Truck Trailer Leasing Co. v. Sentle Trucking Corp.
Opinion of the Court
This trespass action instituted in the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny County arises out of an accident in Chippewa Township, Beaver County, involving a vehicle owned by plaintiff and a vehicle owned by the corporate defendant and operated by the individual defendant. Defendants filed a complaint to join the operator of plaintiffs vehicle and the township in which the accident occurred as third party defendants. Their claim against the township is based upon allegations that the accident was caused by a township police officer’s negligent direction of traffic.
The township has filed preliminary objections in which it contends that there is no venue as to the township in Allegheny County and that the township is immune from liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act of November 26,1978, P.L. 1399, 53 P.S. §5311.101 et seq.
However, the Rules of Civil Procedure govern only to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. See section 801 of this act which provides that: “The laws of the Commonwealth and the rules of civil procedure as promulgated and adopted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania insofar as applicable and not inconsistent herewith shall apply to and govern actions under this act.” The township believes that the venue provisions of the rules permitting a political subdivision to be sued outside the county in which it is located, if there is venue against any other defendant, are inconsistent with section 502 of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act which reads as follows:
“Venue shall he in the judicial district in which the cause of action accrued or where the political subdivision is located, except where such political subdivision is located in more than one judicial district, the action shall be brought in the judicial district where the cause of action accrued or in the judicial district in which the principal office or place of business of such political subdivision is located.”
Defendants contend that by stating that “venue shall he” in the county in which the cause of action accrued or where the political subdivision is located without also stating that the action may be commenced only in such judicial district, section 502 is permissive and not restrictive and, therefore, operates only to expand the venue provisions of Pa.R.C.P. 2103(b). This reading of section 502 as
Even if section 502 is restrictive, defendants argue that it does not bar the joinder of a political subdivision as an additional defendant where venue between the original parties to the law suit is already laid.
Defendants rely on Ward v. Tinicum Township, 2 D. & C. 3d 790 (1977), which allowed a political subdivision to be sued in a judicial district in which it was not located because venue was properly laid, against another defendant. Through Pa.R.C.P. 1006(c) and 2254(a), the Rules of Civil Procedure have created exceptions to Pa.R.C.P. 2103(b) in order to promote the judicial policies of protecting the venue choice of a plaintiff and of encouraging third party joinders to dispose of all issues arising out of the same transaction in the same litigation. However, since the legislature stated in section 801 of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act that it did not intend to defer to conflicting judicial policies expressed in the Rules of Civil Procedure,
Pa.R.C.P. 1006(e) provides that if preliminary objections to venue are sustained and there is a county of proper venue within the state, the action shall be transferred to the appropriate court of that county. This rule was obviously designed to benefit a plaintiff who mistakenly brought an action in a county in which there was no venue. To extend Pa.R.C.P. 1006(e) to cover the present case will deny a plaintiff who has chosen a county in which venue lies the fight to bring his or her action in this county. But to not extend the rule will defeat the policies of Pa.R.C.P. 2252 et seq. of resolving all issues in one action. Because the right to select venue is not absolute — see Pa.R.C.P. 1006(d) — we resolve the conflict between the rules in favor of the policies behind third party joinder in this case in which joinder can be effected by a transfer to an adjoining county where plaintiff can easily prosecute its action. See, generally, United States Cold Storage Corporation v. Philadelphia, 431 Pa. 411, 246 A. 2d 386 (1968).
Because this action shall be transferred to Beaver County and because the township’s remaining preliminary objection goes to the merits of the claim, this court shall reserve for the Beaver County Common Pleas Court defendants’ remaining preliminary objection.
ORDER
On this May 23, 1980, it is hereby ordered that (1) the preliminary objections of Chippewa Township raising a question of venue are sustained,
. The township has withdrawn its preliminary objections complaining of its joinder more than 60 days after service of plaintiff’s initial pleadings on the original defendants without obtaining leave of court as required by Pa.R.C.P. 2253.
. Because both plaintiff and the corporate defendant have places of business within Allegheny County, venue is properly laid between plaintiff and the original defendants. See Pa.R.C.P. 2179(a)(1), 1006(c).
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.