is from the same source, the only difference being in the extent,of his powers. Since he is to be chosen by the two arbitrators specified in the contract, their powers in the one case are logically the same as in the other. Upon this question, Morse on Arbitration and Award, page 245, says:

“The power of arbitrators to name an umpire is not necessarily exhausted by a single nomination. If the nominee refuse to accept, or neglect to act, successive nominations may be made, until someone is found who will actually exercise the function. The authority is determined only when it has been fully executed.”

*148An interesting discussion of this subject is found in the case of Cloud v. Sledge, 1 Bail. (S. C.) 105, wherein; under the terms of the submission, the two arbitrators, being unable to agree, named as umpire s¡. Dr. Douglass, who, after an investigation of the matters presented, declared himself unable to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion, and recommended that a man named Gill should be called in as umpire in his stead, and this was done. Upon appeal it was urged that the powers of the arbitrators had been exhausted in appointing Dr. Douglass, but the court says:

“Formerly much strictness was required in the execution of the authority delegated to these domestic tribunals, but, as it was found to impede the determination of cases, and greatly to hinder and delay the administration of justice, this strictness has been relaxed; and if the arbitrators act in good faith, and the decision is fairly and impartially made, it is the inclination of the courts in all cases to support the award. The right of the arbitrators to appoint a second umpire, where the first has refused or declined to act, was once questioned, but it had long since been determined, that they have this power, and, indeed, it is somewhat surprising that it should ever have been questioned.”

The court in that, case held that a successor to Dr. Douglass was properly selected. This ruling appears to be in accord with modern authority, and meets our approval.

3. As to whether or not Mr. Clark had assumed the duties of his task as an arbitrator, the record discloses that when notified of his selection, he accompanied Mr. Sigler and Mr. Watkins to the land in controversy, where they made some investigation and had some discussion as to what should be done, and then, after agreeing to meet on the following Mon*149day for further proceedings, they separated, and upon the intervening Sunday Mr. Clark died. There was here no such performance or action by Mr. Clark as would preclude the arbitrators from naming his successor.

4. (b) It is also contended by appellant, that even if it be conceded that Stearns was legally chosen to succeed Clark, the award is nevertheless void because Pallay gave notice of his revocation of the arbitration before any award was made or published. The evidence discloses that the three arbitrators together visited the ground, inspected it from various points, drew a plat disclosing the three tracts to be awarded, as agreed upon by all three; and then instead of making their report at once, they awaited the return of Mr. Winfree, then out of town, upon whom they relied to frame their report, looking to him, for the reason that he was the attorney who had prepared the contract of submission. While they were awaiting Winfree’s return, and before their report was reduced to writing or signed, 'Mr. Pallay, by his attorney, notified, the arbitrators by letter that he would not be bound by the award, and that he revoked the submission. Respondents urge that a revocation could not be thus accomplished, and their contention is undoubtedly correct. The formality of a revocation must conform to the formality of the submission. If the submission is under seal, or by deed, the revocation must be by deed. If the submission is in writing, the revocation must be in writing: Morse on Arbitration and Award, p. 232; 5 C. J., §105, p. 57; 2 R. C. L., p. 368, § 17. It will be recalled that in the present instance the submission was by deed, and a simple letter, signed by either the appellant *150or Ms attorney, is ineffective to accomplish a revocation.

5. It is urged, further, that the award is invalid for the reason that no opportunity was given to the parties to appear before the new board of arbitrators for a hearing, and among others, the case of Cohn v. Wemme, 47 Or. 146 (81 Pac. 981, 8 Ann. Cas. 508), is cited. This case, as well as the others which are-relied upon by appellant, are cases which called for hearings and the introduction of evidence, while the case at bar is in an entirely different class. The written agreement of submission occupies the place of pleadings, stipulated facts, and an order appointing referees in a suit for partition of real property. The arbitrators are in no sense different from referees in 'such a suit in partition and it was not contemplated that they should do anything more than to go upon the premises, survey the same, and, in the exercise of their best judgment, divide the ground into three tracts in the manner stipulated, and make a report of their action. Such proceedings do not contemplate a hearing before the arbitrators, and the fact that there was no such hearing cannot affect the award.

We have carefully considered the entire recoid, and find that the award is fair and just, and the findings and decree of the trial court thereon, and upon the question of rentals, meet with our approval. The decree is therefore affirmed.

Affirmed. Rehearing Denied.