This is an appeal by a pro tempore judge of the District Court for Multnomah County from an order of the Multnomah County Circuit Court directing a peremptory writ of mandamus to issue to the district judge requiring him to reinstate a verdict of guilty and to enter judgment against the defendant in a criminal case in the district court.

The facts are not in dispute.

A criminal trial charging a defendant with driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor was held before the appellant judge in the district court. After the jury returned a verdict of guilty, the judge invited the defendant to move for a "judgment of acquittal.” The defendant did so, and the judge entered an order setting aside the verdict and entering a judgment of acquittal. At no time during the trial in the district court, either at the close of the state’s case or after all the evidence, had the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the state’s evidence.1 See ORS 136.445.

The district attorney filed mandamus proceedings in the circuit court to require the district judge to set aside the judgment of acquittal and to enter a judgment against the defendant based on the verdict of guilty.2 The circuit court accordingly entered a peremptory writ, and the judge appeals.

*856In effect, the action of the district court in setting aside the verdict of guilty and entering a judgment of acquittal was to enter a judgment n.o.v. See State v. Deets, - Iowa -, 195 NW2d 118 (1972). The specific issue before us is whether the district judge had the authority in a criminal case to enter such a judgment.

Preliminarily, we note that while judgments n.o.v. are available in civil cases, the only post-verdict motions authorized by statute in criminal cases are motions for a new trial and motions in arrest of judgment. ORS 136.535 provides that the same grounds for a new trial in civil cases will apply to criminal cases. However, a motion in arrest of judgment is restricted to challenging the jurisdiction of the grand jury or to alleging that the facts in the indictment do not state an offense. See ORS 136.500 and 135.630.3 Similarly, although both a motion for a new trial and a motion in arrest of judgment were available at common law, 1 Chitty’s Criminal Law 654-64 (1816), a motion for a judgment n.o.v. in a criminal case was unknown at common law. Ex parte United States, 101 F2d 870 (7th Cir), aff’d 308 US 519 (1939); Commonwealth v. Heller, 147 Pa Super 68, 24 A2d 460 (1942); State v. Mantia, 101 RI 367, 223 A2d 843 *857(1966). Therefore, neither under our statutes nor under common law is there any basis for the entry of a judgment n.o.v., or its equivalent, in a criminal case. Correspondingly, the trial court’s power in a case such as this one is restricted to the grant or denial of a new trial or an arrest of judgment upon proper motion. In the absence of such a motion, his authority is limited to the entry of a judgment on the guilty verdict. Therefore, we conclude that the appellant judge had no power or authority to enter a post-verdict judgment of acquittal under the circumstances of this case. State v. Deets, supra; People v. Superior Court of Butte Co., 240 Cal App 2d 90, 49 Cal Rptr 365 (1966); Commonwealth v. Heller, 147 Pa Super 68, 24 A2d 460 (1942). See also Annot., 131 ALR 187 (1941). But see State v. St. Clair, 21 Wash 2d 407, 151 P2d 181 (1944).

Under these circumstances, the district court’s action in entering a judgment of acquittal "was totally void and of no legal force or effect” because it was in excess of his authority. State v. Deets, supra. Consequently, we conclude that the circuit court properly entered the peremptory writ of mandamus ordering the appellant judge to set aside the judgment of acquittal and to enter a judgment against the defendant based on the jury’s verdict.4

Affirmed.

dissenting.

The majority opinion holds, in effect, that a trial judge in a criminal case does not have the inherent power to set aside a jury verdict of guilty if he is *858convinced that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict. I would hold that in such a situation a trial judge has not only the inherent authority but the duty to do so. Whether the defendant’s lawyer has the perspicacity to move for a judgment of acquittal because of the insufficiency of the evidence prior to submission to the jury or for a new trial after the return of the verdict should have no effect upon the trial judge’s ability to rectify what would appear to be a horrifying injustice. While I believe the trial judge has the inherent authority to set aside a conviction under such circumstances, I, also, do not believe that the legislature ever intended by its statutory scheme to bring about the bizarre result manifested by the majority opinion.