Defendant was indicted on separate counts of kidnapping, ORS 163.225, coercion, ORS 163.275, menacing, ORS 163.190, sexual abuse, ORS 163.425, five counts of sodomy, ORS 163.405, and illegal possession of a firearm, ORS 166.270, all arising "[a]s part of the same act and transaction” involving one victim during a period of about three hours. Upon his conviction of nine of these counts (one charge of sodomy having been withdrawn), the circuit court sentenced defendant to 20 years’ imprisonment on each count of sodomy and five years on the sexual abuse charge, these sentences to run concurrently, and in addition to consecutive terms of five years on the weapons charge, five years on coercion, 10 years on kidnapping, and on the menacing charge to 127 days in the county jail, the time defendant had already been jailed. Of the resulting total of 40 years, the judge also imposed one half as a minimum sentence. On appeal, defendant contended that certain of these counts should have been "merged” in the judgments of conviction and sentence.1 The Court of Appeals declined to consider this contention on the ground that it had not been adequately raised in the circuit court. 37 Or App 715, 588 P2d 100 (1978). We allowed review of this ruling.

Our precedents show that a defendant is not entitled as of right to a reversal on appeal of trial court errors that were not brought to the attention of the trial court, including a failure to "merge” offenses in entering a judgment of conviction and sentence. State v. Ragghianti, 260 Or 347, 490 P2d 490 (1971); State v. Kennedy, 250 Or 422, 443 P2d 226 (1968). Defendant argues that the Court of Appeals and this court may consider "egregious” error apparent on the face of the record even if not raised below, and that the imposition of an illegal sentence is such an "egregious” and evident error. We agree that lack of prior objection in *338the trial court does not place such claimed errors beyond appellate jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals has, in fact, often considered claims like the present that had not been argued to the trial court, as pointed out in Judge Buttler’s concurring opinion, 37 Or App at 720-721. But it does not follow that the Court of Appeals is obliged to decide every such claim.2 The question is not one of statutory authority but of judicial administration.

There is a practical as well as a legal difference between appellate review of a sentence challenged as "excessive” pursuant to the legislative command of ORS 138.040 and 138.050 and one challenged for lack of legal authority or procedural error. A trial court may well be more receptive to reconsideration of a sentence attacked on these legal grounds if they are brought to its attention than to an argument that the sentence is excessive. While postconviction relief in circuit court under ORS 138.530 is available for unauthorized or unconstitutional sentences even when raised there for the first time,3 the legislature has expressly assigned review for excessiveness to the Court of Appeals.

*339Accordingly, the Court of Appeals acted within a judicial discretion supported by our precedents when it held in this case and later in State v. Applegate, 39 Or App 17, 591 P2d 371, rev den, 287 Or 301 (1979), that henceforth it would review a challenge to multiple sentences arising from a single criminal episode for legality (as distinguished from excessiveness) only if the issue was first raised in the trial court, except in "exceptional circumstances . . ., especially when it presents a novel problem.” 39 Or App at 20. This court, of course, retains the power to review in any case. But although we hold that the Court of Appeals adopted a permissible policy in requiring that legal challenges to multiple sentences ordinarily must first be raised in trial courts, the question remains whether the issue in fact was adequately raised in this case.

We find that the issue was brought to the trial court’s attention. It was not a new issue discovered for the first time in preparing the appeal. At the sentencing hearing, court and counsel discussed the significance for the "merger” issue of the then recent decision of the Court of Appeals in State v. Cloutier, 33 Or App 121, 575 P2d 996 (1978), since reversed, 286 Or 579, 596 P2d 1278 (1979). Defense counsel characterized the course of defendant’s conduct as a continuous act rather than a series of independent acts punishable as separate offenses. The record indicates that the prosecutor had previously submitted a legal memorandum on the issue. Although the precise legal relationships among the several crimes charged were not spelled out at the sentencing hearing, there is no reason to believe *340that the court did not decide defendant’s claim adversely on the merits. We therefore reach the substance of his claim.

Defendant’s first contention on appeal was that the charge of sexual abuse should have been "merged” in the conviction for sodomy. We agree. In State v. Cloutier, supra, we stated that the term " 'merger’..., which can easily become a name for a conclusion rather than a reason, is best reserved for the narrow situation when the completion of one offense necessarily includes commission of acts sufficient to constitute violation of another statute.” 286 Or at 586. In the factual setting of this case, commission of sodomy in the first degree necessarily included commission of the offense of sexual abuse.4 It is, of course, possible to commit one of these offenses on one occasion and the other offense against the same victim on another occasion; but in this case the first sexual contact and at least one act of sodomy were not so separated in time, intervening events, or other circumstances as not to be consecutive steps in the sodomy.

Defendant’s second contention concerns the claimed "merger” of the kidnapping, menacing, and weapons *341charges. These do not present a true issue of merger. As far as the statutory definitions go, it is quite possible to commit each of these offenses without committing one of the other two.5 Apart from "merger,” however, the statutes do not necessarily authorize multiple sentences for the violation of one of these prohibitions in the act of violating another. As stated in State v. Cloutier, supra, multiple sentences often do not represent the contemplated result of the criminal code when one offense occurs as a step in the commission of another offense in the course of a single episode with a single criminal objective, as defined in ORS 131.505(4). 286 Or at 597. However, since the menacing charged against this defendant was not a step in kidnapping the victim, defendant’s objection on this score is not well taken.6 The same is true of the relation of these charges to the charge under ORS 166.270, illegal possession of a concealable weapon by *342one previously convicted of a felony. The evident legislative objective of that statute is to serve a preventive function, in advance of the actual use of the weapon to injure or threaten any victim, and it would contradict that function to "merge” this offense into such a subsequent crime. Cf. State v. Cloutier, supra, 286 Or at 597, n. 17. As stated in Cloutier, separate sentences that are not improper under the analysis of decisions such as State v. Fish, 282 Or 53, 577 P2d 500 (1978), State v. Roach, 271 Or 764, 534 P2d 508 (1975), Doran v. State, 270 Or 758, 529 P2d 928 (1974); State v. Welch, 264 Or 388, 505 P2d 910 (1973); and State v. Woolard, 259 Or 232, 484 P2d 314, 485 P2d 1194 (1971), are nonetheless subject to the strictures against excessive sentences in ORS 138.040 and ORS 138.050, particularly if made consecutive, see 286 Or at 592-594, but since no such contention was presented to the trial court or the Court of Appeals in this case, we do not pursue the question here. Except for the separate sentence under ORS 163.425, we find no error below. The case is remanded to the circuit court for entry of a corrected judgment on that issue; in all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

specially concurring.

I concur in the result reached by the majority in this case except for the reservations expressed in my dissenting opinion in State v. Cloutier, 286 Or 579, 604, 596 P2d 1278, 1291 (1979).