In re Rubinovitz
Opinion of the Court
At the registration of electors in the fall of 1929, Israel Rubinovitz, of 813 Fifth Avenue, was registered in the First District of the Third Ward, City of Pittsburgh, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, as a qualified elector, and the record shows he voted at the fall primary and the general election of 1929, and at the spring primary of 1930. He was registered on presentation of a tax receipt issued by the County Treasurer of Allegheny County, dated August 20, 1929. If this tax receipt was a valid one, this elector would be entitled to register on it at the fall registration of 1930.
It is beyond all doubt that the tax receipt upon which Israel Rubinovitz was registered was illegally procured and was utterly void in his hands, and, therefore, he was not entitled to be registered as an elector qualified to vote on the strength of that tax receipt, which was procured from the county treasurer on what purported to be a written order from Israel Rubinovitz to Dome-nick Mastriano, authorizing him to obtain a tax receipt for Rubinovitz. This written order was a manifest forgery. While Rubinovitz appeared before the board of registration commissioners, no report of this testimony was furnished us, and he did not come into court to defend his rights, nor did his counsel offer any testimony in his behalf. There was testimony that it was not uncommon to issue tax receipts on such orders as that on which Rubinovitz’s receipt was issued, though presented by an entirely unknown person, and though he presented a number of such orders at one time and paid the amounts required. We may rightfully infer that Rubinovitz paid no money for his receipt, as required by law, and, as stated, we know positively he did not sign the written order which was used. We have no doubt the tax receipt was secured without consulting Rubinovitz at all.
Counsel for the registrant made no pretense that Rubinovitz was entitled to be registered, but did object to his name being stricken from the registers, because he asserted the court had no jurisdiction, since section one of the Act of June 18, 1915, P. L. 1027, provides that petitions for appeals from the board -of registration commissioners must be filed not less than ten days preceding an election, and counsel contends that' as the petition in this case was
Section one of article eight of the Constitution of Pennsylvania provides, among other things, that in order to qualify a citizen to vote, if he is twenty-two years ©f age and upwards, “He shall have paid within two years a state or county tax, which shall have been assessed at least two months and paid at least one month before the election.”
By an Act of Assembly of July 15, 1897, P. L. 276, it is declared to be unlawful “for any person or persons to pay, or cause to be paid, any occupation or poll tax assessed against any elector except on the written and signed order of such elector authorizing such payment to be made.” This act makes it unlawful for any person authorized to collect taxes to receive any occupation or poll tax from any person other than the elector himself, except upon his written and signed order authorizing such payment to be made, and also makes it unlawful for any person to vote, or attempt to vote, at any election upon a tax receipt obtained in violation of the act, and makes it a misdemeanor for any person to violate any of the provisions of this act.
In section eight of the Act of July 24, 1913, P. L. 977, it is enacted that “Every person who shall have paid his taxes, either by himself or his duly authorized agent or attorney, on or before the last day for registration, and who shall possess all the other qualifications of an elector as provided in the Constitution and laws of this Commonwealth, . . . shall be entitled to be registered at the Pall registration.”
In section one of the Act of June 18, 1915, P. L. 1027, it is enacted that, “If any citizen shall object to the action of the registrars in accepting or rejecting any claim for registration, he may file (with) his petition, duly sworn to by said citizen, with the commissioners, setting forth the ground of his complaint. . . . When such petitions are filed, the commissioners shall fix a time and place for hearing them, sufficiently in advance of the election to enable the same to be heard and disposed of prior thereto, and to have a review thereof by the courts. Such hearing shall be public before the commissioners, and the register of voters may be amended, either by the insertion of a new name or the cancellation of a name already on the register, or otherwise, as the commissioners may order. . . . The applicant, or any elector who is not satisfied with the decision of the commissioners, may petition the court of common pleas, setting forth the reason why he feels that injustice has been done, and thereupon the said court of common pleas may, in its discretion, allow an appeal to it from the decision of the commissioners. The said court may then fix a day for a public hearing. . . . The said court, after such public hearing, may reverse, affirm or alter the decision of the commissioners. Such petitions for appeals must be filed not later than ten days preceding an election.”
In Com. v. Shrontz, 213 Pa. 327, it was held that in a judicial inquiry into an elector’s right to vote, the court may go behind the tax receipt and ascertain the actual facts.
While the board of registration commissioners was not represented at the hearing of this case, we are informally advised the reason they refused to strike off the registration of Israel Rubinovitz was that they were not sure they had any right to go behind the record of the face of the tax receipt on
While it is true the proceedings here are statutory and that the statute must be strictly followed, we are satisfied the provision of the statutes herein-before quoted, that a petition must be filed ten days before an election, does not forbid the consideration of this matter now, because the petition for the appeal was not filed ten days before the primary election. There was no effort to deprive the registrant of his vote at the primary election on May 20, 1930, and the court granted the appeal and set a date for a hearing after the date of the primary election. It is true there will be a new registration of electors before the election next November, but it is provided in section one of the Act of May 28,1915, P. L. 576, that “The list shall become of no validity at the beginning of the period of Fall registration next succeeding that at which the registers were opened,” from which it appears that the registration of Israel Rubinovitz is still a valid registration which would entitle him to vote should a special election be held before the beginning of the period of registration this fall, and, as above stated, the tax receipt issued to Rubinovitz would entitle him to register at the fall registration this year if it were a valid tax receipt. The question is not, therefore, a moot one, and should be determined now. We will, therefore, enter a decree reversing the order of the board of registration commissioners dismissing the objection of the petitioner to the registration of Israel Rubinoviz, and ordering that the name of Israel Rubinovitz on the registers of the First District of the Third Ward of the City of Pittsburgh, as a registered elector, shall be canceled and stricken from the registers.
Decree.
And now, to wit, June 25, 1930, upon consideration of the petition, the testimony taken and arguments of counsel, it is ordered and decreed that the decision of the Board of Registration Commissioners of Pittsburgh, Allegheny County, made on May 12, 1930, dismissing the objection of petitioner to the registration of Israel Rubinovitz as an elector qualified to vote, is hereby reversed, and said board of registration commissioners are directed to strike the name of said Israel Rubinovitz from the registers of the First District of the Third Ward of the City of Pittsburgh, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, as a qualified elector of the City of Pittsburgh.
From William J. Aiken, Pittsburgh, Pa.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.