The first reason assigned why the complaint is alleged to be fatally defective is that the representations, made by defendant to the plaintiff concerning the financial conditions of the bank, are not alleged to have been in writing. It is not necessary to allege that a contract within the statute of frauds is in writing. That is a matter of evidence. Section 809, Or. L., relied on by the defendant, is to the effect that no evidence is admissible. The statute does not require that one, relying on a contract within the statute of frauds, must aver that it is in writing: Smith v. Jackson, 97 Or. 479 (192 Pac. 412). The plaintiff is relying on alleged false representations. Whether or not he has written evidence to support the allegation cannot be determined by demurrer.

It is next contended that the plaintiff should have alleged that he filed his claim with the superintendent of banks, the complaint having shown that the bank was declared insolvent by that officer and taken in charge by him on January 28, 1922. He also contends in this same connection that the complaint should have shown that the plaintiff had tendered to the defendant, prior to the commencement of this action, plaintiff’s claim against the bank. Neither of these contentions is sound. If the plaintiff sustained a loss by reason of the false representations of the defendant, he has a right to maintain an action for the purpose of recovering the amount so lost. The reasons above assigned by defendant in support of his *590 demurrer might be available in mitigation of damages, but are no part of plaintiff’s cause of action. The question of the possibility, or even probability, that tbe plaintiff might receive something thereafter from tbe liquidation of tbe bank is not tendered by general demurrer to the complaint. Tbe demurrer, however, admits tbe allegation in tbe complaint that said sum of $3,057.11 is a total loss to said plaintiff. In tbe face of that admission, tbe defendant cannot successfully contend on demurrer that plaintiff possibly or probably may receive something in tbe future from tbe defunct bank. Tbe office of tbe demurrer is to test tbe sufficiency of tbe complaint, not to try issues which may be joined by an answer.

Defendant contends that tbe complaint should have alleged that there were no assets of said bank in tbe bands of tbe superintendent o'f banks or that tbe receivership of said bank bad been closed anil its assets distributed among its depositors and stockholders. We do not believe these to have been necessary allegations in tbe complaint. This is an action for damages. Tbe reasons urged for sustaining the demurrer do not appear on tbe face of the complaint and are not available for that purpose.

This court bad under consideration recently a case involving tbe liability of tbe directors or officers of a bank for false representations resulting in loss to one relying thereon, where many authorities are collated: Coughlin v. State Bank, ante, p. 83 (243 Pac. 78).

Tbe law is well stated in 14A C. J. 181, Section 1959, in this language:

“Tbe directors or officers of a corporation are liable for their fraudulent acts and representations to persons who are injured thereby. They are no more immune for their false representations made with *591 intent to deceive, and which result in a loss to one who relied thereon, than any other individual. The facts that they are acting for the benefit of the corporation and that they did not personally receive the fruits of the transaction, or that the company is nominally the contracting party, does not relieve them from liability.” See, also, 14A C. J., § 1955; Hill v. Tualatin Academy, 61 Or. 190, 200 (121 Pac. 901).

The complaint contains all the elements of a good cause of action for false representations: Purdy v. Underwood, 68 Or. 56, 59, 60 (169 Pac. 536); McFarland v. Carlsbad San. Co., 68 Or. 530 (137 Pac. 209, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 555); Boord v. Kaylor, 100 Or. 366 (197 Pac. 296); Obermeier v. Mattison, 98 Or. 195 (192 Pac. 283, 193 Pac. 915).

It was not necessary for the plaintiff to allege in his complaint the condition of the bank at the time he filed the complaint. That would be a matter of defense or in mitigation of damages. Plaintiff’s action sounds in tort and any evidence tending to show that plaintiff has not suffered a loss or that tends to diminish any loss he may have suffered would' be pertinent. Such matters are not in issue on a general .demurrer.

Conceding for the purpose of this opinion that the defendant as president of the bank could not have lawfully paid plaintiff’s demand because to have done so would have given a preference in violation of Section 6221, that would not relieve him from liability for misrepresentations. He cannot hide behind a law intended to prevent dishonest banking. Violating that statute is no justification for other dishonorable practices resulting in injury to others. If the bank were not insolvent, plaintiff would not have suffered damage. Without damage he would have no cause of action.

*592 It is suggested that the complaint discloses that the alleged false representations did not damage plaintiff because his money was lost at the time they were made. Plaintiff had in the bank at that time $3,057.11. In order for plaintiff to have sustained the loss the bank must have been able to pay at the time plaintiff demanded his money, and the alleged false representations.were made. It is claimed that because the complaint alleges that the representations of the bank’s solvency were false, it follows that plaintiff’s demand could not have been complied with, and therefore no damage resulted to plaintiff. This matter is not submitted by demurrer. The bank was a going concern at the time. It was transacting business for about ten days thereafter. Prom the nature of its business it must have been receiving and paying out money. These facts appear from the complaint. The reasonable construction of the complaint is that it' could have paid plaintiff’s demand.

The language of the complaint with reference to that phase of the case is that the defendant as president stated that the bank

“was not insolvent, and was not in a failing condition, but that said bank was then and there solvent, was strong financially, and then and there had funds, in money of the United States of America, sufficient and adequate to meet any and all demands and obligations outstanding against said bank, and money sufficient and adequate to pay at any and all times any and all demands of any and all of the depositors of said bank, and particularly that said bank was possessed of sufficient moneys to pay this plaintiff the sum he had on deposit therein, to-wit, the sum of $3057.11.

“That the said J. W. Siemens then and there well and personally knew that the representations he had then and there made to the said Tim Brown, were *593 false, fraudulent and untrue, that is to say, * * defendant herein, then and there well and personally knew that the said First State & Savings Bank was then and there in truth and fact insolvent and in a failing condition, and could not meet its current obligations. ’ ’

It thus appears that the complaint does not allege the bank did not have sufficient funds to pay plaintiff’s demand. The inference logically to be drawn from the complaint is that it had. The action is not against the bank, but against its president personally for his individual wrong.

The complaint continues:

“That the said Tim Brown, plaintiff herein, then and there believed the statements and representations then and there made to him by the said J. W. Siemens, President of the said First State & Savings Bank; that said bank was solvent and in a prosperous and thriving condition, and that he, the said Tim Brown, then and there acted upon said false and fraudulent representations, and did, because of said representations refrain from withdrawing Ms money, to-wit: $3057.11, money of the United States of America, from said bank, and that because of the said statements and representations made to him by the said J. W. Siemens, left all of said funds with and on deposit in the said First State & Savings Bank.”

The plaintiff is not in as favorable condition as one who was induced to deposit money by false representations. His money was already deposited. If at the time the representations were made the bank could not have paid its debt to plaintiff, he was not damaged by the representations. But it appears from the complaint that for about ten days thereafter the bank was transacting business. The amount of his loss must be ascertained from evidence. Sufficient *594 allegations appear in the complaint to show some damage to plaintiff.

Plaintiff argues his right to maintain this action even if he has no written evidence of the alleged false representations. He bases his argument on a distinction in the meaning of the words “credit” and “solvency.” He reasons that the false representations are not alleged to have been made to obtain credit for the bank, but were made regarding the solvency of the bank. So far as this case is concerned there is no difference. The alleged purpose of the misrepresentations was to induce plaintiff to leave his money in the bank,—that is, to continue his credit to the bank. This was “a representation as to the credit,” or “character” of the bank: Section 809, Or. L.

In order for plaintiff to recover, it will be necessary for him to produce some evidence in writing of the alleged false representation in compliance with said Section 809. The case of Upton v. Vail, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 181 (5 Am. Dec. 210), relied upon by plaintiff, was decided before the enactment of Lord Tenterden’s Act. The other American cases cited by plaintiff are largely based on Upton v. Vail, above. The English cases cited by plaintiff were decided prior to the enactment of that statute which occurred in 1828. Since that date the courts of England have uniformly held that representations regarding the credit of a third person were not actionable without some written evidence, and that the statute ruled whether the action was based on contract or tort. The statute was enacted for the express purpose of preventing the courts from entertaining actions on the case in deceit in order to avoid the effect of the statute of frauds requiring written evidence in actions on an agreement *595 to answer for the debt of another. In order to avoid that provision of the statute, the practice had become common to prosecute actions for false representations, or deceit, instead of on a contract. After repeated suggestions from the courts, Parliament passed Lord Tenterden’s Act substantially as found in Section 809, Or. L. The history of the statute is given in Knight v. Rawlings; 205 Mo. 412 (104 S. W. 38, 12 Ann. Cas. 325, and note in p. 332, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 212). Other authorities examined are: 25 R. C. L. 445, § 15; 27 C. J. 168 et seq., §§ 71-77; Nevada Bank v. Portland Nat. Bank, 59 Fed. 338, 344.

It has been uniformly held that an officer’s representations about his corporation are within the statute: McKee v. Rudd, 222 Mo. 344 (121 S. W. 312, 133 Am. St. Rep. 529); Hunnewell v. Duxbury, 157 Mass. 1, 6 (31 N. E. 700); McKinney v. Whiting, 8 Allen (Mass.), 207, 208; 27 C. J. 173, §81. Having adopted that statute we have also adopted the construction thereof of the courts of last resort in the country of its original enactment.

Our statute differs from similar statutes in many states of the Union in this: Most statutes state “no action can be maintained” where our statute reads “no evidence is admissible.” It not appearing from the face of the complaint that the evidence of alleged false representation is not in writing, the presumption is that it, or some memorandum thereof, is. The demurrer should have been overruled. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

Reversed and Remanded.

Dissenting. It appears from the

complaint that at all the times mentioned therein the *596 defendant was president of the First State and Savings Bank of Klamath Falls, Oregon, in which, on January 28, 1922, and for a long time prior thereto, the plaintiff had on deposit $3,057.11. The pleading goes on to state in substance that about ten days prior to the date last mentioned the plaintiff demanded his money from the defendant but the latter falsely and fraudulently stated to the plaintiff that the bank was not insolvent and was not in a failing condition, but that it was then and there solvent, was strong financially, and then and there had funds sufficient and adequate to meet any and all demands and obligations outstanding against said bank, and particularly that said bank was possessed of sufficient moneys to.pay plaintiff the sum he had on deposit therein. It is said likewise that the plaintiff stated to the defendant his reasons for wishing to withdraw his money, to wit: That he had heard rumors that said bank was insolvent and in a failing and insolvent condition, whereupon the defendant urged him to leave his money in the bank. It is charged that the defendant knew his statements were false; “that is to say, the said J. W. Siemens, defendant herein, then and there well and personally knew that the said First State & Savings Bank was then and there in truth and fact insolvent and in a failing* condition, and could not meet its current obligations.”

The plaintiff avers that he believed the statements of the defendant and refrained from withdrawing his money, no part of which has ever been paid to him by anyone. A general demurrer to the complaint, on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, was sustained and as the result thereof the action was dismissed, whereupon the plaintiff has appealed.

*597 In accord with numerous precedents on this subject, Mr. Justice Bean, in Wheelwright v. Vanderbilt, 69 Or. 326, 328 (138 Pac. 857), wrote thus:

“To constitute actionable fraud it must appear: 1. That defendant made a material representation; 2. that it was false; 3. that when he made it he knew it was false, or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth, and as a positive assertion; 4. that he made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by plaintiff; 5. that plaintiff acted in reliance upon it; and 6. that he thereby suffered injury. Each of these facts must be proved with reasonable certainty, and all of them must be found to exist. The absence of any one of them is fatal to recovery.”

If the plaintiff could have got his money from the bank at the time the representations were made, then they were true and hence not fraudulent. For anything stated in the complaint their truth is not impeached by the fact that ten days afterwards the bank became insolvent and closed its doors. On the other hand, if, as stated in the complaint, the bank “was then and there in truth and fact insolvent and in a failing condition, and could not meet its current obligations,” the damage to the plaintiff had already happened, his money was lost and the statements imputed to the defendant could not and did not operate to enhance his damage or change his position for the worse.

The complaint fails to meet the sixth specification in the precedent laid down by Mr. Justice Bean. It does not show that the plaintiff suffered injury on account of anything said by the defendant. The judgment rendered on the demurrer was correct and should be affirmed.