Stoner v. Conewago Valley School District
Opinion of the Court
This is a suit in assumpsit brought by two teacher employes against the school district for salary allegedly due and not paid according to appropriate salary schedules beginning with the school year 1965-66. Plaintiff Stoner claims $5,500 together with six percent compounded interest from June 30,1966. Plaintiff Swanger claims $6,000, together with six percent compounded interest from June 30,1966. The case was tried without a jury. Many of the essential facts were stipulated.
Stoner was employed by defendant as a temporary professional employe on September 5, 1961, and has remained in continuous employment with defendant since that date. Swanger was employed by defendant as a temporary professional employe on July 6, 1962, and has remained in continuous employment with defendant since that date. The suit was commenced February 21,1973.
Section 1142 of the Public School Code of March 10, 1949, P. L. 30, as amended, 24 PS §11-1142, sets forth the minimum salary “schedules” for professional employes of school districts. For the purpose of this suit, the amendments to the Act of 1949, as adopted June 1, 1956, P. L. 1955, December 9, 1965, P. L. 1057, and June 12, 1968, P. L. 192, are relevant and controlling. The amendment of 1956 prescribed a minimum starting salary of $3,600 with $200 annual service increments for the school year 1959-60 and thereafter. The amendment of 1965 provided a minimum salary of $4,500 beginning with the school
In that respect, the school district has offered excerpts from its minute book and the testimony of an administrative officer. The minutes of March 1, 1961, show that five teachers were hired at $3,800 per annum. The minutes of June 7, 1961, show that six teachers were hired at salaries ranging from $3,800 to $4,300 (including Mr. Stoner who was hired at a salary of $4,000). The administrative officer testified that $3,800 was the minimum salary when both employes were employed. From that evidence, the school district asks us to conclude that a salary schedule had been adopted by the school board in 1961 fixing minimum starting salary of $3,800. We hold that the evidence is inconclusive and insufficient to prove that the school board adopted a minimum salary schedule for the year in question. Therefore, we hold that Stoner was employed under the provisions of the State mandated minimum salary schedule then in effect, Act of 1956, supra.
Flowever, on February 7, 1962, a resolution was adopted by the school board providing that the pay for starting teachers would be $4,000 per year. Plaintiffs claim that this action on the part of the board is not equivalent to the adoption of a formal salary sched
Defendant urges that subsequent increments in salary for both plaintiffs must be based upon actual years of service in the school district. Plaintiffs contend that their increments are based upon the “step” at which the employe entered the salary schedule when they were employed initially. Thus, in 1961 the minimum state salary was $3,600. Stoner was hired at $4,000 or two increments above the minimum. He contends he was employed in step 3 of the salary schedule. Swanger’s initial contract called for a salary of $4,600. He was employed after the school board adopted a minimum initial salary of $4,000. The annual increments were $200 each under the Act of 1956, supra. Therefore, he would enter the salary schedule at step 4 on the date of his employment. (He contends, however, that the school board did not adopt a salary schedule and, therefore, he would enter at step 6.) A school administrator’s memorandum (no. 100, July 9, 1968) from the Superintendent of Public Instruction to all chief school administrators, offered as defendant’s exhibit, substantiates plaintiffs’ contention. It is said there that the “entering step” is the step on the school district’s salary schedule at which the employe agrees to enter the services of the school district. While we recognize that the memorandum specified that its con
In determining the minimum salary to which each teacher was entitled in subsequent years, we must refer to the “step attained” in those particular years. The school administrator’s memorandum previously referred to defines a “step attained” as the step on the school district’s schedule determined by years of service within the school district beyond the agreed-upon entering step. Thus, in the two cases now before us, each plaintiff is entitled to be paid a minimum salary on the basis of his initial step, plus his years of service in the school district. The school district did adopt a professional salary schedule for the school year 1967-68 and it negotiated salary contracts for the school years
Beginning in 1964, the school board adopted a salary adjustment schedule providing for a $100 increment for each five years of service and further providing for an increment of $100 for each ten credits earned beyond those required for permanent certification. Such increments are normally denominated as “incentive” payments. There would be little incentive to teachers to accrue either service or teaching credits if those items were to be used to determine whether the State mandated minimum salary had been met. We hold that such increments may not be applied by defendant as a credit to any sums they may owe plaintiffs under the State mandated salary schedules or under those adopted by the school district as interpreted herein.
With respect to the matter of interest, section 1155 of the Act of 1949, supra, 24 PS §11-1155, provides that where the salaries of employes of school districts are not paid when due, the district will be liable for interest at six percent per annum from the due date. We do not construe that statute as authorizing compound interest. Compound interest is permitted only when the parties have provided for it or a statute expressly authorizes it: Powell v. Allegheny Co. Retirement Bd., 431 Pa. 396 (1968). Since neither of the requisite conditions are present here, we will allow simple interest at six percent per annum.
In his trial brief, counsel for defendant requests the court to apply the doctrine of laches to the case now before us. Laches, of course, is an equitable defense not applicable to the law side of the court : Penna. Co. for Banking and Trusts v. Philadelphia, 167 Pa. Superior Ct. 637 (1950). We take no position on the question of whether or not the statute of limitations
VERDICT
And now, June 18, 1974, we find for plaintiffs and against defendant as follows:
1. Ronald K. Stoner v. Conewago Valley School District in the sum of $5,040.20, calculated in the following manner:
School Year Sum Due Interest Total
1965-66 $ 625 $ 300.00 $ 925.00
1966-67 600 252.00 852.00
1967-68 300 108.00 408.00
1968-69 600 180.00 780.00
1969-70 600 144.00 744.00
1970-71 600 108.00 708.00
1971-72 260 31.20 291.20
1972-73 200 12.00 212.00
1973-74 120 None 120.00
$3,905 $1,135.20 $5,040.20
2. William G. Swanger v. Conewago Valley School District in the sum of $4,026, calculated in the following manner:
School Year Sum Due Interest Total
1965-66 $ 400 $192.00 $ 592.00
1966-67 560 235.20 795.20
1967-68 600 216.00 816.00
1968-69 300 90.00 390.00
1969-70 300 72.00 372.00
1970-71 300 54.00 354.00
1971-72 300 36.00 336.00
1972-73 180 10.80 190.80
1973-74 180 None 180.00
$3,120 $906.00 $4,026.00
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.