Plaintiff, a discharged employee of the defendant, filed a "complaint for specific performance” of a collective bargaining contract between defendant and the union representing its employees by granting plaintiff a hearing under the terms of that contract. The trial court, after a trial, dismissed plaintiff’s complaint. We affirm.

Plaintiff’s principal contentions on this appeal are that the trial court erred "in finding that the lawsuit was a suit for common law specific performance,” rather than a proceeding for enforcement of a contract providing for arbitration under ORS 33.210 and 33.2301 and "in finding that the grievances and appeal procedure of the parties did not fit the true definition of arbitration.”

In deciding these questions, it is first to be noted that plaintiff’s complaint was specifically designated as one for "specific performance” rather than as a "petition” under ORS 33.230, and that plaintiff did not, upon expiration of the statutory 10-day period, then proceed in the summary manner provided by that *258statute by promptly requesting an "order directing that the arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in the contract,” in accordance with the provisions of ORS 33.230. Instead, defendant filed an answer, with affirmative defenses, to which no reply was filed by plaintiff, and the case came on for trial many months later.

Wholly aside from these facts, however, it is clear that the contract which plaintiff seeks to enforce is not a contract for arbitration, so as to be enforceable under ORS 33.230. The contract provision upon which plaintiff relies provides as follows:

"ARTICLE XX - GRIEVANCES AND APPEAL PROCEDURE

5k * 5k *

"Section 5. In the event that an adverse personnel action is taken against an employe after he or she has completed a trial service period, he or she has the right of appeal to a three member Appeal Board. The Appeal Board will be composed of three members of the Association: (1) one member selected by the Association Board, (2) one member selected by the employe, (3) one member mutually agreed upon by the other two members.

"Section 6. The Appeal Board will hear testimony of the parties concerned and will make a decision to affirm or rescind the action of the Executive Secretary. This action of the Appeal Board shall be final and binding on the Association. ” (Emphasis added.)

It is elementary that an agreement by parties for the "arbitration” of a controversy necessarily involves an agreement to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and binding on both parties. See Elkouri and Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 1-2 (2d ed 1960). This is also implicit in the terms of ORS 33.210, in providing that "[a]ll persons desiring to settle by arbitration any controversy” may "submit their differences to the award * * * of any person or persons mutually selected” and also by the terms of ORS 33.310 in providing for entry of a judgment based upon such an arbitration award.

*259The contract provision in this case does not provide for an award that is final and binding on both parties. Instead, it provides that the "action of the Appeal Board shall be final and binding on the Association. ” Because the employee involved is not also bound by such "action,” but is free to seek any other available remedy, it follows that this contract provision is not an agreement for arbitration within the terms of ORS 33.210.2 It also follows that the trial court did not err in finding that this grievance and appeal procedure did not "fit” the "true definition of arbitration” and in refusing to consider plaintiff’s complaint as a proceeding under ORS 33.230 to enforce an agreement for arbitration.3

Plaintiff also contends that the court erred "in deciding procedural issues of estoppel, laches and waiver [pleaded as affirmative defenses] as these issues should be decided by the arbitrator” and also "in finding that plaintiff had waited an unreasonable length of time before requesting a hearing and that Defendant materially changed its position in reliance.”

In support of these contentions plaintiff cites cases holding that when a court is presented with a case involving a request for enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate, it cannot properly consider "procedural questions,” including the question whether a grievance has been barrred by laches.4

*260In this case, however, the sole basis upon which it is contended that this rule should apply is that this case is a proceeding to enforce an agreement to arbitrate. Because, as previously held, there was no agreement to arbitrate in this case, it follows that this contention must be rejected. It also follows that the trial court properly considered the defendant’s affirmative defenses, including that of laches.

As previously noted, plaintiff did not demur to these, affirmative defenses and filed no reply denying them, again relying upon the contention that this is a proceeding under ORS 33.220 to enforce an agreement to arbitrate, a contention which we have held to have no merit.

In addition, we find, upon examination of the record, among other things, that plaintiff was discharged on January 8, 1976; that he did not request "arbitration” of his discharge until April 16,1976; and that this request was denied as not timely filed. Meanwhile, plaintiff also filed a claim on January 14, 1976, for unemployment compensation, as well as a claim for severance pay. According to defendant’s witness, this was an indication that plaintiff desired to "totally sever himself from the organization” and did not intend to appeal his discharge. Also, in the meantime, defendant engaged another person to perform the duties previously performed by plaintiff.

Based upon this and other evidence in the record, the trial court found that "98 days is an unreasonable length of time for plaintiff to wait to request a hearing and that the defendant did change its position materially in reliánce upon plaintiff’s inaction.” We agree.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.