Opinion by

Plaintiff sued on an admitted claim for food products sold and delivered. Defendant pleaded a set-off and counterclaim for damages upon a prior purchase of cheese which he alleged did not meet the description of that contract. The verdict was for $500 in defendant’s favor. Plaintiff moved for judgment n. o. v. on the whole record and for a new trial. Judgment was refused but a new trial was granted on the ground that defendant “did not produce sufficient satisfactory evidence of the extent and amount of the loss” under the applicable measure of damages. The court held that defendant had an enforceable claim against the plaintiff if properly proven. It is true that a trial court has discretionary power and is not bound to enter judg *270 ment n. o. y. in every case when convinced that binding instructions should have been given at the trial. Bunn et al. v. Furstein, 153 Pa. Superior Ct. 637, 34 A. 2d 924. But a party to an action who, as a precaution, moves for a new trial, and a new trial is granted, is not denied an appeal (Act of April 9, 1925, P. L. 221, 12 PS 682) from a resultant order refusing his motion for judgment n. o. v. Giving the defendant the benefit of the most favorable inferences from the testimony, there is nothing in the whole record of this case which gives legal support to defendant’s right of action on his counterclaim. The lower court therefore is chargeable with an abuse of discretion in granting a new trial, and with reversible error in refusing plaintiff’s motion for judgment n. o. v. March v. Phila. & West Chester Trac. Co., 285 Pa. 413, 132 A. 355; Fornelli v. Penna. R. R. Co., 309 Pa. 365, 164 A. 54.

These are the material facts established by the verdict : Plaintiff, a manufacturer’s agent and importer, by written contract, sold to defendant 50 cases of Argentine Romano Cheese , 7 to 8 months old, at $53 per 100 kilos, f. o. b Buenos Aires. Upon arrival of the shipment in Philadelphia on August 8, 1941, defendant paid a sight draft drawn upon him by the plaintiff for the full purchase price, in accordance with the terms of the contract. Thereupon, after clearing United States Customs, the entire shipment of 5,703 pounds of cheese was delivered to defendant and was accepted by him. Argentine Romano type cheese was used as a substitute for Italian Romano during the period when exports from Italy were closed. In proper condition, it is a hard dry cheese suitable for grating. Defendant on inspection following delivery discovered that the cheese was not more than five months old and was too fresh; that it had a bad odor and was green with mold. He however, did not then attempt to reject the shipment and request a return of the price paid as he might have done. Foell Packing Co. v. Harris, 127 Pa. Superior Ct. 494, *271 193 A. 152.- The sale had been negotiated by one Basso, plaintiff’s soliciting or selling agent. Two days after delivery defendant complained to Basso as to the quality of the cheese and was advised by him to put it in cold storage to condition it. Two weeks later upon further complaint from defendant Basso told him that he would report the matter to “Mr. Schroeder” (of plaintiff corporation) ; shortly thereafter Basso told defendant that Schroeder would not make any adjustment. In March 1942 at Basso’s suggestion defendant went to plaintiff’s office in New York and renewed his demand on Schroeder for an adjustment as to price. This was refused, on the ground that defendant had not registered his complaint with plaintiff in accordance with the terms and conditions of the written contract. Defendant had not read his contract and did not notify plaintiff, in writing, of his complaint as to variance between what he contracted for and what was delivered, until about eight months after accepting delivery of the shipment. He never offered, in writing or otherwise, to submit the dispute to arbitration. Under “Conditions of Sale” the written contract provided that all claims must be made in writing within eight days after arrival of the shipment and disputes between the parties shall be submitted to arbitration demanded by the buyer within that period of eight days. 1

*272 The above provisions of tbe contract were reasonably necessary for tbe protection of plaintiff, characterized in tbe agreement as “agent of tbe seller” in Argentina. Altbongb acting for an undisclosed principal (at tbe trial plaintiff offered to name tbe shipper but defendant’s objection to tbe offer was sustained) plaintiff on its sight draft collected tbe full purchase price. Plaintiff was entitled to know promptly before remittance to bis principal of any claims chargeable to the shipper. Tbe parties reduced their sale agreement to writing; both are bound by its provisions and defendant is barred by bis failure to assert bis claim as be was obliged to do under tbe terms of bis contract. Defendant did not make a claim on plaintiff in writing until long after be bad accepted tbe shipment and exercised dominion over tbe goods and be never made a demand for arbitration. Arbitration is a convenient method of settling disputes both of law and fact with finality between a buyer and a seller of merchandise. Pierce Steel Pile Corp. v. Flannery, 319 Pa. 332, 339, 179 A. 558. And tbe public policy of this State is to give effect to such agreements. Kuzmen v. Kamien et ux., 139 Pa. Superior Ct. 538, 12 A. 2d 471. Where the parties to an executory contract agree to submit disputes, arising in tbe performance of it, to arbitration, they are bound by their contracts (Kaisha, Ltd. v. Ewing-Thomas Corp., 313 Pa. 442, 170 A. 286) even though tbe arbitrators are not named in tbe agreement. Britex Co. Ltd. v. Schwab & Sons Inc., 139 Pa. Superior Ct. 474, 12 A. 2d 473; Katakura & Co. Ltd. *273 v. Vogue S. H. Co., 307 Pa. 544, 161 A. 529. The contract in question is specific in designating the procedure by providing that the arbitration shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York. It must be liberally construed to give effect to the primary intention of the parties. Britex Co. Ltd. v. Schwab & Sons, Inc., supra.

Basso was no more than plaintiff’s selling agent. He solicited the sale but the contract was entered into by defendant with plaintiff, and was executed on plaintiff’s behalf by Henry W. Schroeder. As selling or soliciting agent Basso’s authority was limited and he did not have the power to alter or waive the conditions of the written contract. Doll et al. v. Ryder et al., 118 Pa. Superior Ct. 7, 178 A. 320. Notice to him that the quality of the cheese did not satisfy the description of the contract was not notice to plaintiff. Restatement, Agency, §268; Foell Packing Co. v. Harris, supra. Defendant’s complaints to Basso did not estop plaintiff from holding defendant to the conditions of the contract. Dougherty, Tr., et al. v. Thomas Exr., 313 Pa. 287, 169 A. 219.

Where a contract is in writing and its terms are not in dispute its construction is a matter of law for the court. Hay v. Pgh. Lodge No. 46 L. O. O. M., 137 Pa. Superior Ct. 205, 8 A. 2d 434; Simsohn v. Wetter, 111 Pa. Superior Ct. 523, 170 A. 422; Baldwin v. Magen, 279 Pa. 302, 123 A. 815. Whether an estoppel results from established facts is also a question for the court. Gen. Elect. Co. v. N. K. Ovalle Inc., 335 Pa. 439, 6 A. 2d 835. Under the proofs in this case the court should have found that defendant was barred by his failure to comply with the condition of his contract. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for binding instructions should have been granted. Defendant admits the validity of the charges of $730.03 against him, upon which this suit was brought; plaintiff is entitled to judgment in that amount.

*274 Order reversed and judgment is directed to be entered for plaintiff against the defendant n. o. v. for $730.03 with interest from April 1, 1942.