Opinion by

The plaintiff’s claim grows out of the alleged failure of the *342defendant, a carrier, to perform its duty in the transportation and delivery of goods shipped over its railroad. The evidence shows, without contradiction, that the goods were shipped by the plaintiff, in good condition, at Bethlehem, Pa., addressed to Samuel R. Riley, Strafford, Pa.; one shipment, consisting of “jack-rafters” and moldings, having been.made in October, 1893, and another, of doors and moldings, in February, 1894. When received by the consignee, a large number of the jack-rafters were broken or otherwise injured, and the doors were entirely spoiled by exposure to the rain.

The defense,- as set forth in the points submitted by the defendant on trial, was “ that Strafford was at the time a prepaid station at which there was no freight station, and that it was the custom of the company not to give notice to the consignee of the arrival of goods; ” that by the terms of the bills of lading, or shipping receipts, “ the shipment at the station was at the risk of the shipper from the time of delivery at the point of consignment,” that “ it was the duty of the consignee to be on the lookout for his property and ready to receive it on its arrival at the point of destination; ” and that the damage to the goods was due to the consignee’s neglect to be at the station on their arrival, to receive and protect them from injury.

Altogether, ten shipments appear to have been made by the plaintiff to the consignee. As to eight of these, in which the goods were uninjured, it does not appear whether notice of their arrival was given to the consignee, or whether the latter was at the station to receive them. As to the damaged goods, no notice appears to have been given; but the consignee’s superintendent, on the first occasion, and his foreman, on the last, arrived at the station and saw the goods, a short time after they were unloaded. The damage, however, had already been done.

The injury to the jack-rafters appears to have happened in the course of transportation, or in unloading. There is no evidence that it was due to the cpnsignee’s failure to be at the station to receive them, or that the injury happened after they were unloaded. The only testimony on this subject is that the consignee’s superintendent found them unloaded, many of them in a damaged condition, partly on the station platform and partly on the ground. The carrier gave no explanation of the injury, and offered no testimony as to their condition when *343unloaded. Hence, even if its liability was limited by tbe custom alleged, or by the terms of the shipping receipt, the presumption of its negligence follows of course: Express Co. v. Sands, 55 Pa. 140. ’ As to this shipment, the question of the carrier’s duty to give notice to the consignee does not' arise, since there is no evidence that the injury was due to the want of such notice.

The carrier’s liability on the shipment of February, 1894, remains to be considered. In relation to this, the question is ■whether, if the carrier was required by law to give notice to the consignee, it was relieved of this duty by reason of the custom alleged, and whether, under the stipulations of the shipping receipt, it discharged its whole duty by the delivery which it made.

First, as to the custom alleged. The rule in this state as to relief from the carrier’s liability at common law, by special custom or usage, is thus stated in McMasters v. R. R. Co., 69 Pa. 874: “ In all cases where this is relied on, the custom or usage must be clearly proved, and that the employer knew it, or is presumed to know it by reason of its generality in the neighborhood.” The only testimony as to the alleged custom, and a general knowledge of it, in the present case, was that of Howell, the carrier’s freight claim agent and of McFadden, its freight conductor. The testimony of Howell is as follows:

“ Q. Was or was not the custom, and had it been the custom of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company to give notice to the consignees of the arrival of freight at such stations as this? A. It was not the custom. It never is done. Q. Is- that a general custom? A. So far as my knowledge goes it is- a- universal custom with all the railroads in the country not to give notice of the arrival of freight at prepaid stations. Q. That is not only to this defendant, but to all other railroad companies, is it not ? A. I believe it to be a general rule.”

The testimony of McFadden is as follows:

“ Q. On other occasions has anybody been at the station representing Mr. Riley to receive the freight ? A. Yes, sir. There are parties there every morning receiving freight waiting for us to unload it. Q. You are positive in these other shipments shown in these waybills there were representatives there of Mr. Riley to whom you delivered the freight? A. Yes, sir. *344Q. Anybody with wagons? A. Nobody there at all on this morning. Q. On the other mornings was there somebody there to haul that away? A. Not these shipments of lumber there was not. But there is a grocery store there; the party is ther§ every morning to receive his freight when we come there. That is about the only party who would come to receive the freight would be waiting for us. Q. You say a party came to receive the freight; who was it ? A. Some grocer that receives freight there. Q. Who came from Mr. Riley that you know to get his freight? A. I never saw anybody there. Q. Do you mean on any other occasion or on this occasion alone ? A. None at all.”

Thus the testimony of Howell is altogether indefinite as to the extent of his knowledge on the subject, and he is silent as to general knowledge of the alleged custom at Strafford. McFadden says nothing of a custom, .and the only part of his testimony indicating any knowledge of the alleged custom at Strafford is his statement that a grocer at that point “ was about the only party who would come to receive the freight, would be waiting for us.”

This testimony falls far short of establishing the requisites of a custom by which a common law liability may be modified. There is by no means the clear proof of the custom or usage, and of the consignee’s knowledge of it, or the presumption of his knowledge “ by reason of its generality in the neighborhood where it is claimed to exist,” which were declared essential in McMasters v. R. R. Co., 69 Pa. 374. The utmost effect that can be given to it is as showing that the railroad company has a rule, for the government of its freight conductors and agents, prescribing the method of disposing of freight at “ prepaid stations,” wholly irrespective of acquiescence, or even knowledge of the rule, on the part of the consignees, or of the community generally at those stations. Under this rule, moreover, the conductor, as he testified, would not have unloaded the freight in the present case had it been raining when his train reached the station. Thus the rule recognizes a duty to protect the freight at such stations, without requiring the consignee to look after it on its arrival. So far therefore, as the defense rests on a custom, it lacks the requisite foundation of proof, and, indeed, is not adequately stated in the point submitted.

*345Next, as to the stipulation limiting the carrier’s liability.

The thirteenth clause of the conditions indorsed on the shipping receipt stipulates that “When merchandise is destined to or from the several ‘ way stations ’ and platforms, where station buildings have not been established hy the carrier, or where there are no regularly appointed freight agents, it shall be at the risk of the owner until loaded into the cars and when unloaded therefrom.”

In considering the effect that should be given to a custom or to a stipulation in a bill of lading or shipping receipt, in limitation of the carrier’s common law liability, we must take into account the situation of the parties. This is very forcibly presented by Mr. Justice Williams, in Willock v. R. R. Co., 166 Pa. 184, viz: “The carrier and the shipper do not stand on equal terms. The latter cannot afford to refuse that which the carrier demands as a condition to the transportation of his goods, and, in ninety-nine cases out of every hundred, if he does so refuse he will find himself discriminated against until his business is ruined and he has nothing left to ship. The rule that stipulations, insisted on by carriers or other persons who stand in such a position toward their customers as enables them to compel a compliance with their demands or destroy their customer’s business, should be judged of by their fairness, and held to be void whenever they are unreasonable or oppressive, is one of very large acceptance. Public policy compels its acceptance in all civilized countries.”

This principle applies alike to a custom and to a stipulation, for, when demanded, as a condition to transportation, acquiescence cannot he refused in the one more than in the other. Transportation is an absolute necessity of business, with respect to which, in a large measure, the shipper has practically no freedom of choice, while the carrier may dictate terms unless restrained by legal obligation, competition, or enlightened self-interest. We cannot leave out of view the power and too often the disposition of the carrier, unless so restricted, to establish and enforce, with arbitrary hand, an unreasonable and oppressive practice in avoidance of his common law liability, declare it a custom, and demand acquiescence in it as such; or to limit his liability by conditions in a shipping receipt, reducing his obligations to a minimum, and imposed on the shipper nolens *346volens. The contract, so called, implied from such conditions, is practically a dictation of terms by the carrier, to be declined by the shipper at his peril, and affording him only a choice of evils. Whether the shipper may refuse acquiescence, and demand transportation of Ms goods under the common law obligation of the carrier, we need not now decide, since, in the present case, the shipper accepted the receipt tendered, and gave it in evidence to prove delivery of the goods to the carrier. The question before us is to what extent the liability of the carrier is limited by the custom and the condition here set up as a defense.

Public policy forbids that any stipulation or condition shall release the carrier from liability for negligence: Willock v. R. R. Co., 166 Pa. 184. Even a provision fixing the value of the property, or limiting the amount to be recovered, will not relieve the carrier if the loss or injury be due to his negligence: Grogan v. Express Co., 114 Pa. 528; Weiller v. R. R. Co., 134 Pa. 310. The reasons for denying effect to such a stipulation or condition apply with equal force to a custom limiting in like manner the carrier’s obligations. One of the first requisites of a custom in derogation of the common law is that it be not unreasonable. The policy of the stipulation and the reasonableness of the custom under consideration are to be tested by the same standard. If a stipulation or a condition be against public policy, assuredly a custom to the same effect must be pronounced unreasonable. Neither contract nor custom, therefore, can relieve a carrier from liability for negligence.

When goods have been carried to the place of destination, liability as carrier ceases, and the less onerous liability of a warehouseman is substituted: McCarty v. R. R. Co., 30 Pa. 247; Shenk v. Propeller Co., 60 Pa. 109. This liability is only for negligence: Ibid. We have therefore to consider whether the injury to the doors shipped by the plaintiff in February, 1894, was due to the carrier’s negligeuce in the manner of keeping them after they had reached their destination. We need not here define the precise degree of care demanded in cases of this nature; it is sufficient for the present purpose to hold the carrier, as a warehouseman, to the lowest degree which the law will tolerate in a bailee. Its liability is at least that of a depositary, and this is liability for the want of ordinary care: Bank *347v. Smith, 62 Pa. 47. Such care depends largely on the nature and value of the property; a degree of care which seems to have been required for the preservation of the shipment in this case would be unnecessary in a shipment of pig iron.

Strafford was among the “ way stations ” mentioned in the condition indorsed on the shipping receipt, without station buildings or freight agent. The only convenience for receiving freight was a small platform. The carrier neither provided shelter for the goods nor took other steps to protect them from the weather. The plaintiff’s witnesses testified that it had been raining for some time when the doors were unloaded, while the defendant’s freight conductor testified that the rain did not begin until about an hour after the unloading; and this is the only contradiction in the testimony. It is not denied that the doors were ruined by the rain, and the plaintiff’s foreman testified that the ruin was complete upon his first knowledge that they were at the station.

Had the carrier taken any measure for the protection of the goods at their place of destination, the question of its sufficiency, under the circumstances, would have arisen. But it did nothing whatever; there was an absolute want of care in any degree. For a carrier to discharge freight without any attempt at making reasonable provision for its protection from dangers which, in the ordinary course of affairs, may naturally be apprehended, must be regarded as not only negligence but gross negligence. If a carrier may do this at one station, he may with equal right do it at all stations, and thus be relieved from his obligation as a warehouseman throughout his entire route, for it is impossible to fix the point between a crossroad station and a large city at which this obligation is to begin or end. He may even dispense with a platform on which to unload freight, and “just chuck it off,” as one of the defendant’s agents testified was sometimes done. The carrier’s duty at a station is not to be measured by the quantity of freight received; as to this, no line can be drawn fixing the point at Avhich the duty of ordinary care begins. This duty is not discharged at any station, by dropping freight at the side of the road, whether on an open platform or in mud or snow, to remain exposed to the elements, to injury from other sources, or to theft, until the OAvner learns , of its arrival and removes it. To give to such a practice *348tlie legal sanction of a custom, or to enforce a stipulation pei’mitting it, would be to place the public at the mercy of the carrier. In this case, the defendant’s freight conductor testified: “If it had been storming when I came to Strafford I would not have unloaded those doors.” But between unloading freight in a storm, and leaving it, after unloading, where a storm may ruin it before the owner can take care of it, the difference in negligence is only one of degree. Upon the principle laid down in Willock v. R. R. Co., supra, that “stipulations, insisted on by carriers or other persons who stand in such a position toward their customers as enables them to compel a compliance with their demands or destroy their customer’s business, should be judged of by their fairness, and held to be void whenever they are unreasonable or oppressive,” the stipulation in the shipping receipt must be pronounced void, so far as it is urged in justification of the practice pursued by the carrier at the point of destination. In this aspect, it is in the highest degree unfair, unreasonable, and oppressive. What effect might justly be given to such a stipulation, expressly made by a shipper not coerced by his business situation or necessities, but with actual freedom of choice, and for a consideration, we need not now consider.

In this view of the case, it is not material whether or not the carrier is by law required to give the consignee notice of the arrival of freight. Neither freedom from such obligation, nor its performance, can relieve the carrier from the duty of ordinary care at the place of destination. If notice is unnecessary, the need of care is all the greater. A failure on this point is negligence, from the consequences of which neither notice, custom nor stipulation can relieve the carrier. Therefore the language of the trial judge in relation to the duty of giving notice did the defendant no harm.

We do not regard this view of the questions involved as conflicting in any manner with the point actually decided in McMasters v. R. R. Co., 69 Pa. 374. In that case, no question of negligence on the part of the carrier was raised, suggested or considered, except such as might be implied from a failure to deliver the goods. The case turned solely on the question of actual delivery at the station; the defendant contending that *349the goods had been delivered there, while this was denied by the plaintiff.

The specifications of error are overruled, and the judgment is affirmed.

Dissenting opinion by

January 18, 1897:

Established precedent founded in reason and upon authority which I regard as binding compels me to dissent from the conclusion reached by the majority of the court in this case. Recovery was had in the court below upon one or both of two distinct grounds: First. That the defendant, a common carrier by rail, unloaded from its cars upon its platform the merchandise of the plaintiff, carried by it, in such a negligent way as to destroy its value for the purposes for which it was intended, the negligence consisting as to one consignment in the breakage of a part of the merchandise and in another consignment in the unloading of doors and other material intended for the inside work of a house, in the midst of a rain storm, in consequence of which the material was rendered practically worthless. As to this point there was contradictory testimony, it being contended, on the one hand, so far as the last and principal consignment is concerned, that the storm had not begun, when the goods were unloaded, and on the other hand, that it was raging at the time the train arrived at the station and the goods were unloaded. The question involved in this part of the case was we think fairly submitted to the jury, and, in view of the contradictory character of the testimony, the answers of the trial judge to the defendant’s fourth and fifth points, as contained in the 7th and 8th assignments of error, I agree must be sustained and these assignments overruled. Whether, however, the verdict was based upon the finding of the jury as to this particular fact or as to another question which arose in the case, it is impossible to determine, and I am, therefore, compelled to consider at length a second question which legitimately grows out of the facts in the case and concerning which the trial judge in the court below made a distinct and positive ruling which has been assigned as error. It is a question concerning which there has been great contrariety of opinion and decision in the courts of last resort of the several states, and upon which our text writers upon the subject are almost equally divided. The question, as it is raised *350in this case, is capable of subdivision into three distinct propositions, and first, the general proposition: Is a common carrier by-rail bound to notify a consignee of the arrival of goods at the carrier’s station? Second: If there be such a duty on the part of the carrier, can it be modified or avoided by a stipulation in its bill of lading ? And Third: Can the carrier set up a general custom or a particular custom as to a special class of stations, at which there was no warehouse and no freight or station agents, which will relieve him of the duty of giving notice of the arrival of goods to the consignee ? These three questions practically coyer all the remaining alleged errors, as contained in the appellant’s first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth assignments. They will be considered in th e order above named:

First, as to the general proposition. As already intimated, theré is a very wide divergence of view on the part of our courts of last resort, both in England and in tins country, but with this divergence, so far as the consideration of the case under review is concerned, it is not necessary to occupy space in discussion, except to say that, so far as Pennsylvania is concerned, no case has arisen which required a distinct ruling on the subject. The different views as to the question, however, are presented in dicta of Mr. Justice Sharswood in Shenk v. Philadelphia Steam Propeller Co., 60 Pa. 109 (1869), and Mr. Justice Read in Tanner v. Oil Creek R. R., 53 Pa. 411 (1866).

Admitting, however, that the law is not clearly settled in Pennsylvania, can a shipper by express stipulation waive the right to notice and discharge the common carrier from liability as such, when the goods are delivered upon the platform of the carrier at a station where there is no warehouse and where he cannot in the nature of things undertake the duties of warehouseman ? If, for the convenience of a consignee, a common carrier by rail agrees to deliver at a road crossing upon a private turnout or a private platform any goods which may be forwarded at any time to the said consignee, in consideration of a release at and after the time of such delivery of all liability as a common carrier, it can hardly be doubted that such an agreement would be held to be binding. This would be equally true, if a dozen neighbors in the vicinity of the crossing united in asking that their goods should be so delivered. "Why is it not equally true, if the common carrier, for the benefit of a *351small community where the business does not justify the erection of a warehouse and the employment of a station agent, erects for the convenience of people in the neighborhood a platform, with the general understanding as to all who will have freight addressed to that station that the duties of the carrier cease as such, when the goods are delivered upon the platform? And, if this proposition be true, why may not a consignor, with the knowledge that a station is what is called a “prepaid” station, ship goods to that point, stipulating that the duties of the common carrier shall cease as such, when delivery is made upon the platform of such a station ? If this proposition be tenable, we cannot see why the 5th condition in the bill of lading of the Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, of October 7, 1893, and the 13th condition of the bill of lading of the Easton & Amboy Railroad Company of February 22, 1894, shall not be binding upon the consignor. They constitute the contract between shipper and carrier. Such a contract does not contravene established law. It is not contrary to public policy. It is the subject of agreement. It does not release the carrier from negligence or from any liability as a common carrier. It is simply an agreement to terminate the relation existing between the consignor and the carrier upon the delivery of the goods carried, upon the platform of the carrier at the place of final destination. It is perhaps fair to say that there is no express waiver of notice to consignee either in the 5th paragraph of the bill of lading of the Central Railroad Company óf New Jersey, or in that of the Easton & Amboy Railroad Company of February 22,1894. In the latter, under which the main consignment for which recovery was had was shipped, there occurs this clause : “ Except that, when merchandise is destined to or from the several way stations and platforms where station buildings have not been established by the carrier, or Avhere there are no regularly appointed freight agents, it shall be at the risk of the owner, until loaded into the cars and when unloaded therefrom.” The court below having correctly charged the jury that the defendant was entitled to the benefit of the contract made by the consignor with the connecting railroads, upon which the goods had been shipped, this stipulation must, of course, be held as inuring to the benefit of the defendant. I am of opinion, therefore, that the court below should have affirmed the defendant’s first point in toto, *352so far at least as the consignment last above referred to was concerned.

As to the third proposition, assuming that there is no general rule of law which forbids, why was it not competent for the defendant in the court below to show a general custom known and understood in the community and known by the consignee of the goods carried, that the consignees of goods delivered at Strafford station were expected to remove the same upon their arrival without notice? And, if shown, why should the jury not have been instructed that, if they found that as a fact, the plaintiff could not recover on the ground of lack of notice ? As I understand McMasters v. Penna. R. R., 69 Pa. 374, this question was therein expressly decided. Chief Justice Thompson, after describing the station at Turtle Creek and the particular circumstances attending the shipanent and delivery of the barrel of sugar which was involved in the case, says : “ The .defendants had no warehouse at that place and gave no notice to the consignee that the sugar had been delivered at that place, but insisted that it was the custom for consignees to be present themselves, or by somebody for them, to receive goods shipped for them by rail to that place. This custom was testified to by the plaintiff himself and also by the conductor of the local freight train and the proof was not at all controverted. Was this uneontroverted custom sufficient excuse for the want of warehousing and of notice to the consignee by defendants? The learned judge thought it was, and so instructed the jury, and there was a verdict for the defendants. In other words he held a delivery on the platform a good delivery, under the custom. That a custom or usage will control the general law of liability of carriers is shown by many cases. I will quote briefly from a few of the decisions to that effect, as also from some of our most reliable text writers.” Then follow quotations from Redfield on Railways, Angelí on Carriers and numerous cases decided in the courts of other states, closing with this language by'Chief Justice Thompson : “This is a clear recognition of the power of custom to regulate the liability of common carriers, and I need not further multiply cases to prove a matter so consonant to reason as this. The cases cited by the plaintiff in error are good law but relate to adjudications on the law of carriers without any reference to the question here,

*353namely, how far it is within the usage and course of business to modify the duties and liabilities of common carriers ? But in all cases where this is relied upon by the carrier the custom or usage must be clearly proved, and that the employer knew it or is presumed to know it by reason of its generality in the neighborhood where it is claimed to exist.” In view of the general character of this decision and the reasoning upon which it is founded, I am led to the irresistible conclusion that the trial judge in the court below was in error, both in the general charge and in the answer to defendant’s second and third points, when he laid down the general proposition that a common carrier is bound under all circumstances, to give notice to the consignee of the arrival of goods, and particularly in the answer to the defendant’s third point, which point and the answer thereto are as follows : “‘It appears from the evidence that Strafford was at the time a prepaid station at which there was no freight station, and that it was the custom of the company not to give notice to the consignee of the arrival of goods.’ If that was-the custom, it was a very had custom indeed and one which was contrary to law and the sooner it is abolished the better, because it is the plain duty of every carrier, when goods reach their final destination, to give notice to the consignee of their arrival. Whether they were in the habit of doing so at once made no difference as regards the rights of the party whose property has been injured by their negligence.” Mr. Angelí, in ins treatise on the law of carriers, lays down the general proposition, in section 315, as cited by the appellee, that “ The carrier is, of course, bound to continue his care of the goods, until a knowledge of the notice is brought home to the owner or consignee; ” but in the next section (316), he says, “ But the carrier may be permitted to prove that the uniform usage and course of business in which he is engaged is to leave the goods at his usual stopping place in the town to which they are directed, without notice; and if such usage has been of so long continuance as to justify a jury to find that it was known to the employer, the carrier will be' discharged.”

As to the general proposition herein referred to, I do not think it necessary in this case to decide whether or not a common carrier by rail is bound under the law, ás it is held in Pennsylvania, to notify a consignee of the arrival of goods at the carrier’s sta*354tion, but I would hold that, even if there be such a duty generally, it can be modified or avoided by an express stipulation in the bill of lading, the acceptance of which will be a practical waiver by the consignor, and that the carrier can set up a general custom.or a particular custom as to a special class of stations at which there was no warehouse and no freight or station agent which will, if the evidence justify such a finding by a jury, relieve him of the duty of giving notice of the arrival of goods to the consignee, and I would base this decision expressly upon the case of McMasters v. The Pennsylvania Railroad, supra, from which I am unable to distinguish the present case, so far as the effect of an established custom in relieving the carrier from the necessity of notice of the arrival of goods to the consignee is concerned.