The plaintiff’s action was based on the allegation that being the tenant of a farm belonging to the defendant, Anna M. Kentz, under a lease in writing from the latter, he was forcibly and unlawfully ejected from the premises *18 within the period of his term as a result of which he lost the privilege of occupying and cultivating the farm subject to the conditions of the lease. It is a conceded fact in the case that the plaintiff was a tenant of his father, Thomas C. Kent, under a written agreement for a term of five years, ending April 1,1919. The lessor died April 5,1918, having by his last will devised the farm to Anna M. Kentz, one of the defendants, for life. The plaintiff alleged that prior to the death of his father he had a verbal agreement with him for some changes in the lease, and that about a year after his father’s death, he went to the defendant, Anna M. Kentz, with a copy of the lease and stated to her what alterations had been agreed upon between him, the plaintiff, and his father; that thereupon the said defendant consented to the alterations and erased on the plaintiff’s copy of the lease the parts of the contract which were to be eliminated as agreed upon by the father and the plaintiff, and at the bottom of the amended lease the said Anna M. Kentz added the following words: “What change is made on this article is made by Anna M. Kentz. Leo and family are to remain on the farm as long as I live. — Anna M. Kentz.” Early in April, 1921, the defendant, James M. Kentz, came to the farm with several other men by direction of Anna M. Kentz and ejected the plaintiff and his family from the farmhouse and at the same time removed his furniture therefrom. It is admitted that this was done: the justification being that notice had been given to the pláintiff to leave the premises and that he had refused so to do. The alteration alleged to have been made in the lease was denied by Anna M. Kentz, although she admitted the postcript was in her handwriting. The verdict of the jury shows however that th'e plaintiff’s allegation on the subject was believed. This fact being established the plaintiff was in possession with the permission of the defendant, Anna M. Kentz. She received a portion of the crops for the year after her father died, and to that extent recognized the tenancy of the plaintiff. *19 It is contended by tbe appellants that tbe addition to the-lease if signed by Anna M. Kentz was invalid because not under seal and because it purported to grant a term during tbe life of tbe grantor, and much of tbe argument of tbe appellants is devoted to tbe consideration of tbe nature of tbe plaintiff’s tenure, assuming tbe change to have been made as claimed by bim. Tbe remainder of tbe argument is directed to a discussion of tbe competency of evidence admitted relating to tbe extent of tbe plaintiff’s damage. We think it unnecessary to consider tbe question whether a grant of tbe land during tbe life of tbe life tenant required a seal, and if granted for that period whether tbe instrument was a deed of conveyance as distinguished from a lease. Tbe writing added by tbe life tenant at tbe time tbe lease was changed in some inconsiderable respects was sufficient to create an interest in tbe land in tbe plaintiff as tenant, and was in effect an adoption by Anna M. Kentz of tbe lease theretofore existing between tbe plaintiff and bis father. Tbe evidence was directed to tbe injury resulting to tbe plaintiff from tbe disturbance of that tenure. The farm was a large one, in good condition with suitable buildings, near a large town, and was adequately stocked. Tbe testimony offered was within tbe limits indicated in Cornelius v. Lytle, 246 Pa. 205. Tbe witness bad before bim a consideration of tbe uncertainty of tbe crops, tbe expense and labor necessary to tbe operation of tbe farm; be bad been a tenant thereon for several years and bad worked as a farmer for a longer period — be was a competent witness therefore. No evidence was offered in contradiction of that presented by bim and we are unable to say that tbe testimony was not admissible in support of tbe claim. No one could know better than tbe plaintiff what tbe annual value of tbe farm was to bim for be bad bad tbe experience of years in carrying it on as a tenant under a lease less favorable to bim than was that which tbe defendant, Anna M. Kentz, undertook to give. Tbe soundness of the conclusion of tbe witness as to tbe *20 amount of Ms injury was subject to analysis under cross-examination. The loss of Ms opportunity was evident; the elements entering into Ms damage were in the mind of the witness and before him as he presented Ms evidence. Testimony in such cases is necessarily more or less indefinite. It must be an estimate, based on experience in the prosecution of the industry of husbandry. The evidence was open to contradiction by witnesses having knowledge which qualified them to testify on the subject, but this opportunity was not taken advantage of at the trial.

We are not able to reach a conclusion that judgment should have been entered for the defendants non obstante veredicto. It will be noted that the plaintiff was in possession of the premises under a tenancy recognized by the owner of the life estate. The disputed paper supported the occupancy of the plaintiff. Nor is there ground for reversal because of the refusal of the court to grant a new trial. The verdict was not clearly excessive under the evidence and the discretion of the trial judge exercised on a rule for new trial is not reviewable except when an abuse of discretion clearly appears. We conclude therefore that the appeal is not sustained. The judgment is affirmed.