Silverman v. Sobel
Silverman v. Sobel
Opinion of the Court
Opinion by
This assumpsit action to recover rentals paid by plaintiff in excess of the legally allowed maximum resulted in a finding by a judge sitting without a jury in favor of the plaintiff-tenant, in the sum of $302.57 ($191.40 being the amount of the overcharge during the period for which recovery could be had under the Statute of Limitations, $36.17 interest and $75.00, plaintiff’s attorney’s fee). The defendant’s (landlord’s) motion for judgment n.o.v. was refused and judgment was entered on the finding, from which this appeal was taken. The plaintiff, under a written lease dated October 13, 1949, became the tenant of the apartment in question. The lease did not contain any covenant obligating the landlord to provide furniture or furnishings. Prior to the plaintiff’s tenancy, the premises had been rented to W. L. Reams and it was classified with the Area Rent Director as a furnished apartment. The landlord never filed a written report with the Area Rent Director showing a decrease in the furniture or furnishings. On June 9, 1952 the Area Rent Director issued an order adjusting the rent from $78.00 per month to $54.60 per month, the reason on the order being “Apartment is unfurnished.” There was nothing in the files of the Area Rent Director to indicate when the apartment became unfurnished. The order of the Area Rent Director was not expressly made retroactive nor was there anything in the order to indicate that the landlord was being relieved of the duty to make a refund to the tenant. On August 29,-1952 plaintiff instituted this action in the lower court. Plaintiff testified that no furniture had ever been provided. The defendant testified that the furnishings
Appellant argues that the lower court did not have jurisdiction and that the plaintiff may not recover any rent in the absence of a specific refund order made by the Area Rent Director. His argument is based upon the fact that the Area Rent Director’s order decreasing the maximum rent was issued and effective as of June 9, 1952. He argues that “If the plaintiff feels that she is entitled to any refund for any possible overcharges prior to the effective date of the order for rent decrease, the appropriate procedure to effect a modification or change in said effective date, would have been an appeal to the Emergency Court of Appeals.” He further argues that by failing to take such an appeal, plaintiff failed to exhaust all administrative remedies provided in such instances, and, therefore, defendant cannot now ask the court to modify the order. This would be a good argument if plaintiff were endeavoring to change the Area Rent Director’s order. As we comprehend this matter, the plaintiff is entirely satisfied with the order as written. She only asks the lower court to apply the regulations issued under the Housing and Rent Act to the order of the Area Rent Director. By virtue of the authority of an Act of Congress, known as The Housing and Rent Act of 1947, Public Law 129, 80th Congress, and The Housing Rent Regulation issued June 30, 1947, effective July 1, 1947, as amended, issued under the authority of said Act, the Office of Price Stabilization issued Housing Rent Regulation RR1, imposing maximum
Section 825.5 (b) : “Decreases in minimum services, furniture, furnishings, equipment, and space. (1) Requirements for petition and order, or report. The landlord shall until the accommodations become vacant, maintain the minimum services, furniture, furnishings and equipment as required under section 825.3, unless and until he has filed a petition to decrease the services, furniture, furnishings, or equipment and an order permitting a decrease has been entered thereon. When the accommodations become vacant, the landlord may on renting to a new tenant decrease the services, furniture, furnishings, or equipment below the minimum, within 10 days after so renting the landlord shall file a written report with the area rent director showing such decrease.”
Section 825.5 (b) (2) : “Adjustment in maximum rent for decreases on or after April 1, 19J¡8. The order on any petition under this paragraph (b) may require an appropriate adjustment in the maximum rent; and any maximum rent for which a report is required by this paragraph (b) may be decreased in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 (c) (3). If the landlord fails to file the report required by this paragraph (b) within the time specified, or decreases the services, furniture, furnishings, or equipment without an order
We do not believe that the order of the Area Rent Director would have to state that it is retroactive. This is at complete odds with the wording of regulation 825.5 (b) (2) which expressly provides that the excess rental shall “be refunded to the tenant within 30 days after the date of issuance of the order unless the refund is stayed. ...” This section authorizes the director to relieve the landlord of the duty to refund if the director finds that the landlord was not at fault in failing to file a written report with the Area Rent Director showing such decrease in furnishings. The regulations above mentioned provide for the retroactivity of the order. The purpose of the order adjusting the maximum rent is to fix the amount of overcharge. When this is done the regulations become self-operative. Should we decide otherwise, the landlord would be permitted to profit from his own failure to comply with the law. Furthermore, the statute provides, 50 U.S.C.A. App. §1895, “(a) Any person who demands, accepts, receives, or retains any payment of
Appellant also argues that inasmuch as the order of the Area Rent Director was not expressly made retroactive, its effect was to relieve the landlord of making any refund of the amounts in excess of the legal maximum. Regulation 825.5 (b) (2) provides: “If the director finds that the landlord was not at fault in failing to comply with this paragraph (b), the order may relieve the landlord of the duty to refund.” No such finding Avas made and the order does not expressly relieve the landlord of his duty to refund. A mere inference based upon- the effective date of the
Judgment affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.