dissenting.

I would grant the petition for review in this case. I am of the opinion that neither this court nor the legislature has the constitutional power to require an attorney to defend an indigent unless the attorney is reasonably compensated for his service. I shall not at this time set out the reasons which support this conclusion. See, however, the following references which lend support to my point of view. Johnson and Douglas v. Superior Court, 2 Ariz App 407, 409 P2d 566 (1966), (but see State v. Superior Court, 2 Ariz App 466, 409 P2d 750 (1966)); Hill v. Superior Court, 46 Cal2d 169, 293 P2d 10, 14 (1956) (dissenting opinion) ; People v. Randolph, 35 Ill2d 24, 219 NE2d 337 (1966), noted 16 DePaul L Rev 499 (1967); Knox County Council v. State ex rel McCormick, 217 Ind 493, 29 NE2d 405 (1940); Ferguson v. Pottawattamie County, 224 Iowa 516, 278 NW 223 (1938); State v. Rush, 46 NJ 399, 217 A2d 441 (1966); Dane County v. Smith, 13 Wis 585 (1861); Hunter, Slave Labor in the Courts — A Suggested Solution, 74 Case & Comment 3 *336 (1969); Allison & Hasset, Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, 41 Ana Jud Soc’y 100 (1957); Comment, Attorney and Client — Compensation of Indigent’s Counsel in Federal Post-Conviction Proceedings, 46 N Car L Rev 379 (1968); Note, 49 Cal L Rev 954 (1961); Note, 107 U Pa L Rev 812 (1959); see also Beaney, The Right to Counsel in American Courts 213-216 (1955), and Brownell, Legal Aid in the United States 136-138 (1951).